論一般法律原則作為國(guó)際法淵源的正當(dāng)性及必要性

[摘 要]《國(guó)際法院規(guī)約》第38條第3款規(guī)定一般法律原則為國(guó)際法的淵源之一，但是與國(guó)際條約和國(guó)際習(xí)慣不同，一般法律原則存在的模糊性導(dǎo)致其作為國(guó)際法淵源之一的地位受到質(zhì)疑。例如，一般法律原則與國(guó)際習(xí)慣在概念上相混淆;一般法律原則起源于國(guó)際條約和國(guó)際習(xí)慣;一般法律原則在國(guó)際法院很難適用等。但其實(shí)，這些質(zhì)疑主要來(lái)源于對(duì)一般法律原則含義的錯(cuò)誤解讀。擬著重分析一般法律原則的含義，從而反對(duì)對(duì)一般法律原則的質(zhì)疑，進(jìn)而證明一般法律原則作為國(guó)際法淵源之一的正當(dāng)性和必要性。

[關(guān)鍵詞]一般法律原則;國(guó)際法淵源;國(guó)際法院規(guī)約

[中圖分類號(hào)]D99

[文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識(shí)碼]A

[文章編號(hào)]2095-3283（2019）10-0034-04

On the Rationality and Necessity of General Principles of Law as One of the Sources of International Law

Liu Fengtao

（East China University of Political Science and Law， Shanghai 200063）

Abstract： Article 38， paragraph 3 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates that the general principles of law are one of the sources of international law. However， unlike international treaties and customary international law， general principles of laws role as one of the sources of international law is always challenged due to its ambiguity. For example， general principles of law are conceptually confused with customary international law; general principles of law originate from international treaties and customary international law; it is difficult for International Court to apply general principles of law. In fact， these questions mainly come from the misunderstanding of the meaning of general principles of law. This paper is going to emphatically analyze the meaning of general principles of law， with a view to opposing challenges against general principles of law， and to further justifying the rationality and necessity of general principles of law as one of the sources of international law.

Keywords： General Principles of Law; Sources of International Law; Statute of the International Court of Justice

[作者簡(jiǎn)介]劉峰濤（1995-），男，漢族，浙江臺(tái)州人，碩士研究生，研究方向： 國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)法。

一、背景及問(wèn)題的提出

《國(guó)際法院規(guī)約》第38條第3款明確規(guī)定“一般法律原則為文明各國(guó)所承認(rèn)者”為國(guó)際法院裁判案件之依據(jù)。而根據(jù)國(guó)際法學(xué)者們一致達(dá)成的合意，該第38條即為國(guó)際法淵源的權(quán)威說(shuō)明。有鑒于此，一般法律原則當(dāng)然地成為了國(guó)際法的第三大淵源。但是，與條約和習(xí)慣不同，一般法律原則“帶有如自然法般的抽象性色彩”，其地位和作用也因此遭受部分學(xué)者的否認(rèn)。有些學(xué)者認(rèn)為，條約和習(xí)慣與一般法律原則是包含和被包含、根本和從屬的關(guān)系，因此將一般法律原則排除在國(guó)際法淵源之外。例如，周鯁生便認(rèn)為一般法律原則需要公認(rèn)成為條約和習(xí)慣后方可成為國(guó)際法淵源?！?br>