Fritz Machlup's Verdict on the Economic Value of the Patent System and the Chinese Economic Reality

Abstract：A \"verdict\"on the economic value the patent system by the US economistFritz Machlup published in 1958 stillhas animportant impactonassessing the effects thepatent systemon economic developmentbyintellectual property scholars worldwide.Thiscontribution analyses Machlup's studyas is in the light subsequent US global legal economic developments.Machlup's assssment was examined based on empirical data generated bythe US Bayh-Dole type legislation as regards the translation basicresearch into innovative products processes.Moreover，it analyses the impact thenew world economicorder instituted inthe framework the World Trade Organization （WTO）matorilyrequiring efective patent protection inall WTO Member States on the economic development developing emerging economies.The case China，which adopted its first Patent Law in 1984，is addressed inthe context Machlup's verdict inlight the subsequent economic，scientific technological development that country.Concluding thoughts consider today's value Machlup's \"verdict\".

Keywords： patents; economic development; innovation; Chinese experience

CLC： D923 DC： A Article：2096-9783（2025）04-0121-0

（20 \"http:// Economists havean image practicality worldliness，but we are basically storytellers，creators make-be lieve economic systems. \"http:// （

RobertLucas，NobelLaureate in economics1995

1 Introduction

In1958，The SubcommiteeonPatents，Trademarks Copyrights theCommiteeon theJudiciary the United States Senate published its Study No.15 \"An Economic Review the Patent System\"，prepared byFritz Machlup， DepartmentPolitical Economy，Johns Hopkins .Inhisconcludingremarks，PressorFritz Machluprendered the following \"verdict\" on the patent system：

\"If we did not have a patent system，it wouldbe irrsponsible，on the basis our present knowledge its economic consequences，torecommend institutingone.Butsincewe have hadapatentsystem along time，itwould be iresponsible，on the basis our present knowledge，to recommendabolishing it.This last statement refers toa country such as the United States America-not to a smallcountry not apredominantly nonindustrial country，where a different weight argument might well suggest another conclusion.\"

Machlup thenadded，interalia：

\"While economic analysis does not yet provide a sufficiently firm basis decisions choosing between 'allor nothing'，itdoesprovideasufficientlyfirmbasisdecisionsabout’alitlemoreoralitlelessvarious ingredients the patent system.Factual data various kinds maybe needed even bee some these decisionscan be made with confidence[1].

Machlup's \"economic verdict\" on the patent system has probably been one the most quoted referred to by legal economic scholars，particularly those skeptical thepatent system.Allhaveused PressorFritz Machlup as a particularly trusted prominent witness that no empirical evidence exists thateven countries with patent laws which have made rapid technical progress，did sobecause thepatent systemhas promoted the progress the technical arts the productivity the economy.Howcould then patents promote technology in less or even underdeveloped countries？

Those using Machlup's \"economic\" verdict on the patent system as pro that the patent system at best does not harm national economy，predominantlyrefer torelyonlyon the firstpart theabovequoted Machlup's conclusions.Mostthem do not discuss the entire Machlup study， theydo not test Machlup's verdict inthe light empirical data economic developments，which have taken place since 1958.

As stated predicted bythe Senate subcommiteeChairman Joseph C.O'MahoneyintheForeword the publication，Machlup'sstudy isan excellnt contribution to patent literature.It has certainly served the public interest. However，afterreading the study，onemayraise theuestion，whether itis \"aneconomicreview the patentsystem\"，or is itactually\"areview thehistoricaldevelopment patentlawstheeconomic theoryonthejustification the patentsystem—prepared byaneconomist\".Foran \"economicreview\"，one expects itbased itsfindings ontests economic effects the patentsystemasa whole inagivennationaleconomy，under givenpolitical，technologicalscientificcircumstances.Moreover，thatbasedonempiricaldata，itexamines theefectsidentifiedpatentlawrules， such as the term protection，abuse monopoly，compulsory licenses，or non-working.Fritz Machlup，however，did not fer any such empirical data.

Machlupcarefully reported on the legal development the patent system touched upon discussed in the pastapplied systems governmental awards to inventors as alternatives to the grant exclusive rights.Machlup reportedonsuch proposalsdiscussed，e.g.inthe USin1787，inRusiain1834，onthe system Inventor'scertificateinthe mer Soviet Union.Machlupcould/should have also referred to the French Patent Act January 7， 1791，which introduced in Articles5 6the inventorthe freechoice betweenrequesting the granta patent as exclusive righttoprotect the inventionor to transferthe inventionto the governmentinexchange areward（\"recompense\"）.Loi relative aux gratifications etsecours ?accorder aux artistes September12，1791，regulated rewards aids inventors2].InFrance the choice takingareward instead the patentasan exclusive right，never gained any importance inpractice.In the mer Soviet Union inventors certificateasarighttoareward but not to an exclusive right exploitation the protected invention，which was vestedtothe state couldthereebefreelyused by allstate ownedcompanies，long remainedtheonly reward theemployees working in state owned companies.Foreigners，individualsorlegal entities hadthechoice between patentsinventors certificates[3.Machlup，however，did notdiscuss theseaspects，butrather mainly focusedon economictheories concerningthe justification the value the patent system，which he eventually theoretically assessed.

Machlup's \"Economic Theory\" review started with a brief reference to opinions expressed in the 18^th the first half the 19^th century by Adam Smith， Jeremy Bentham，John Stewart Mill，in Engl， Jean Baptiste Say， in France，who accepted time limited monopolies awarded to inventors as necessary preferred over the govermmental bonuses as inventors rewards].

Much moreatention Machlup devoted to the plethora economic writings，which during the great patentcontroversy the second half the 19^th century discussed the economic justification the patent system. Based on those writings Machlup workedoutalistarguments，hecharacterizedas the \"naturallaw\"reward，the \"reward by-monopoly\"，the \"monopoly-prit-incentive\"， \"theexchange--secret\"theses，which since thenremained the mostreferred to，discused patent theories.He also insome detail discussed the arguments brought wardbytheir proponents dissenters during the period 1850-1878^?1?. Then，under the title \"Modern Economic Opinion： Since 1873\"[1]， Machlup ereda subtle thorough discussion how renown economists from Leon Walras in1898，to John Jewkes in1958 had asessd the economic value the patent systemll. Whetherby chance oronpurpose，Machlup concluded this section[1 with a long quotation from John Jewkes et al.， which starts ends as follows：

\"It is easy enough to perceive the weaknesses，even the absurdities， the patent system the reasons why conflictingopinionsasto itsvalueare tobefound.Itsveryprinciplesareparadoxical.Itis meant toencourage over the long period the widest possble use knowledge，but it starts out byconferring upon the inventor the power to restricttohimself the use thatknowledge.

It is almost impossble toconceive any existing social institution so faultyin so many ways.It[the patent system] survives only because there seems to be nothing better\"[4].

However，Machlup missed to quote what Jewkes etal.wrote immediately after the quoted sentence，namely：

\"And yet the individual inventor or the small producer struggling to market a new idea，the patent right is crucially important.Itistheonlyresource heposssses，fragileprecariousas his rights maybe，withoutthemhe would have nothing bywhich toestablishaclaim toarewardhis work.Thesalehis ideas directlyortheraising capital exploiting the ideas would be hopeless without the patent\"[4l.

For this modest contribution should suffice to mention that Machlup's references to the writings ，e.g. Ludwig vonMises，MichaelPolanyi，Edith T.Penrose，AlfredE.Khan，SirArnoldPlantorFriedrichA.Hayek，onthepatent system ¹¹¹ reveal an assessment the patent system very similar to that John Jewkes，et al.It requires some efts to readoutfrom Machlupthat，e.g.Friedrichvon Wieser，LeverettS.Lyon，Myron W.Watkins， Victor Abramson，as wellas AlbertF.Ravenshear，cautiouslyacknowledged somepositiveefectsthepatentsystem.EdKitch，whocharacterized Machlup'sverdict，as \"this tepidendorsement[thepatentsystem]\"，notedthatit \"reflectsaliteraturethat has seenthe patent system as atradefbetween the gains the patent incentivethe output constraints existing patents \"[5].

Machlup noted that the remarks he made on the patent system have been \"prompted by observations on the value （existing）patents to society\"，butthat \"several value concepts remaintobe discussed\".For that purpose \"a more patient discussion exposition，perhaps，anexplanationthe basic economicconcepts involved\"，wererequiredl. Machlupundertook thattask first byexplaining，the \"Private social cost value\"as basiceconomic concepts. Then he examined the following aspects：\"Thecost value inventions\"，\"Thecost value additional inventions\"，\"Shortening orlengthening theduration patents\"，\"Introductionorabolishing compulsorylicensing\"，\"Prohibiting or permiting restrictive licensing\"， \"Evaluation the patent system as a whole[1].

Inthe light the statement thelate NobellaureateRobert Lucas usedas the moto thiscontribution，Machlup'sremarksontheeconomists'observationsregardingthevalue（existent）patents，fallintothe\"storyteling\"category.His discusion，exposition explanation thebasic concepts involved in the patent system，make Machlup a \"creator make-believe patent system\".Notbeing qualified to either analyze in detail or assss Machlup's \"make一 believe patent system，\"Ishallimit myself to\"testing\"his final verdict，interalia，against the background the Chinese legal economic development since the publication Machlup's study.

2 Some ThoughtsPrior to \"Testing\" Machlup's Verdict

2.1 Theory v. Practice

For a pure lawyer，the ideato \"test\" what the great economist Machlup stated what has received that much long-lasting attntionseems notonlycourageous，even notserious ludicrous.However，Iamencouraged inthis endeavor emostbyMachlup'scommentthat hislaststatement，i.e.the \"verdict\"actualyrefers\"toacountry such as the US-nottoasmallcountrynota predominantly nonindustrial country，whereadiferent weight argument might wellsuggestanotherconclusion\"1l.What Machlup meant by this statement allows various interpretations.Forinstance，thatasmallorapredominantly nonindustrial countrycouldwell beresponsible toabolish anexistentpatent system，or notto institute one，if notyetin place？Machlupalso stated thatfactualdata various kinds maybe needed bee some decisions choosing between \"allor nothing\" could be taken[1].

A further encouragement my hazardous idea Ifind in a statement Ben Bernanke，Nobel laureate economics 2022amer Chair theUSFederalReserve Bank.Asked，if hewas confidentthat QE（Quantitative Easing）—the policy buying bonds to drive down long-term interest rates when short-term rates are already at zerowoulddothe job，Bernankeanswered： \"The problem with QEis it works in practice，butit doesn't work in theory\"l6l. Analysts seem to agree that the first round purchases in2Oo9 helped to avoid a catastrophic recesion buying government debt was a kind confidence trick or signaling device.More importantthan theamount assets bought were thecredibilityFed'scommitmenttodoing what it takes toget economyback ontrack.Inother words，thetrust the practice into the functioning the system despite its deficiencies eventually \"defeated\"theoretical arguments.

Despiteall the skepticismtheeconomictheory about the economic valuethepatent system its weaknesses to which Machluptheeconomic literature hereferred to refer，industry，individual inventors，public private research institutions，lastbutnotleast，governments，seemingly trusttheeconomicpotentials the patentsystem. A plausible theoreticalexplanation theacceptance patents inpracticeers Kitch'sundersting theprospect function patents.According to Kitch，\"Consideration the prospectfunction suggests that patents facing competition from altermative approaches to technologicalmarket problemmay infactbethe important class， hat such patents may permauseful socialfunction even though manyarelitle value to theirowners\"7l.They use itat the micro as well as at the macro-economic level.In the late 198Os，even skeptical economists agreed on the overall positive macro-economic effects patents other intellectual property rights in the context market economies. Althoughthe importance patents quite obvious reasons very much depends on the branch industry is highestated inthefield pharmaceuticals，ithasbecomeapparentwidelyacceptedthattheserightsconstituteafficient important incentive research innovation[8-11].

2.2 The Patent System as a Factor Globalized Economy

With the establishment the World Trade Organization （WTO）in 1994 theadoption the Agreementon TradeRelated AspectsIntellectual PropertyRights （TRIPS）asan integral part itslegal framework，Machlup'sverdict appears in anew light.In a globalized economy the requirement，that all WTO Members must bring their patent legislation in line with the matory TRIPS stards，constitutes a precondition anycountry to participate activelyin the global trade.Most importantly，theymust make available \"patents any inventions，whether products or processes，in allfieldstechnology，provided thattheyarenew，involveaninventivesteparecapableindustrialapplication\".Moreover，inallWTO Members，\"patent rights[mustbe]enjoyablewithoutdiscriminationas totheplace invention，thefield technology whetherproductsare importedorlocalyproduced\"（Article27（1）TRIPS）.Therebypatentsdefinedas exclusivepropertyrights theefects whichcanbe limitedonlyunderconditions setth inthe TRIPS Agreement （Artt28，30， 31）.Inother words，WTO Members must commit themselves tothose stards，irrespective their assessment the economic consequences the patent system.Thus，the WTO TRIPS rules make Machlup's alternative， \"all-or-nothing\"，practically obsolete.

Intellectual propertyrights，especiallypatents，have accruedanew economicrole.Apartfrom their \"classical\" role as potentialmeans incentivizing research development， innovation，primarily byattracting securingthenecessaryrisk investment，the \"merger\"internationaltrade with intelectual propertyrightsmadethelaer， including the patent system，an inescapable instrument an international market economy[12].

Because the economicefects involved，the TRIPSAgreement faced strong criticism from legal scholars economists.Keith E.Maskus，Jerome H.Reichman，SisuleF.Musungo，Graham Dutfield James Boyle suggested either，thatdevelopingcountries begiventheposibilitytothoroughlyevaluatetheirrealm interests，onthebasis the newly gained knowledge，oreven tocalltheentireconcept the system intoquestion3].Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz inan interview in 2O04 emphasizedthat，\"the structure intellctual property rights has become so extreme that it is harmful to society especially harmful to developing countries\".He stoodup an institutional mechanism， \"so that wecango back recognize the need developing countries， instance，to have some technology transfer\"[4l. However，neither the legal scholars，nor Joseph Stiglitz based their criticismonanyempirical data although they were available but revealed exactlythe opposite.National economies developing countries had growth rates on average at least 6% higher than that industrialized states.According to statistics The International MonetaryFund （IMF），the growth rates even inthe Sub-Sahara the Middle East，until then，consideredas thelosers globalization，werehighestinthelastthirtyyears.ChinaIndiaexperiencedbreathtaking influxeigndirectinvestment （FDI） establishment thousseign productionRamp;D sites，obviously involving substantial transfer knowledge technology[13，15].

3 Testing Machlup's \"Verdict\"

3.1USBayh-DoleTypeLegislation

Machlup died in January 1983.Thus，hehad no knowledge the economic externalities the WTO TRIPS Agreement 1994 willeventually generate.However，he probablywasaware the Bayh-Dole the Stevenson

WydlerTechnologyActs，bothadoptedin1980bytheUSlegislation （Public Law96-517，PublicLaw96- 480）.The first introducedtheposibility private parties toretain patentrights viaa\"title incontractor\"policy，i.e. smallbusineses non-pritorganizations，includinguniversitiescouldretain intellctualpropertyrights toresults from publiclyfunded research.The second required thatfederal agencies administering research establish an Office Research Technology Application （ORTA）at all government operated or contractoroperated laboratories with an annual budget more than US $＼$ 20Million.Likewise，MachlupwasawarethereasonsthenewUSlegislation.Namely，patentsgrantedonpubliclyfundedresearch，couldbeneitherexclusivelylicensed，norasignedtoprivatebusiness.Bytheend197Os，the25O00to30000governmentownedpatentswerelessthan5 ＼%$ licensed.In other words，these patents were not manageableas truly exclusive rights.Business was not interested in non-exclusive licenses，lacking guaranty securing returnon investmentincase successful exploitation.Thus the respective inventions，although patented，not translated intoinnovative productsproceses[5l.The lack exclusivity，deprecated byeconomists，obviouslyplayedacrucialroleas meanstranslation.Whatthe USBayhDolelegislatordid insystemic terms the patent system was，（re）institutingtherationale the patent system，i.e.the exclusivity the patent rightinan importantarea national economy，where ithad beencurtailedbylegislative limitations.To paraphrase Machlup，the US legislatorconsidered irresponsible，basedonempirical findings，nottoreactivate patents issued to publicly funded research institutions as truly tradable exclusive rights.

The enormous impact public private academic research institutions on technological innovation transpires from Nature 202 Index leading 50O institutions bypatentinfluence metric，i.e.bytaking intoaccount citations publications in patents.Among the first 3Oranked institutions are27universities non-industrial researchcenters，ledbyWelcomeSanger（UK），follwedbySalk Biological Studies，TheRockefeller ， Scripps Research （all US） European Molecular Biology Laboratory （Germany）. In ranks six to eight follow Alphabet Inc. （US），F(xiàn).Hfmann La Roche AG（Switzerl） IBM Corporation （US）（Nature Index 2022）.Statistics demonstrate that leading universities hold remarkable patent portfolios especiallinthearea life sciences.Between20172O21theCaliniaSystemreceived1743，St 701，Harvard 662，Massachusets Technology 628 Texas System 608 patents[l.In 2018 total revenues US universities from their licensing activities amounted to US $＼$ 2.94$ billion （AUTM 2018） were responsible sales products estimated to some US $＼$ 147$ billion[7].The crucial role，which the inventions generated，patented eventualy licensed or assigned to acompany through a license by US public-sector research institutions playin the drug development transpires from thefactthatbetween1991 2O06，153 drugs weredeveloped （i.e.received marketing approvalfromthe Federal Drug Administration （FDA）.Among those drugs were 22 developed from the Intramural Research Program the US National s Health （NIH-IRP）.The drugs biologics developed patented by NIH alone had stillhave an enormous impact on public health bioeconomy worldwide. Those still under the license from NIH generated in 2O1O sales US $＼$ 4.7billion.Moreover，salesdrugsbiologicswhichpatentshadexpired（i.e.arenolongerunderNIHlicense），wereaboutUS2.2 billion in 2010^?18? .The importance attributed to researchersinstitutions contributing tothe translationresearchresults—inventionsto innovative productsprocesses，byseekingobtaining patents isreflectedinstanceinstatistics thetop\"translational\" biotech researchers according to the numbers issued patents[19].

3.2China's Development

As noted，Machlup died in January 1983.He was certainlyaware what happened in China in1979 when Deng Xiaoping declared China's new opening policy.Probably Machlup alsoknew thatthismost populated，then stil predominantlynonindustrial country never hadapatent system.Whether heasked himself，what，if askedbythe Chinese，whethertheyshould institutea patentsystem，he should answer，we do not know.Would he stick to his highly publicized \"verdict\"，that

\"It would be irresponsible，on the basis our present knowledge its [the patent system's] economic consequences，to recommend instituting one.\"？

Likewise，we do not know，whether the Chinese government consulted Machlup or anyother patents skeptical western economist on that issue.What we know，China has taken therisk economic consequences the patent systemonMarch12，1984，i.e.tenyearsahead theadoption theTRIPSAgreement，adopteditsfirstPatent

Law20l.Bee adopting its Patent Law，Chinese experts carefullstudied patent laws 85countries visited ten. Chineselegislator had to overcome many objections.On the one h，the argument that most enterprises，companies， scientific institutes organizationsbelong tothe state，theree patents as exclusiverightsdo notsuitorconm to the socialist natureChina.Ontheotherh，that thepatentlawincaseChina，asadeveloping country，would essentially protect patents ownedbyeigners who could ocupy，even dominate the technological market China[1.

Since 1984，China has several timesamended its patent law，inaddition，in 1996 adopted theLawon Promoting the TransmationScientific TechnologicalAchievements，which experienced importantchanges bytheOrderNo.32thePresidentin2015.With thislegislation，bysome Chinese scholars called，\"thenewlyrevised‘BayhDole Act ^1[22] ，China by large indeed folowed the Bayh-Dole type laws the United States，having the same task， enhancing the translation basic appied research results generated by \"state maintained research development institutions institutions higher education，\" into innovative practice[23l.

Some 4O years after the adoption its first PatentLaw，Chinese State Intellectual Property Office （SIPO）received closeto1.6millionpatentapplications，i.e.more thanthe patenticestheUS，Japan，KoreatheEPOtogether. In the statistics resident patent applications relative to growth domestic product （GDP）in2O21，China with 5738applications perGDPunit was second，only behindthe Republic Korea，ahead Japan，Switzerl，Germany，F(xiàn)inl，US，Sweden，Denmarkthe Netherls（WIPOIPFactsFigures）.In Global Index （G）202， Chinaisin rank11（WIPO Index）.That China with US $＼$ 18.1$ trillion GDP in 2022，second only behind the US with 25.5 trilion GDP，hasbecomethesecondlargest economy inthe world the maincompetitor，challnger the US economic dominance，is common place needs no further comments.According to some estimates，China's GDP is alreadybiggerthanthat theUSA[24.urprisinglyhowever，rarely，ifatall，therole，which theChinesedecision to adoptapatentsystem from theoutset much in line withthose idustrializedcountries，atracted any attntion US IP scholars ，ingeneral，academics skeptical theeconomic impact patents Certainly，there has beena lot criticismaboutdeficienciestheChinese patentsystemits hling bylocalauthorities，whichledto gradualimprovements，butno discusion about the impact patentsas exclusive rights hadonthe Chinese technological economic development.It would be hard to findarguments that it hadnegativeconsequences on the Chineseeconomic， technological scientific development.Some mayalreadydeplore thatthey pushed China sostrongly in that direction.

4 Concluding Thoughts

The patent system，although very important，is but one the many factors influencing the entire innovation proces.An isolatequantifying its impacton Ramp;Dprocess eitheras stalone，or asan integral part the innovation processin terms empirical data seems \"mision impossible\".However，considering theempirically proven mpact， which，e.g.the US Bayh-Doletype legislation hadoninnovation by\"re-activating\"patents owned bygovernment funded institutions into truly operational exclusive rights ^[25] ， the historically unique case China's economic， technological scientific developments following the adoption its very first（！l） Patent Law，the ex -cathedra statement RobertMerges，the vast empirical literature publishedafter1958had not \"producedevidencesufficient to dislodge Machlup's basic conclusion\"[26]，does not st scrutiny. With all due respect，Mergesas most IP critical US scholars， shies away from empirical data，even those related to the Bayh-Dole impact on innovation.Onlyrecently，questioning the positive impact Bayh-Doleon innovation provoked a strong reaction the Bayh-Dole Coalition，emphasizing thatthe legislation \"exped patentincentives，leading toalmost 3OO medicines thatarenow fighting disease around the world \"！27！ The silence on China in this regard is telling，butcertainly not supporting Machlup's basic conclusion.

AsRichard A.Epstein correctly observed，the current patent system

\"is imperfect onany number points.It is easyto find examples where current institutions lead to unhappy results.It is surely possble to envision intelligent ms tinkeringabout theedges established doctrine … The allor-nothing solution—either its private propertyor inthe public domain dominate any allefts tocarve out some elegant but inoperable middle position[28].

Applied to Machlup's \"verdict\"，Epstein's commentconfirms Machlup's conclusion to the extent that，in1958，as actually today，a sufficiently firm basis existed still exists \"decisionsabout 'a little more ora little less‘ various ingredients the System\"，however，notquestioning the system，i.e.patents as exclusive rights supporting

innovation，as a matter principle.

It seems that also to the \"verdict\" Fritz Machlup willapply what John Maynard Keynes observed atthe end his General Theory：

\"The ideas economists political philosophers，both when they are right when theyare wrong are more powerfulthan iscommonlyunderstood.Indeed，the world is ruledbylitleelse.Practical men，whobelieve themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences，are usually slaves some defunct economist\"[29].

And，the legacy Machlup's \"verdict\"？ It inspired numerous thoughts ideas on the economic justification the patent system，which have dominated discussionsoverdecades，but，Iam hesitant tosay，eventually ledonly to many \"make-believe patent system\" models，none them，however operable.Maybe，because the complexities the interplaybetween the patentsystem innovation inthe environmentamostcomplex economic systemmake itimposibletoconsiderallrelevantdata，theyfallintecategory \"rational-expectations-with-misperceptions\"cannot deliver[30]？

In view what Epstein statedon imperfection the patent system， how Bernanke commented the functioning the QE，a pure lawyermay conclude： The patent system seeminglydoes not work in economic theory，but it does in practice.Those，activelyusing it，trust inthe prospects patents，based onown experience.They provethecorrectness the Robert Lucas model \"rational expectations' ∣∣31-32∣ ！

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摘要：美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家弗里茨·馬赫盧普于1958年發(fā)表的一份關(guān)于專利制度經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值的“裁決書”，至今仍對(duì)全世界的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)學(xué)者評(píng)估專利制度對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的效用具有重要影響。文章結(jié)合后續(xù)美國(guó)和全球的法律與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，分析了馬赫盧普研究的原典。對(duì)馬赫魯普研究的評(píng)估系基于美國(guó)“拜杜法案”型，即關(guān)于將基礎(chǔ)研究轉(zhuǎn)化為創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品和工藝的立法所產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)。此外，文章分析了世界貿(mào)易組織（WTO）框架內(nèi)建立的世界經(jīng)濟(jì)新秩序，即要求所有WTO成員國(guó)提供有效的專利保護(hù)對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家和新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生的影響。中國(guó)于1984年通過了第一部《專利法》，在馬赫盧普“裁決”的背景下，結(jié)合中國(guó)隨后的經(jīng)濟(jì)、科學(xué)和技術(shù)發(fā)展，對(duì)中國(guó)的情況進(jìn)行了討論。最后，文章思考了馬赫盧普“裁決”在今天的價(jià)值。

關(guān)鍵詞：專利；經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展；創(chuàng)新；中國(guó)經(jīng)驗(yàn)