A study of Indirect Speech Act from the perspective of cognitive linguistics

Abstract：The use of indirect speech act is a very common phenomenon in daily communication and English teaching. A lot of attention has been paid into the matter of the interpretation of indirect speech act since it was first put forward by J. Austin， British philosopher， and was developed by J. Searle who is Austins student. Different linguists apply various methods and theories to explain the importance and effectiveness of indirect speech act in interpersonal communication. Although the previous studies of indirect speech act focus on different aspects， no theories can interpret the implementation of the indirect speech act thoroughly and systematically. On the basis of existing researches， this thesis studies the indirect speech act from the perspective of cognitive linguistics， to make it better use in both daily communication and English teaching.

Key words： indirect speech act； cognitive perspective； English teaching

1. Introduction

This thesis adopts a cognitve approach to analyze and interpret the indirect speech acts， the language phenomenon that always attracts a lot of attention in the research of pragmatics.

Traditional inference theory offers a large body of fruitful ideas in acknowledging the role of the extralinguistic and situational context in utterance interpretation. However， it does not satisfactorily account for the fact that people usually comprehend the indirect speech act， in particular the conventional ones， readily and naturally without any noticeable effort. Furthermore， it does not systematically specify the kinds of inference patterns that are needed for interpretation of indirect speech acts， or how the mechanism involved is called up.

Then the thesis demonstrates that above deficiencies can be successfully overcome by the cognitive study under-discussion. The conceptualization of speech acts is reflected in the idealized cognitive model and a set of metaphors linking the physical action domain with the language domain in terms of the concept of force. This framework of speech acts comprises the speech act scenario which is just the result of abstracting away from a number of stereotypical everyday life situations， and which is referenced by the event scenario on account of the fact that speech act is a kind of special event.

2. Austin's contribution to SAT

Speech act theory originated in Austin's work in the 1940's and 1950's， while was published in 1962， under the general title of "How to do things with words" . One of his central beliefs he summed up is： speech can be analyzed from the perspective not just of what information it communicates， but of what it acts it performs. He insists that "the total speech-act in the total speech-situation is the only phenomenon which in the last resort， we are engaged in elucidation"（Austin，1962：147）.

2.1 Constatives and Performatives

Philosophers of logical positivism has focused their interest on true-value of sentences， i.e. how to judge whether a sentence is true or false. They believed that a statement was used either to state a fact or to describe a state of affairs. Austin（1962） argued that these utterances could not be tested for their truth of falsity， but the speaker wants to perform actions. Thus he made a distinction between what he called "constatives" and "performatives". Constatives are statements that either state or describe， and they have the property of being either true or false. Performatives， by contrast， have no true-value； they are used to do something， rather than to say that something is or is not the case. Roughly speaking， we can say that his distinction between constative and performative utterances， as it was originally drawn， rested upon the distinction between saying something and doing something by means of language.

2.2 The classification of speech act

Austin（1962） shifted from his dichotomy between performatives and constatives to a general theory of illocutionary acts. Austin isolates three basic senses in which saying something one is doing something， and hence three kinds of acts that are simultasneously performed：

（i） lucutionary act： the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense and reference

（ii） illocutionary act： the making of a statement， offer， promise， ect. in uttering a sentence， by virtue of the conventional force associated with it （or with its explicit performative paraphrase）

（iii） perlocutionary act： the bringing about of effects on the audience by means of uttering the sentence， such effects being special to the circumstances of utterance

2.3 The classification of illocutionary act

After classifying the three kinds of speech acts， Austin focused his study on illocutionary acts， and tentatively proposed grouping them into five major classes according to their illocutionary forces：

（i） Verdictives： typified by the giving of a verdict by a jury， arbitrator or umpire. Examples of verbs in this class are： acquit， estimate， describe， assess， reckon， etc.

（ii） Exercitives： the exercising of powers， rights or influence. "It's a decision that something is to be so， as distinct from a judgement that it is so： it is advocacy that it should be so， as opposed to an estimate that it is so； it is an award as opposed to an assessment； it is a sentence as oppposed to a verdict" （Austin. 1962：155）. Some examples of verbs are： appoint， order， advise， warn， announce， etc.

（iii） Commissives：" The whole point of a commissive is to commit the speaker to a certain course of action"（Austin， 1962：157）. but it also includes declarations of announcements of intention. Some examples are： promise， guarantee， bet， oppose， swear，etc.

（iv）Behabitives： a miscellaneous group concerned with attitudes and social behavior， e.g. reaction to other people's behaviour and fortunes. Examples of verbs in this class are： apologize， thank， congratulate， sympathize， bless， etc.

（v）Expositives： "used in acts of expositon involving the expounding of views， the conducting of arguments， and the clarifying of usages and of references"（Austin， 1962：161）. Examples are： argue， affirm， illustrate，state，deny，ete.

3. Traditional discussions about indirect speech act

3.1 Notion of indirect speech act

Austin mentions indirect illocutionary acts in How to Do things with Words in claiming that one performative utterance can be used as an indirect means to perform another act. The existence of the fact that a recognized convention guarantees the uptake in the case of the indirect speech act was presented by Austin， but how uptake is secured when an ordinary speech act involving no extra-linguistic convention is preformed indirectly？ This question is answered by Searle. He finds that sometimes"one illocutionary act can be performed indirectly by way of performing another". He calls it indirect speech act. Searle argures that an indirect speech act invloves the performance of two distinct speech acts， each having a different illocutionary point. There is a literal illocutionary point， as well as an intended illocutionary point that is conveyed by means of the literal illocutionary point. He investigates the case in which the speaker utters a sentence and means not only what he says literally but also something more.

Language researchers have developed two main approaches with respect to the issue of the interpretation of indirect speech act. The first is "idiom theory"， which suggests that the intended illocutionary force is recognized directly. The second approach， "inference theory"， focus on the inferential processing assumed to occur when a hearer recognizes the intended illocutionary point. Both approaches will be covered in some detail here because they raise important issues regarding language comprehension.

3.2 Idiom Theory

Idiom theory proposes that indirect speech acts are all in fact idioms for or semantically equivalent to the direct speech acts that indirect speech acts intend to perform. For example， the utterance of "Can you hand me the book？" is an idiom for I（hereby） request you to hand me the book. Forms like Can you + VP are idioms for I request you to VP in just the same way as kick the bucket is an idiom for die. That is to say， they are not compositionally analyzed， but merely recorded in the lexicon as a whole.

According to Holtgraves， there is a certain intuitive appeal to idiom theory especially for utterance like. On hearing such utterance， it is suggested that we usually do not go through the time-consuming process of understanding the literal meaning， rejecting the literal meaning due to its inappropriateness in context， and then recognizing the intended meaning. When someone says， "Can you pass the salt？"it is usually the case that we know right away that it is a request for the salt.

3.3 Inference Theory

Disagreeing with the idiom theory which considers the indirect meanings as idiomatic expressions and are non-compositional， inference theory， which includes Searle's classical analysis of indirect speech acts， assumes that an indirect remark has both a literal illocutionary force as well as an intended， indirect illocutionary force， and the identification of the speaker's communicative intention requires some inferential work on the part of the hearer.

In his analysis， Searle has not mentioned the conditions， which must be fulfilled in order to perform an indirect speech act. The question， which he raises for himself， is： hwo can a speaker say one thing and simultaneously mean another thing. He believes the answer of this question involves the solution of another problem： how is it possible for the hearer to understand the indirect speech act when the sentence he hears means something more. He explains this in terms of the speech act thory， the cooperative principle discussed by Paul Grice， the mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer's ability to make inferences. He claims that two things are crucial： first， a strategy for establishing the existence of another illocutionary point beyond the illocutionary point contained in the meaning of the sentence； second， a device for finding out what this another illocutionary point is. The first is established by the Cooperative Pringciple shared by the speaker and hearer and the second is derived from speech act theory together with the background information.

3.4 Problems of traditional inference theory

In general， experiments and research on figurative language have not supported the traditional inferential processing model of indirectness in the following respects. First， consider the claim that a non-literal meaning is the result of an inference process. An inference process is time consuming， and so people should take longer to comprehend figures of speech than their direct equivalents. But numerous studies have demonstrated that an inference process is not required for these forms. People simply do not take more time to understand the meanings of figurative expressions than they do literal equivalent expressions.

Second， in the standard inferential processing models， activation of the literal meaning of remark is obligatory and must occur prior to the recognition of the non-literal， of figurative meaning.

4. Cognitive foundations of indirect speech act

4.1 Cognitive pragmatics

Along with the advancement of the science of cognition， studies of cognitive syntax， cognitive psychology， and cognitive anthropology， etc. have been carried out by a lot of scholars. Among those， cognitive linguistics...is an approach to language that is based on our experience of the world and the way we perceive and conceptualize it. In other words， it attempts to find out the common law of the cognitive-related process of language production， acquisition， employment and understanding， as well as to build up the reasonable model of the linguistic knowledge structure concerned with mind and memory. In general， it is the study of language with regard to information organization， information processing， and information transmitting.

4.2 The Interactive Character of speech acts and cognition

The interactional aspect of speech act has been hinted by Austin himself at the bilaterality of performatives such as betting， whereby the addressee's uptake is necessary for the performance of the act. The point is highlighted by Clark in claiming that speech acts are inherently joint acts， and there can be no communication without listeners taking actions too--without them understanding what speakers mean. More important from an experiential point of view， Croft proposes an empirical based cognitive model of speech acts which is essentially interactional in taking into account the response of the address. This model also admits the conventionality of linguistic form to reflect function， or in other words， the conventionality of linguistic form to encode the manipulation of the propositional content of sentences.

4.3 The idealized cognitive model of speech act

Marmaridou claims that speech acts are better understood in terms of an idealized cognitive model that is socioculturally determined. Moreover， action scenes evoke and are evoked by lexical frames which may either in themselves perform a speech act， or may merely describe it. The former lexical frames are commonly called speech act verbs. These speech act verbs are space-builders in that they create a space in which a proposition is inscribed. In the absence of speech act verbs， which is more often the case， an utterance may be relativized to such a space in terms of an institutionally determined speech situation and the role of the interlocutors in it. In this case， the situation sets up this space pragmatically. Similarly， the conditions that must hold for the successful performance of a speech act are relativized to relevant institutional practices in corresponding spaces.

5. Cognitive analysis of Indirect Speech Acts

5.1 Essential Notions

5.1.1 Speech Act Metonymy

It is important to emphasis at this point that the notion of metonymy under discussion is viewed as one of the basic characteristics of cognition. It is claimed to be essentially a conceptual phenomenon which is part of our everyday way of thinking， is grounded in experience， is subject to general and systematic principles and structures our thoughts and actions. And according to Taylor， the essence of metonymy resides in the possibility of establishing connections between entities which co-occur within a given conceptual structure. While Radden and Kovecses claim that "Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity， the vehicle， provides mental access to another conceptual entity， the target， within the same idealized cognitive model". In the example of "Washington is insensitive to the needs of ordinary people， the 'Washington' serves as the vehicle for accessing 'the government of the United States' as the target.

5.1.2 Speech Act Scendrio

Scenario is a cognitive model that is designed particularly for event sequences in which one stage is often a prerequisite for the next stage. The most famous example is the emotion scenario， which involving the stages of cause， actual emotion， control， loss of control and resulting action.

Before looking into the issue of 'speech act scenario'， we will present the'action scenario' because of the assumption that speech acts are certain special acts， and therefore share certain properties with ordinary non-linguistic actions.

5.2 Cognitive Interpretation of Indirect Speech Acts

5.2.1 Metonymic Link Force

Panther and Thornburg formulate the hypothesis as follows： The more distant a speech act scenario component is from the CORE， the weaker is its ability to evoke the scenario metonymically. In other words， the more conceptually removed a component is from the CORE， the less likely that component will be in a stand for relation to the scenario as a whole.

According to above hypothesis， we would expect that the presupposition need for X to be done， located at the periphery of the Directive Scenario， would have weaker ability to stand for a request than the component S's reasons for wanting X to be done， which， in turn， would be less likely to stand metonymically for a request than more central components， S wants H to do X for S. To illustrate this hypothesis， we analyse some exchanges that are experts of business negotiations

5.2.2 Metonymic Reasoning

In the discussion above， it is claimed that speech acts are well understood as action scenarios， and each of the components of the scenarios can evoke the whole scenario， in other words， parts of the scenario can bear metonymic relations to the whole of the scenario， i.e. "stand for" it. Hence the metonymic linkage between secondary speech act and primary speech act of the utterance make it possible for the address to comprehend the indirect meaning， i.e. primary speech act naturally and quickly without any noticeable effort. Moreover， it is assumed that metonymic reasoning and schematic structure， apart from accounting for indirect speech acts， also contribute to the study of pragmatic inferencing， conversational coherence， discoursal continuity and so on. Many articles concerned with such issues are presented in various academic journals.

5.3 Conceptual Inference Schema

In the model proposed by Panther and Thornburg above， indirect speech acts are explained in terms of a metonymic operation in which one phrase of the action scenario is highlighted and thus metonymically stands for the whole scenario. The cognitive motivation of indirect speech acts and their dependence on social convention have been further supported by psycholinguistic experiments. Reporting on a number of experiments concerning indirect requests， Gibbs claims that the speaker plans his request as part of a transaction of goods in conversation. To get the addressee to 'submit the goods'， in other words， to comply with the speaker's desires， they have to deal with the main obstacles to the compliance of their requests by designing the request around such obstacles. The addressee is expected to metonymically infer what is desired from the potential obstacle to their compliance that the speaker focuses upon by his utterance

6. Conclusion

Traditional inference theory offers a large body of fruitful ideas in acknowledging the role of the extralinguistic and situational context in utterance interpretation. However， it does not satisfactorily account for the fact that people usually comprehend the indirect speech act， in particular the conventional ones， readily and naturally without any noticeable effort.

This thesis adopts a cognitve approach to analyze and interpret the indirect speech acts， the language phenomenon that always attracts a lot of attention in the research of pragmatics. Furthermore， it does not systematically specify the kinds of inference patterns that are needed for interpretation of indirect speech acts， or how the mechanism involved is called up.

Then the thesis demonstrates that above deficiencies can be successfully overcome by the cognitive study under-discussion. The conceptualization of speech acts is reflected in the idealized cognitive model and a set of metaphors linking the physical action domain with the language domain in terms of the concept of force. This framework of speech acts comprises the speech act scenario which is just the result of abstracting away from a number of stereotypical everyday life situations， and which is referenced by the event scenario on account of the fact that speech act is a kind of special event.

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作者簡介： 李冰（1990.1.30），女，遼寧阜新人，碩士（在讀碩士研究生），研究方向：英語教學。