Global Security Initiative and China-Africa Security Cooperation

Against the backdrop of changes unseen in a century unfolding at an unprecedented pace， Africa is faced with unprecedentedly complicated security challenges. On the one hand， the existing security challenges within Africa are compounded by emerging challenges; on the other hand， ever deteriorating external security environment is imposing a kind of structural pressure on Africa. Faced with the bitter reality of increasing deficits in peace and security globally， Chinese President Xi Jinping has put forward the Global Security Initiative （GSI）， providing the international community with a new type of international public goods in the field of security. As a critical pillar of China-Africa community for security， the GSI will contribute to the building of a high-level China-Africa community with a shared future and stand as a regional and sectoral example of the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.

More Complicated Security Challenges in Africa

Since the end of the Cold War， security situation in Africa has roughly undergone four stages： in the 1990s， the outbreak of accumulated internal conflicts as the bipolar structural pressure exerted by the United States and the Soviet Union disappeared dragged Africa into “a decade of civil war”; after the 9·11 Attack in 2001， global counter-terrorism efforts became a new structural pressure that forced Africa into “a decade of counter-terrorism”; after the 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East， security threats arising from the grassroots became a new source of security challenges and Africa entered a new “decade of grassroots”; entering the third decade of the 21st century， Africa is faced with the complex interplay of internal and external as well as existing and emerging security crisis， mainly manifested in five aspects.

First， violence is more grass-rooted. Since 2011， Africa has witnessed the fundamental changes of security challenges， with non-structural violence replacing structural violence as the dominant challenge. The so-called structural violence refers to top-down violence mainly initiated by the state and its agents， such as conflicts between government forces and rebels and government repression of civilians. Correspondingly， non-structural violence refers to bottom-up violence initiated by the society， with such typical examples as political protests， social hatred and violence. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset （ACLED）， between 1997 and 2008， the share of non-structural violence in all security incidents in Africa was consistently below 30%， dipping to the bottom of less than 20% in 2002. Ever since 2011， non-structural violence has become the major source of security challenges in Africa， with its share in all violent incidents rocketing from 35.05% in 2010 to 49.77% and still standing at above 40% till today. In the meantime， public self-defense efforts， especially by local militias， have become major players in non-structural violence， with Burkina Faso’s Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland （VDP） being the most typical example.

Second， terrorists and bandits are collaborating. The counter-terrorism missions carried out by the United States in the Middle East resulted in expanding terrorist activities across the African continent. For example， among the top 10 countries in the world faced with the most acute threat of terrorism， only two African countries， Somalia （ranked 5th） and Nigeria （8th）， were listed in 2011; and only Nigeria （2nd）， Egypt （7th）， and Somalia （8th） were listed in 2015. But by 2020， the number of African countries in this list has increased to 5， including Somalia （3rd）， Nigeria （4th）， Burkina Faso （6th）， Mali （7th） and Mozambique （9th）. Deaths caused by terrorism worldwide in 2023 increased by 22% compared with 2022， the highest record since 2017. Sub-Saharan Africa still ranks top in the world， with the Sahel region witnessing the most deaths， where almost half of terrorist attacks in Africa took place and 26% of global terrorist attacks happened. Burkina Faso is the country suffering the most severe threat of terrorism. Terrorist groups in Africa are gradually penetrating into communities and functioning more and more like organized crime groups. The two may coexist， collaborate or even converge. This means that “the collaboration between terrorists and bandits” is becoming normal in Africa， with such criminal activities as kidnapping， gold mine robbery， illegal economy and collecting protection fees becoming the means of survival for terrorist groups.

Third， security threats are crossing borders and networked. Only 35% of Africa’s 170，000-kilometer international borders have been officially delineated， with a total of 109 disputed sections. Permeable borders mean not only highly convenient interference among neighboring African countries， but also rampant opportunities for terrorism， organized crime and illegal economy among others. Therefore， since 2020， previously highly-dispersed terrorist activities in Africa have gradually concentrated in the border area of Kenya and Somalia in East Africa， the Lake Chad region in Central Africa and the Sahel region in West Africa. From a broader perspective of conflicts or instability， security challenges in Africa are mainly concentrated in four cross-border regions： Mano River region， the Horn of Africa， the Great Lakes region， and the Sahel-Maghreb.

Fourth， coups are more frequent. Western countries tend to observe the new wave of coups in Africa since 2019 through the lens of “democratic regression”. But this round of coups features anti-colonial endeavors and indicates that African countries are unaccustomed to the “Western democracy”. This new round of coups since 2019 were mostly launched on the pretext of the incapability of the incumbent governments to fulfill their missions of security， governance， and development， receiving the acquiescence and approval of the general public. A series of public opinion polls conducted by the Afrobarometer show that although democratic politics have received popular support， the public who are suspicious of the proper functioning of democracy is also poised to tolerate coups. According to a survey in 2022， the public （67%） who oppose military rule has decreased by 8 percentage points， with 53% believing that military intervention is acceptable in the event of elected officials abusing their power; The proportion of young people aged between 18 and 35 who hold this view is even higher （56%）. Only 43% of the public believe that the armed forces should not interfere in politics whatsoever.

Fifth， interference is conducted in the form of aid. In sync with the wave of coups in Africa since 2019， France was forced to withdraw troops from Mali， Burkina Faso and Niger and the United States was forced to suspend its security cooperation with Niger. Such setbacks were highly relevant to the excessive direct military intervention by Western powers， with France’s decade-long Operation Barkhane as a typical example. In this context， the United States and Europe initiated a strategic transformation to disguise their military intervention in Africa with the so-called “security aid”. By integrating civilian aid with military aid and covering the entire process from conflict management， stable transformation to peacetime construction， western countries attempt to beautify their military intervention in Africa with “security aid”.

The Substance of Global Security Initiative as a Public Goods

China has long been a supporter of Africa’s cause of peace and security. For the African continent suffering from deteriorating deficit in peace and especially security， the GSI proposed by China is a timely and targeted international public goods， which is reflected in the concepts， substances and institutional arrangement of the GSI.

First， the GSI is committed to the vision of common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security， representing an important thoughtful global public goods in the security domain that China offers to the international community， including Africa. Firstly， the trend of security challenges in Africa featuring more grass-rooted violence， cross-border and networked crime and intervention in the form of aid has amplified the relationship between homeland security and national security， internal security and external security as well as individual security and common security. The new situation further highlights the importance of common security for African governments and people， neighboring countries as well as African countries and partners outside the continent. Secondly， the trend of security challenges in Africa featuring the collaboration between terrorists and bandits， cross-border and networked crime and frequent coups indicates the necessity of striking a comprehensive balance among people’s security， political security， economic security and national security， which is the key to achieving long-term peace and stability in Africa. Thirdly， the interplay of internal and external as well as existing and emerging security challenges in Africa indicates the importance of collaboration between the state and the people as well as African countries and the international community to Africa’s peace and security. Fourthly， such deep-seated root causes of Africa’s security challenges as deficits in development， insufficient financing and poor governance necessitate the adoption of the vision of sustainable security. The China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035 released in 2021 emphasizes the need to uphold the common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security concepts and also to advance governance experience sharing and enhance the alignment of development philosophy and concepts. This shows Africa’s recognition of the vision of common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security advocated by the GSI.

Second， the GSI explicitly identifies 20 priorities， offering the international community， especially Africa， an important global public goods in the security domain. Firstly， China supports African countries in strengthening their ability to safeguard peace independently and supports addressing African problems in the African way. China pledged a total of US$100 million in military aid to the African Union for supporting the construction and operation of the African Peace and Security Architecture （APSA）. The China-Africa Peace and Security Cooperation Fund was launched during the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation （FOCAC）. China has carried out security cooperation with many African countries and helped these countries improve their security governance capabilities through police and military training. Secondly， China not only advocates for the international community’s provision of adequate， predictable， and sustainable financial support for African Union （AU）-led peace support operations， but also makes efforts to increase its financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations. Before 2000， China’s financial contribution to UN peacekeeping operations was less than 1%， but by 2021， China pays 15.2% of the UN peacekeeping budget. In 2016， China initiated and financed the launch of the China-UN Peace and Development Fund. As of the end of 2023， the Secretary-General’s Peace and Security Sub-Fund has kicked off a total of 83 projects， with actual investment of US$59.6 million， a significant portion of which has been invested in Africa. During the Beijing Summit of FOCAC held in September 2024， Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged Africa RMB 1 billion yuan of grants in military assistance to support Africa’s military development. Thirdly， China will contribute to the resolution of hotspot issues in Africa， especially by advancing the implementation of the “Vision of Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa”， promotes the institutionalization of the Horn of Africa Peace Conference and creates demonstrative cooperation projects. Fourthly， the GSI also focuses on security cooperation to address such non-traditional challenges as terrorism， climate change， cyber， biology and emerging technologies， helps Africa accelerate the implementation of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and promote sustainable security through sustainable development.

Third， the GSI proposes five platforms and mechanisms of cooperation， offering the international community and Africa an important institutional public goods in the security domain. Such five platforms and mechanisms of cooperation cover global mechanisms with the United Nations at the core， China’s overall diplomatic mechanisms towards developing regions， China-proposed the GSI mechanisms， as well as the existing security dialogue mechanisms dedicated to specific fields. Among them， Africa is a critical player in such mechanisms as the United Nations， the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum， the Horn of Africa Peace Conference， and the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum （Lianyungang）.

While offering global public goods in the security domain to the international community and especially Africa， the GSI also draws on the experiences and lessons of other global public goods of its kind. Since the end of the Cold War， security aid has gradually become the dominant approach of supplying international security public goods and the United States， France and the United Kingdom are among the best performers. The Chinese government officially adopted the term “security aid” for the first time in 2018 and pledged to carry out 50 security aid projects in Africa. In mid-2021， China pledged another 10 projects in Africa. In the meantime， aware of insufficient practice of Western countries， China provides African countries with whole-process security aid covering conflict management， stable transformation and peace support on the premise of coordinating security and development. The best demonstration of China’s commitment is the Action Plan adopted at the 2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit.

The GSI achieves innovation in two aspects on the basis of drawing on the supply of existing international security public goods， especially the security aid by Western countries. Firstly， the GSI stays committed to the vision of common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security， further summarizes the “theory on Peace through Development”， emphasizes the reasonable balance among development， stability/security and reform/governance， and believes that “development is the master key to all problems”. For example， the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan （2025-2027） stresses that China supports the initiative of AU to develop a program focused on the peace-security-development tripartite nexus. Secondly， adhering to the principle of openness and inclusiveness， China welcomes and looks forward to the engagement of all parties to jointly expand the substance of the initiative and proactively explore cooperation in new formats and in emerging sectors.

GSI Contributes to the Peace and Security of Africa

The 2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit is of strategic importance in building on past achievements and charting the future， adopting action plans for China-Africa cooperation in the next three years and making a medium and long-term plan for China-Africa cooperation in the upcoming decade. Building a China-Africa community for security caters to the need of Africa and is especially benchmarked to the AU’s Agenda 2063： Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan （2024–2033） to achieve comprehensive synergy of peace and security cooperation between China and Africa. The community also meets another strategic goal of the same Implementation Plan， which is to build a fully functional African Global Partnership Platform.

The AU’s Agenda 2063： Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan puts forward peace and security goals （ASPIRATION 4） that cover two strategic objectives. The strategic objective 4.1 （Enhance Peace and Security） sets a specific objective that “all risks to peace and security in Member States are identified and addressed timeously”， with seven concrete measures; the strategic objective 4.2 （Foster Stable and Peaceful Africa） contains two specific objectives that “all guns are silenced and all forms of militia groups are eliminated” and “the Africa Peace and Security Architecture and other continental frameworks on peace security and stability are fully operationalized”， which are further broken up into seven and four concrete measures respectively.

Taking the successful convening of the 2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit as an opportunity， China and Africa will take the initiative to push forward the comprehensive alignment between the GSI and the peace and security goals laid out in the AU’s Agenda 2063： Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan， join hands to advance the modernization of peace and security and build China-Africa security cooperation into a regional and sectoral demonstrative project of the GSI.

First， priorities in China-Africa peace and security cooperation should be systematically set with a forward-looking assessment of global security governance situation as well as Africa’s challenges and capabilities of response. We should focus on the following aspects： firstly， China and Africa will intensify exchanges of ideas. Guided by the vision of common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security， parties concerned will respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African countries， follow the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter， take into serious consideration of the legitimate security concerns of African countries， peacefully resolve differences and disputes through dialogue and consultation and reasonably coordinate traditional and non-traditional security-related issues. Secondly， China and Africa are committed to upholding the central role of the United Nations and jointly work on conflict prevention， construction of peace and security architecture， post-conflict reconstruction， peacekeeping operations and peace support in Africa within the framework of the United Nations. Thirdly， China and Africa will focus on arms control， especially the control of small arms and light weapons and support the implementation of Africa’s initiative to “silence all the guns”. Fourthly， China supports addressing African problems in the African way and Africa’s security capacity building and provides necessary and beneficial security aid. Fifthly， the two sides will explore solutions to hotspot issues with African characteristics， facilitate the political resolution of hotspot issues in the African region and forge demonstrative cooperation projects of the GSI.

Second， in view of the three-year short-term action plan and the decade-long medium and long-term implementation plan， China and Africa identify concrete measures for peace and security cooperation within the framework of the GSI. The first is the alignment of philosophies， focusing on item ii （putting in place mechanisms for entrenching a culture of peace in all development processes）， item iii （including ethnic minority groups in peace and security matters）， item iv （mainstreaming peace education in curricula of schools） and item vi （enhancing the role of women in peace and security） of the strategic objective 4.1 of the AU Agenda 2063： Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan.

The second is conflict mediation， focusing on item v of the strategic objective 4.1 （promoting reconciliation and mediation， including the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms） and item ii of strategic objective 4.2 （implementing measures aimed at mediation， dialogue， negotiation and peaceful co-existence） of the AU’s Agenda 2063： Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan， with the purpose of achieving peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and consultation. Highlighting mediation， political consultation， and inclusive dialogue is the approach with Chinese characteristics to resolving hotspot issues， which is in line with the concept of resolution through dialogue to solve African problems in African ways.

The third is to support the building of Africa’s independent security capacity， including controlling small arms and light weapons and solving African problems in the African way. The focus is on specific measures such as item vii （implementing mechanisms for conflict prevention and addressing and combating terrorism） of strategic objective 4.1， item i （tightening national laws against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons） and item vi （strengthening the African Standby Force to have rapid deployment capability） of the strategic objective 4.2 as well as item ii （providing incentives for compliance with full implementation of APSA by AU Member States， RECs/ RMS） of strategic objective 4.2 of the AU’s Agenda 2063： Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan.

The fourth is institutional alignment. It means to support such mechanisms as the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum and the Horn of Africa Peace Conference within the framework of the GSI， which is also in line with item vii （strengthening the cooperation among AU Member States and international institutions on peace and security matters） of the strategic objective 4.2 of the AU’s Agenda 2063： Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan.

Third， the FOCAC enables the coordinated development of the GSI， Global Development Initiative， Global Civilization Initiative and the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI）， which contributes to the sustainable development and security in Africa.

On the one hand， efforts will be made to synergize and amplify the functions of the BRI and the three Global Initiatives and simultaneously advance the sustainable development and sustainable security in Africa through the full coverage of peace and security， economic growth， social development and civilization exchanges. The first is to connect the BRI and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development， with focus on supporting Africa’s economic transformation， industrialization， agricultural modernization， infrastructure construction and the African Continental Free Trade Area （AfCFTA）. China and Africa will also be deepening exchanges and cooperation on security guarantees for the joint development of the BRI， so that Africa becomes a beneficiary of the “theory on peace through development”. The second is to connect the Global Development Initiatives with African social development plans. By placing the emphasis on reducing poverty， narrowing inequality， tackling climate change and improving public health， they will cement the social foundation for sustainable security in Africa. The third is to connect the Global Civilization Initiative and the African Citizen Empowerment Action. In this regard， priorities will be given to programs for “women empowerment” and “youth development” and efforts will be made to advance the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 （2000） [on women and peace and security] and the United Nations Security Council resolution 2250 （2015） [on youth， peace and security] in Africa. The fourth is to proactively carry out Africa-engaged trilateral security cooperation in the principle of “being proposed， approved and dominated by Africa” and explore task division and cooperation in the supply of international security public goods.

On the other hand， efforts will be made to synergize and amplify the finance of the BRI and the three Global Initiatives. A solid foundation of financial sustainability will be built for Africa’s security governance by fostering Africa’s capability for self-driven development in sustainable security. The first is to adhere to the strategic guidance of the implementation of the three Global Initiatives， take the high-quality development of the BRI as the practice platform， give full play to the “hematopoietic” function of the BRI and solidify the financial foundation for implementing the GSI. The second is to connect the BRI and goals of establishing four African Financial Institutions by 2033， including African Central Bank， Monetary Fund， Pan-African Investment Bank and Pan-African Stock Exchange， as put forward by the AU’s Agenda 2063： Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan. Such institutions will boost Africa’s own development capacity and achieve the virtuous cycle of sustainable development and sustainable security.

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Zhang Chun is Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations of Yunnan University