Differentiation and Reorganization: the Evolution and Prospect of the Geopolitical Pattern in Eurasia

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union， Russia regarded Eurasia as a “close neighbor” and a “special interest zone”， highlighted Eurasian countries in its foreign policy， and integrated the region through Commonwealth of Independent States （CIS）， Eurasian Economic Union （EEU） and Collective Security Treaty Organization （CSTO）. But over the years， countries in Eurasia have embarked on different development paths， showing different development prospects. The Ukrainian crisis that broke out in February 2022 accelerated the geo-fission and reorganization in Eurasia， and the post-Soviet strategic landscape has become increasingly difficult to be observed as a unified region. Since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis， the Eurasian region has been clearly divided into three major camps. With the Ukrainian crisis persisting， the geopolitical pattern of Eurasia will be further divided and reorganized， and the trend of “de-Russianization” and diversification will continue.

Three Major Plates of Eurasian Geostrategic Pattern

In recent years， influenced by multiple factors such as the Ukrainian crisis， the geopolitical pattern of Eurasia has been divided into three plates with their distinctive characteristics， namely the European plate， the South Caucasian plate and the Central Asian plate.

I. The European Plate

The European plate mainly includes Russia， Belarus， Ukraine and Moldova. This sector is mired in the Ukrainian crisis， and the evolution of the conflict will determine the development prospects of the four countries in this region.

Russian economy has withstood more than ten rounds of Western sanctions， and its GDP grew by 3.6% in 2023. In March 2024， Putin was re-elected with nearly 87% of the votes， showing the unity and resilience of Russian society. How to end the special military operations in Russia’s favor is the priority of Putin’s new term. Putin reshuffled the government， made personnel adjustments to some key positions， and put forward development goals for 2030 and 2036. In terms of foreign relations， Russia has substantially adjusted its foreign policy， confronted “unfriendly countries” in an all-round way， strengthened cooperation with “friendly” countries， “turned east and south” in diplomacy， actively expanded international engagements and made efforts to break the isolation and blockade inflicted by the West.

Belarus and Russia are deeply intertwined. After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis， the relationship between Belarus and the West was completely broken. Together with Russia， Belarus was severely sanctioned by the West， and the integration of Russia and Belarus was noticeably accelerated. In February 2024， Belarusian President Lukashenko said that Belarus is now “at the epicenter of a serious military and political crisis， and some forces are trying to involve Belarus in the war”. In view of the great changes in the external environment， Belarus issued a new version of the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine in April 2024， highlighting the importance of the Russian-Belarusian alliance.

The conflict with Russia is nothing less than a total disaster for Ukraine， and its economy has been hit hard. 60% of its budget expenditure depends on external assistance， more than half of its energy infrastructure has been destroyed， and the task of national reconstruction is arduous. The biggest loss is in the population. When the Soviet Union disintegrated， there were more than 51 million people in Ukraine. Before the crisis， its population dropped to more than 41 million， and it is estimated that it would only be 29 million by the end of 2023. According to the World Bank’s estimation， the Ukrainian crisis has turned the clock back on the country’s development by 15 years.

After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis， Moldova’s “pro-West and anti-Russia” policy was strengthened， with itself joining the ranks of sanctions against Russia and withdrawing from various cooperation mechanisms of the CIS. On 20th October 2024， Moldova will hold a presidential election. With the election evolving and the Ukrainian crisis persisting， the situation in Moldova and the Transnistria region is likely to intensify.

II. South Caucasian Plate

The South Caucasian plate has undergone most significant changes since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In September 2023， Azerbaijan launched the “war on terror”， which solved the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in one fell swoop and the regional strategic pattern has been reshuffled. After the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue， Armenia and Azerbaijan accelerated the negotiation of a peace treaty， and faced a historic opportunity to reach the treaty. After the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan， the relationship between Armenia and Turkey， the “historical nemesis”， may be improved， and the pair has basically reached a consensus on opening their borders. While easing relations with neighboring countries， Armenia’s relations with Russia have deteriorated sharply. Armenia holds that Russia， as an ally， did not play the “role of protector”. Armenia basically suspended involvement in CSTO， and constantly strengthened cooperation with the United States and the West while engaging ever more closely with Ukraine.

The overall situation in the South Caucasus has moved from confrontation in the past to relief， but the process will be tortuous and peace will not be accomplished overnight. Recently， the relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia has seen ups and downs. The negotiation of a peace treaty between the two has encountered some resistance， and tensions have emerged in the border areas. There is also instability in Georgia. The ruling party “Georgian Dream” made strenuous efforts to pass the Transparency of Foreign Influence bill in parliament， which triggered a large-scale domestic protest. But on the whole， these events will not affect the general trend of reconciliation in the South Caucasus.

III. Central Asian Plate

The situation in the region of Central Asian plate is generally stable and the economy continues to develop. Kazakhstan has implemented the “New Kazakhstan” reform plan and Uzbekistan is also promoting the “New Uzbekistan” reform. Other Central Asian countries have also put forward medium and long-term development goals. Central Asian countries have held six rounds of regional leaders’ meetings and the environment of regional cooperation has been significantly improved. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have completely solved the border issue， and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are also sparing no effort to solve the border issue through negotiations.

Central Asia has actively developed its relations with the major countries in and outside the region， and the countries concerned have either established or upgraded the level of cooperation mechanisms in Central Asia. In May 2023， the first China-Central Asia Summit was held in Xi’an， which symbolized a new era for the cooperation between China and Central Asia. In June of the same year， the second EU-Central Asia Summit was held in Kyrgyzstan. In mid-September， US President Biden held the first “C5+1” meeting with the heads of states of the five Central Asian countries in New York. At the end of September， the first “Germany-Central Asia Summit” was held in Berlin. In November， the tenth summit of the Organization of Turkic States was held in Kazakhstan， and a number of cooperation documents were adopted. Since 2024， UK Foreign Secretary and South Korean President have visited Central Asia in succession， and major country diplomacy in Central Asia has flourished.

The Deep-seated Reasons for the Division in Eurasia

Although Russia has been trying to reintegrate Eurasia， the division in Eurasia has been going on for nearly 30 years， and the Ukrainian crisis has accelerated this process.

First， the relationship between Eurasian countries and Russia is complex. The tendency of “centrifugation” persists， and some countries have outstanding contradictions with Russia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union， the relationship between countries in Eurasia and Russia was complicated. Russia called countries in Eurasia its “close neighbors”， while these countries had complicated feelings towards Russia. On the one hand， they all depended on Russia to varying degrees in economy and security. On the other hand， issues such as sovereignty and territory remain highly sensitive for them， and it is worried that engaging with Russia will undermine their national sovereignty and independence. After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis， Russia’s neighboring countries have become increasingly worried about Russia， and believe that Russia has an attempt to “restore its sphere of influence.”

There are also many clashes among Eurasian countries due to borders and historical issues， and some countries have deep grievances with Russia. In 2008， conflict broke out between Georgia and Russia， and finally Abkhazia and South Ossetia became independent and recognized by Russia. In 2022， conflicts between Ukraine and Russia over historical， linguistic and territorial issues eventually deteriorated into the Ukrainian crisis， resulting in mass casualties， and the two countries ended up nemeses. Moldova and Russia are constantly at loggerheads over the issue of Transnistria region. These contradictions and conflicts have affected Eurasian integration process spearheaded by Russia. After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis， Ukraine announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia on February 24， 2022， and later gradually abolished the cooperation agreement under the framework of the CIS Free Trade Area. Moldova has basically stopped its activities in the CIS， and plans to leave the CIS before the end of 2024. As an organization for “civilized divorce” of the participating republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union， CIS has a lot of overlap with the Eurasian Economic Union and CSTO in membership after some member countries withdrew one after another， and its development prospects are in doubt.

Second， the economies of major countries in Eurasia are mainly based on the export of raw materials， without being combined into a regional industrial chain and thus lacking the foundation of economic integration. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union， when economic globalization was developing rapidly， all countries in the world joined the “torrent” of economic globalization to varying degrees， but Eurasia was caught up in “separation”. The countries concerned focused on economic sovereignty and independence， and the traditional economic ties were interrupted， which led to major economic recession. At present， the economic development mode of Eurasian countries is mainly based on the export of raw materials， which places them at the low end of the global industrial chain， and the region has not formed a relatively complete and complementary industrial cooperation network.

In Eurasia， Russia is in the leading position in both population and economic scale， and its economic aggregate accounts for about 70% of that of the region. Although Russia has been promoting regional economic integration and the construction of CIS free trade area for many years， pioneering the establishment of Eurasian Economic Union， the economic integration in Eurasia has achieved limited progress. The main reasons are as follows. On the one hand， some countries refuse to join Eurasian Economic Union. On the other hand， the Russian economy has insufficient ability to promote the development of regional countries. Russia’s investment in other Eurasian countries is limited. Russia has invested the most in Kazakhstan， but it also lags behind the United States and the West， ranking only as the fourth largest investor in Kazakhstan. Russia pledged to help Kyrgyzstan build hydropower stations， but later dropped out. At present， only the member countries of Eurasian Economic Union are deeply dependent on Russian economy. For example， Belarus relies on Russian energy supply and market， and workers from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan need to work in Russia. Other countries are not closely tied with Russia in economy.

Third， Russia and the West are engaged in a fierce geopolitical game in Eurasia， and the diplomatic priorities of Eurasian countries have been evidently divided. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union， the United States and the West regarded Russia as the loser of the “Cold War”， and made continuous efforts to undermine Russia’s strategic advantages and curb its development. Since Putin came to power， Russia has gone from chaos to order， put forward the goal of great power rejuvenation， regarded Eurasia as the strategic support， and put on a fierce geopolitical competition with the West， which propelled the Eurasian region towards deep polarization. Under the infiltration and wooing of the West， Ukraine， Moldova， Georgia and other countries gradually “move away from Russia and towards the West” and regard joining the EU or NATO as a strategic goal. In particular， after the Crimean incident in 2014， Ukraine changed its previous policy of not joining NATO， and in 2019， it wrote NATO entry into the constitution， which caused strong anxiety in Russia. Russian foreign minister Lavrov said at a meeting in September， 2022 that “the West has been dividing and disintegrating the former Soviet countries， causing us to quarrel with each other. One clear result is that Ukraine has been turned into an anti-Russian bridgehead”. Although there are still some obstacles and challenges， Moldova and Georgia’s strategic goal of going West remains unchanged. In Eurasia， except Belarus’s “one-sided” allying with Russia， all other countries basically pursue a “pluralistic and balanced” diplomacy. While maintaining cooperation with Russia， they are also strengthening cooperation with countries outside the region. Central Asia has established various levels of “C5+1” mechanism， and strengthened cooperation with the United States， the European Union， Turkey， India， Japan and South Korea.

Fourth， the Ukrainian crisis has accelerated the process of regional differentiation. The most direct consequence of the Ukrainian crisis is that Ukraine and Moldova have sped up efforts to go West， and the two countries have obtained the status of EU candidates. Ukraine hopes to join NATO as soon as possible， and Moldova does not rule out amending the constitution and explicitly proposes the possibility of joining NATO. After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis， no country in Europe and Asia firmly supported Russia except Belarus， and most countries pursued a neutral stance. Russia’s close allies in CSTO， such as Kazakhstan， not only failed to support Russia， but also felt much worried about Russia’s military operation. The relationship between Armenia and Russia also soured tremendously.

Prospects for the Evolution of Geopolitical Landscape in Eurasia

In the face of the great changes unseen over the past century， Eurasia has experienced a new round of turbulent adjustment， and the Ukrainian crisis has accelerated this process. The geopolitical competition between Russia and the West may lead to new turmoil， and the geopolitical pattern in Eurasia will become more diverse.

First， the Eurasian region will be further divided. The European plate has split into two camps with Ukraine and Moldova joining the Western camp， and Russia and Belarus deeply bound. Against the background of the prolonged crisis in Ukraine， Ukraine and Moldova will go further on the westward path. Although the two countries cannot join NATO for the time being， Ukraine has signed security guarantee agreements with many European countries， which will provide Ukraine with long-term security assistance. Moldova also signed a “defense and security partnership pact” with the European Union to comprehensively deepen military and security cooperation. At the same time， Russia-Belarus cooperation will be further strengthened. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus， and Belarus has become Russia’s only “strategic fulcrum” in the West. In the future， the theme of the European plate remains to be conflict and confrontation.

In the South Caucasus， Azerbaijan has got staunch support from Turkey， and its cooperation with Russia is getting ever closer. The EU also needs Azerbaijan’s energy. After the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue， if Azerbaijan and Armenia can reach a peace agreement， the geostrategic pattern of the South Caucasus will change dramatically and the influence of Azerbaijan will increase tremendously. At the same time， the linkage between the South Caucasus and Central Asia has been significantly enhanced. The trade volume between Kazakhstan， Azerbaijan and Georgia has expanded rapidly. The three countries are making every effort to speed up the construction of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route （TITR）. Europe also plans to invest 10 billion euros in this project， and the construction of TITR has been significantly accelerated. Russia and Azerbaijan are also promoting the construction of the International North-South Transport Corridor. In the future， the South Caucasus is expected to serve as a bridge and channel connecting the east， west， north and south of Eurasia.

After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis， the United States and the West sped up their efforts to cozy up to countries in Central Asia. Politicians from the United States and Europe frequently visited Central Asia. Turkey and other countries outside the region also strengthened their cooperation with Central Asia. All countries in Central Asia pursue a “pluralistic and balanced” foreign policy and leave their doors wide open to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with all parties， thereby safeguarding their sovereignty and security. In the future， the diversified landscape in Central Asia will be further consolidated.

Second， the process of “de-Russianization” will continue to advance. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union， newly independent countries are faced with the arduous task of establishing their own states independently. All countries attach great importance to sovereignty and territorial integrity， strengthen their own historical and national identity， bolster their dominant national status， and promote the use of their own national languages， trying to get rid of the historical imprint of Russia and the Soviet Union through continuous “de-Russianization” efforts. At present， in Eurasia， the status of the Russian language is declining. It is the official language in law only in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Belarus， Russian is the second national language. In Tajikistan， Russian is the language of inter-ethnic communication. However， there are no legal provisions on the status of Russian in other countries， and Russian is nothing more than an ordinary foreign language in these countries. The number of middle school students studying Russian in Eurasian countries， especially in Ukraine， Turkmenistan and Georgia， has greatly decreased.

EEU and CSTO also face many challenges. Russia and Belarus will remain to be under Western economic sanctions for some time to come. As other EEU member countries have not imposed sanctions on Russia， they still maintain close economic cooperation with Russia. Western countries keep putting pressure on these countries， asking them not to help Russia circumvent Western sanctions， or they will be subject to secondary sanctions， which makes these countries more cautious in their trade with Russia. In the background of Western sanctions， the circulation of production factors such as goods， capital， services and personnel proposed by EEU faces many problems. CSTO is also facing challenges. First， Armenia has basically suspended its activities in CSTO. Second， CSTO is a military and political alliance with the principle of collective defense. However， in the Ukrainian crisis， other allies did not explicitly support Russia. In particular， after the Ukrainian army raided Kursk， none of the Russian allies stepped forward， showing the internal problems faced by the organization.

Third， the game among major powers may trigger new turmoil. Russia and the West will continue to be involved in a fierce game in Eurasia， which may aggravate regional tensions and catalyze new turmoil in some countries. In October 2024， Moldova will hold a presidential election. Pro-Western and pro-Russian factions are bound to launch a new round of battle， which may aggravate domestic turmoil and possibly invite conflict between Moldovan authorities and the Transnistria region. Georgia will also hold parliamentary elections in October 2024， and the political struggle in the country will intensify. The South Caucasus occupies an important strategic position， and is in the transition period of the regional landscape. It’s therefore almost certain that external forces will increase their presence in the region， and regional stability faces many problems and challenges.

Fourth， China has become an important force to promote the prosperity and stability in Eurasia. Eurasia is a priority in China’s neighborhood diplomacy. Over the past 30 years， China’s relations with countries in Eurasia have developed smoothly， and China has become an important force in maintaining the prosperity and stability of Eurasia. The year 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Russia. Sino-Russian relations have experienced ups and downs， and the two countries have identified the way to get along with each other by drawing from historical experience. At present， Sino-Russian relations are at their best in history. China and Russia have deepened cooperation in various fields on the basis of equality， mutual trust， mutual respect and win-win cooperation. The high-level development of Sino-Russian relations is also conducive to the stability of regional and international situations. In May 2024， President Putin visited China. The comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Russia in the new era was further consolidated. and cooperation in various fields will thrive even further.

In May 2023， the China-Central Asia Summit was held in Xi’an， and the relationship between China and Central Asian countries entered a new era. At present， China has established comprehensive strategic partnerships with the five Central Asian countries， with Kazakhstan as a “permanent comprehensive strategic partner” and Uzbekistan as an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partner”. China and Central Asian countries respect and support each other. China firmly supports Central Asian countries in safeguarding their sovereign independence and territorial integrity. Central Asian countries also firmly support China in safeguarding its core interests and support China on issues related to Taiwan and Xinjiang. Central Asia has become a pioneer and demonstration area for jointly building the Belt and Road. China and Central Asian countries enjoy broad prospects for cooperation in energy， infrastructure construction， industrial investment， agriculture， environmental protection， cultural exchanges and other fields， and China will make even greater contributions to the development and stability of Central Asia.

South Caucasus is not adjacent to China， but the cooperation between China and South Caucasus has also developed rapidly in recent years. Georgia attaches importance to “eastward” diplomacy and regards China as an important partner. In July 2023， China and Georgia decided to upgrade bilateral relations to strategic partnership. In early July 2024， President Xi Jinping met with Azerbaijani President Aliyev， and China and Azerbaijan announced the establishment of a strategic partnership.

Ukraine is also an important partner of China in Eurasia， and China established strategic partnership with Ukraine in 2011. After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis， China always stood on the side of peace， actively promoted peace talks， and created conditions for the peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis. China has put forward the four principles， called for joint efforts in four areas and shared three observations on Ukraine. In February， 2023， China issued the document titled “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis”， putting forward 12 proposals， which was highly appreciated by the international community. In May 2024， China and Brazil jointly issued the “six common understandings” on a political solution to the Ukrainian crisis. China supports the timely convening of an international peace conference recognized by Russia and Ukraine， in which all parties participate equally and all peace proposals are discussed fairly. China supports the formulation of a balanced， effective and sustainable European security framework， has sent a special envoy that has already engaged in several rounds of shuttle mediation， and will play an active role in a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis as soon as possible.

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Ding Xiaoxing is Director of the Institute of Eurasian Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations