Regional Security Governance in the Horn of Africa and China’s Role

The Horn of Africa (HoA) is a region of geographical significance， as it locates on the northeast of the African mainland， extends into the southern coast of Gulf of Aden， connects Asia， Africa and Europe， and faces the Red Sea. In recent years， it has faced numerous security challenges posed by both internal conflicts and external interventions， making it one of the most volatile regions in the world. As China and HoA countries have maintained close political， economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation， security governance in the region concerns not only its own security and the security of Africa by and large， but also that of Chinese investment， business personnel and assets.

Numerous Security Challenges Confronting the HoA

First， the frequent internal conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan， major countries in the region， speak to the importance of harmonious ethnic relations in the process of development governance in African countries. As the second most populous African country， Ethiopia has been credited as the leader of developmental states in Africa with its rapid industrialization. However， due to the poor handling of ethnic relations and power sharing in its development process， armed conflict broke out in November 2020 between the federal government and the local armed force Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Having lasted for two years， the conflict caused huge casualties and serious humanitarian disaster. Moreover， it spilled over into the Amharic and Omoro ethnic groups in Eritrea and Ethiopia， leading to the armed confrontation between the Ethiopian federal government forces， Eritrea and Amharic militia forces on one side and TPLF and Omoro forces on the other. On November 2， 2022， the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF signed a ceasefire agreement， declaring an end to the Tigray conflict and a permanent cessation of hostilities. However， the impact of the conflict persists and poses a grave security threat to Ethiopia.

Sudan has been mired in political turmoil since April 2019 when Omar al-Bashir， who had ruled the country for 30 years， was ousted. In October 2021， the Sudanese military， who was reluctant to cede power， staged a coup which led to the premature collapse of the transitional civilian-military rule. In April 2023， due to the integration of the army and leadership issues， violent clashes erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces， and so far have not been quelled. As of May 2024， the conflict has killed 15，500 people in Sudan， displaced more than 8.7 million people and left some 25 million in need of humanitarian assistance. In Sudan， various political factions and political organizations， weak national governance capacity， and military and local armed forces’ craving for national power all together result in incessant conflicts， which are characterized by tribalization and militarization.

Second， disputes over water resources on the Nile River and Ethiopia’s quest for access to the Red Sea have strained regional relations. The Nile River water dispute among Ethiopia， Egypt and Sudan over the construction of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has long been unresolved. In 2011， Ethiopia took advantage of the unrest in Egypt and the split between north and south Sudan to build the Renaissance Dam on the upper Nile. Egypt， worried that the dam would reduce the amount of downstream water， strongly opposed the dam when it was first built. The three countries have been in negotiation over the legal and technical issues regarding the dam construction for more than a decade， but have yet to reach a mutually agreed and legally binding agreement. They are pitted against one another due to the dam issues， ever more complicated by the intervention of external forces.

At the regional level， Ethiopia， a large landlocked country， also has tensions with neighboring countries over its quest for access to the Red Sea. On 1 January 2024， Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a MOU with Muse Bhi Abdi， the President of the so-called Republic of Somaliland in Ethiopia’s eastern neighbor Federal Republic of Somalia， under which Ethiopia leased 20 kilometers of land along the Gulf of Aden in Somaliland and obtained the right to use the port of Berbera for 50 years. In return， Somaliland will get a stake in Ethiopian Airlines， and Ethiopia may recognize Somaliland as an independent state. The memorandum was strongly opposed by the federal government of Somalia. Egypt， the US and other countries stood out to express respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. It not only has strained relations between Ethiopia and Somalia， but also raised concerns in Egypt， Eritrea， Sudan and other countries bordering the Red Sea.

Third， non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism and climate change are becoming more severe， exacerbating the humanitarian crises. In terms of terrorist threats， the region mainly faces challenges from al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has long controlled the central and southern Somalia and frequently carried out terrorist attacks in Somalia， Ethiopia， Kenya and other countries. The Islamic State is another major terrorist group active in the region. Its Somali affiliate was founded in 2015 with membership from Kenya and other countries， and stays active mainly in the Puntland region of northern Somalia， mostly targeting Western personnel and institutions， the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia and the Somali government. In addition， the HoA is also subject to a series of climate disasters such as reduced rainfall， drought and floods. Since April 2022， the region has seen its worst drought in 40 years. Less rainfall has greatly affected agricultural production， with crop yields falling sharply， leaving millions of people facing a food crisis.

Fourth， the intervention of major powers outside the region has made regional security challenges more complicated and protracted. The geographical significance of the region has attracted wide attention and intervention from the US， Russia， Iran， Saudi Arabia， the UAE and Turkey. In particular， the US has stepped in all-round out of great power competition in recent years. In the past decade， it has doubled down on its efforts to woo the key countries in the region， especially Ethiopia and Sudan， which are friendly with China. The Trump administration made every endeavor to involve itself in the dam dispute， fully supporting Egypt， removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism， and promoting the normalization of relations between Sudan and Israel. In April 2021， the Biden administration set up the post of US Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa， with an aim to mediate regional conflicts and enhance the influence of US in the region. However， the US lacks clarity and consistency in its HoA policy. In the face of the military coup in Sudan， the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia， and the dispute over the Dam， it resorted to the approach of favoring one and suppressing the other. Instead of easing tensions， the regional security has worsened.

The Features of Security Governance in the HoA Region

First， the UN carries out peacekeeping operations and responds to humanitarian crises. In the HoA region， the UN plays its role by sending peacekeeping troops to and easing the humanitarian crisis in the region. Sudan and South Sudan are where UN peacekeeping mission is mostly heavily poured in， due to their protracted crises and the ease with which the UN Security Council can agree on peacekeeping operations. For example， at the outbreak of the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan， the first African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation， one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations was sent to ground in late 2007， with more than 19，000 authorized formed troops tasked with protecting civilians， securing humanitarian assistance， assisting in an inclusive political process， and contributing to human rights protection and the rule of law. Following the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan shortly after independence in July 2011， the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan in 2011 and then strengthened it in 2014， with mandates to protect civilians， monitor and investigate human rights abuses， create conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance， and support the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement. As of February 2024， the UN peacekeeping operations have sent 17，000 peacekeeping military personnel and 2，101 peacekeeping police to South Sudan， making contributions to the country’s progress toward armistice and stability.

In response to the humanitarian crisis in the region， the UN calls for sustained attention， coordination and provision of humanitarian assistance from the international community. In response to the HoA’s worst drought in 40 years in April 2022， FAO quickly provided assistance to nearly 4 million rural people in Ethiopia， Kenya and Somalia. The UN website also dedicated a special “Horn of Africa Drought Concern” page to appeal for international support.

Second， the African Union and African sub-regional organizations adopt the African approach to address security issues. The African approach mainly refers to resolving conflicts through consultation by African countries， peace negotiation， dialogue and mediation within the framework of the African Union and without external interference. To do that， AU usually appoints highly respected former leaders of African countries as special envoys who can use their prestige and networking resources in mediation and help to reach a peace agreement acceptable to all. Following the outbreak of Tigray conflict in November 2020， the AU appointed former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as the AU Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa to find solutions for the conflict through shuttle diplomacy. On 2 November 2022， with the unremitting efforts of the African Union and Special envoy Obasanjo， the Ethiopian government and the TPLF signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement， putting an end to the two-year conflict.

Besides the AU， the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)， a sub-regional organization， also holds sway in the HoA security governance. With its membership covering almost all HoA countries including Ethiopia， Djibouti， Kenya， Sudan， Somalia， Uganda， Eritrea and South Sudan， it is naturally the main mechanism for addressing the region’s security challenges. Since the civil war broke out in South Sudan in July 2011， IGAD has mediated several extraordinary summits and successfully pushed the two parties to sign the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan and formed a government of national unity. In December 2023， IGAD held the Extraordinary Summit Toward Ending the Conflict in Sudan and issued a statement urging the conflict parties to immediately negotiate a comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire and start a full political transition process. In early 2024， IGAD once again launched a new round of peace talks on the Sudan issue， but was refused by the Sudanese Armed Forces believing that it was biased in favor of the Rapid Support Force. This showcased that challenges exist as well when African regional organizations try to solve African problems in an African way.

Third， regional countries stand up to common security challenges through joint actions and mediation. They have carried out dialogues and actions in specific security fields， which serves as a complement to the building of a security governance architecture in the region. For example， in terms of counter-terrorism， as the al-Shabaab in Somalia have long spread their terrorist acts from Somalia to neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia， regional countries have no other options but to unite against its terrorist proliferation. In February 2023， the leaders of Somalia， Djibouti， Ethiopia and Kenya held a regional summit on security and counter-terrorism， and reached an agreement on joint fight against the Somali affiliate of al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. The four countries pledged to take joint military actions to completely disarm al-Shabaab in Somalia by end of 2024. Some believe that the summit and the agreement reached means that regional countries will broaden and intensify their fight against al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda， making it a new turning point in the war on terrorism in the region. For more than a year， the al-Qaeda affiliate has been severely bruised by attacks from the four countries and the Somali government.

Regional powers are also important players in the security governance， with Egypt being a key mediator in Sudan conflict. Since the outbreak of the armed conflict in Sudan in April 2023， Egypt alone has taken in 650，000 registered Sudanese refugees， weighing heavily on its economy which is already in a downturn. In order to ease its own economic burden as well as out of the need for regional peace， it actively mediated the Sudan conflict to help Sudanese refugees return to their home country. As early as July 2023， Egypt hosted a summit of Sudan’s neighbours to establish a humanitarian corridor and a framework for political dialogue on the security and humanitarian crisis facing Sudan. On 6 July 2024， the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs held the Sudanese Political and Civil Forces Conference in Cairo which brought together Sudanese political and civil society representatives and religious leaders， with an aim to strengthen the dialogue among various political and social forces in Sudan and make new efforts for its peace process.

The Role of China in HoA Security Governance

On 11 April 2022， President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Security Initiative for the first time at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference， advocating common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security as conceptual guidance， mutual respect as an underlying basis， indivisible security as an important principle， and building a security community as the long-term goal. China intends to find a new path for security featuring dialogue rather than confrontation， partnership rather than alliance， and win-win rather than zero-sum. It is with this new security concept in mind that China has actively pushed forward intra-regional dialogue among HoA countries， proposing a HoA peace conference to form a political consensus on jointly safeguarding peace and security. At the same time， with regard to development， China has strengthened the Belt and Road cooperation with regional countries， supported their endeavors in accelerating regional revitalization and overcoming development challenges， so as to fundamentally create conditions for peace and stability. In fact， even before the Global Security Initiative was put forward， China had set up the Initiative of Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa to support countries in the region in tackling the challenges of security， development and governance.

First， China promotes security governance within the UN and other multilateral mechanisms. China has long called on the international community at the UN to stay tuned to African security issues and support the African Union and African countries in safeguarding the long-term peace and stability of Africa on their own. On the one hand， as a permanent member of the UN Security Council， China uses the UN platform to set agenda， so as to pool more resources and draw more attention to African security issues. In August 2022 when China assumed the rotating presidency of the Security Council， it proposed to hold an open debate themed Peace and Security in Africa: Strengthening Capacity Building for Lasting Peace. China opposes the acts to use the HoA as an arena for geopolitical rivalry. It has always been a staunch supporter of African solutions to African issues， and of the African Union and relevant countries in their efforts to resolve regional conflicts. On the other hand， China provides public goods of security governance to Africa through UN and other multilateral mechanisms. Take the UN peacekeeping operations as an example. Among the five Security Council permanent members， China has contributed more troops to African peacekeeping missions than any others. Chinese peacekeepers have accomplished their tasks in Mali， Sudan’s Darfur region， South Sudan and other mission areas， and have been awarded the Peace Medal of Honor by the UN many times. Besides that， China has provided a number of food aid packages through the World Food Program and vigorously supported South-South cooperation under the framework of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization to better benefit countries and people in the region.

Second， China supports the African Union and African sub-regional organizations in playing a leading role in conflict mediation， and improves security mechanism by tapping into the influence of the Horn of Africa Peace Conference. In February 2022， China appointed its first Special envoy for the Horn of Africa Affairs. In June of the same year， the first Horn of Africa Peace Conference proposed and hosted by China was held in Addis Ababa. China’s Special Envoy and representatives from Ethiopia， Djibouti， Kenya， Somalia， South Sudan， Sudan， Uganda and other countries attended the conference. A joint statement was issued， stressing that all parties are ready to uphold the vision of common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security and build an HoA where the guns are silenced for sustainable peace. They pledged to enhance trust， manage differences and disputes among countries in the region， peacefully resolve conflicts through dialogue and negotiation， and strive to cool the tension down. On 24 June 2024， the Second Horn of Africa Peace Conference was held in Beijing. China expressed its willingness to continue to be a partner on the path to peace with HoA countries， guided by the Global Security Initiative， to build a comprehensive security framework with a broad vision of peace， and to be a pioneer in maintaining peace. China is willing to work with the HoA countries to turn the region into a horn of peace， development， and prosperity， and build a high-level China-Africa community with a shared future. The Standard newspaper from Kenya opined that， the concept of peaceful development proposed by China echoes the common aspiration of regional countries to build the HoA into a region of stability， peace and sustainable economic development. China does not attach any political conditions， which is in sharp contrast to the ultimatum and coerce-based intervention by Western countries.

Third， China adheres to the comprehensive security concept and strives for peace through development and cooperation during its pursuit for a HoA featuring peace， development and win-win cooperation. Drawing on from its own strengths and development experience， China supports HoA countries in pursuing security and peace through development. Ethiopia and Kenya are the front-runners in Africa’s economic development， as well as the pioneers in Belt and Road cooperation with China. The two flagship infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road framework in the two countries， the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway and Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway， not only become economic drive for the two countries， but also have improved regional connectivity and economic development as an important part of the East African railway network. Under the Belt and Road framework， Chinese companies go on an investment expansion in the region and deepen trade cooperation with regional countries. The construction of the Eastern Industrial Zone in Ethiopia and the Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Egypt have injected new momentum into the regional industrialization process. In addition， China continues to support the expansion of the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway and the Addis Ababa -Djibouti Railway to neighboring countries at an appropriate time， and speed up the development of the Red Sea coast and the East African coast， so as to form a “double-axis and double-coast” development framework， accelerate the building of an industrial belt and economic belt， promote the building of a sub-regional economic community， and jointly build a high-level China-Africa community with a shared future.

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He Wenping is Research Fellow of the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies (China-Africa Institute) at the Chinese Academy of Social Science