基于混合策略博弈的生鮮企業構建標準化冷鏈監管研究

曾世華 吳婷

摘要：隨著近年來國內一系列冷鏈物流標準和冷鏈食品標準的制定和出臺，加快企業冷鏈標準化實施和監督正在提上日程，針對生鮮企業不一定會構建標準化冷鏈，生鮮食品企業構建標準化冷鏈需要考慮實施成本和政府檢查的處罰成本，政府監督需要考慮檢查效果和檢查成本，需要建立政府和生鮮食品企業之間的良性博弈關系。文章采用完全信息靜態博弈方法，構建政府監管機構與生鮮企業之間的混合策略模型，提出政府應適當加大處罰力度、適當提高抽樣檢查的概率、構建政府和企業的責任損失機制、制定高效低成本的檢查措施等策略。

Abstract： With the formulation and promulgation of a series of domestic cold chain logistics standards and cold chain food standards in recent years， accelerating the implementation and supervision of enterprise cold chain standardization is on the agenda. For fresh food companies， it is not necessary to build a standardized cold chain. The establishment of standardized cold chains for food companies requires consideration of implementation costs and government inspection penalties， government supervision needs to consider inspection results and inspection costs， and the establishment of a benign game relationship between the government and fresh food companies. The article uses a complete information static game method to build a mixed strategy model between government regulatory agencies and fresh enterprises， and proposes that the government should appropriately increase penalties， appropriately increase the probability of sampling inspection， construct a responsibility loss mechanism for the government and enterprises， and formulate efficient low-cost inspection measures and other strategies.

關鍵詞：政府檢查;生鮮食品;標準化冷鏈;混合策略博弈

Key words： government inspection;fresh food;standardized cold chain;mixed strategy game

中圖分類號：F274? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 文獻標識碼：A? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 文章編號：1006-4311（2020）20-0116-03