ABSTRACTS

The Arctic in the 2020s has emerged as a critical arena in the global climate emergency and as an area of increasing sensitivity in terms of great power politics.It is pointless to ignore the growing links between the Arctic and the global system and to perpetuate the belief that the currents of great power politics will not spill over to affect the treatment of issues on the Arctic policy agenda.At the same time,this should not blind us to the success of the ongoing efforts to promote international cooperation on specific issues and to the prospect that similar opportunities will continue to arise in the 2020s.This paper treats the“new”Arctic as a zone of peaceful competition in which there are opportunities to cooperate on specific issues,even though the interests of major players diverge.Specific opportunities and the adjustments include developing codes of conduct to avoid armed clashes,responding to climate change,managing commercial shipping,protecting biodiversity,and meshing scientific activities.Opening the Arctic Council to new voices and taking advantage of the Council’s convening power to manage the emerging Arctic regime complex while taking steps to protect its distinctive features will enhance the prospects for success in these areas.The necessary adjustments in existing practices that are individually modest but that,taken together,could make a real difference in addressing Arctic challenges arising in the 2020s.

Arctic,great power politics,peaceful competition,governance,international cooperation

The Russia-Ukraine conflict presents a wide range of risks to international nuclear arms control and disarmament,including growing possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,accidental or intentional attacks on nuclear facilities in nonnuclear weapon states,more nonnuclear weapon states approaching or even crossing the nuclear threshold,halted negotiations on international nuclear arms control and disarmament,expansion of nuclear states’arsenals,and so on.Four factors will shape the global nuclear landscape in years to come,namely,nuclear policies and postures of the nuclear weapon states;the efficacy of the international institutions on nuclear arms control and disarmament;the role of the nonnuclear weapon states in international arms control;and the relations among nuclear weapon states.Growing nuclear risks could also galvanize the international community to improve global nuclear governance by repairing the international institutions on nuclear arms control and disarmament,focusing on preventing a new round of nuclear proliferation and strengthening safeguard measures on civilian nuclear facilities,and forestalling nuclear conflicts.To begin with,the Tenth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be upheld to reaffirm the goal of nuclear arms control and disarmament.Besides,nuclear security cooperation should be increased by further strengthening the role and authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in managing civilian nuclear facilities.In addition,increasing pressure on the two nuclear superpowers to take primary responsibilities global nuclear security.Last but not least,building greater mutual trust among nuclear powers to cement global strategic stability.Adhering to its longstanding policy of nuclear self-restraint,China will continue to play an active and constructive role by working with the international community to explore a new way for more effective arms control and disarmament.

Russia-Ukraine conflict,nuclear arms control,global nuclear governance,strategic stability

Since the end of the Cold War,especially under the Trump administration,the United States has conducted economic sanctions more frequently,drawing growing international criticism.The Biden administration embarks on a reform of U.S.sanctions,which involves setting clear objectives,strengthening coordination with allies,mitigating unintended consequences,emphasizing flexibility and efficacy,and modernizing the capacity of sanctions enforcers.The unprecedented economic sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies on Russia following Moscow’s military actions in Ukraine provide an important opportunity to assess the Biden administration’s sanctions reform.Washington has set mixed and dangerous goals for Russia sanctions and failed to coordinate the use of sanctions and other foreign policy tools.It emphasizes using sanctions to punish Russia while ignoring their bargaining function,and underestimates the systemic impact of sanctions.This shows that the U.S.sanctions against Russia deviate from the purposes and principles of President Biden’s sanctions reform,which either means that the Biden administration is not very serious about its sanctions reform or it has set a very ambitious goal for the sanctions against Russia,aiming to reshape the regional and even global political and economic order.

Russia-Ukraine conflict,economic sanctions,export control,SWIFT,SDN list

The Ukraine situation reflects the conflict between Russia and the West.After the outbreak,the international order and global governance will be profoundly affected.European countries will face enormous economic and social pressure;with NATO given more prominence,EU strategic autonomy will suffer a serious setback;European integration will be hampered while countries are more united by the crisis.Although Western sanctions have a large impact on the Russian economy,it will not be brought to collapse.In the long term,the Western approach to achieving geopolitical goals through financial sanctions will lead to significant adjustments in the international monetary and financial system.On the one hand,the U.S.is reluctant to get openly involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict,but seeks to prevent Russia from changing the security landscape of Eurasia by military means;on the other hand,it continues to shift its global strategic focus to Asia.Strengthening alliances and partnerships to increase deterrence against China remains a priority in the U.S.competitive strategy toward China.

Russia-Ukraine conflict,international order,EU-U.S.relations,sanction,global economy,U.S.-China competition

At present,the United States and its allies deliberately distort the fact that their anti-China activities have seriously undermined international rules and morality,stigmatize China’s legitimate countermeasures,and vigorously exaggerate the “China-economic coercion theory” in order to manipulate international public opinion and provide “new evidence” for their concocted“China-threat theory.” The Chinese media,while trying to do justice to China,unconsciously fall into the trap of Western thinking and theory,even translating“Economic Coercion” into the more pejorative term “Economic Compellence.”Based on this,this paper compares and reflects on the existing research findings on“Economic Coercion”in Western societies and argues that as an instrument or relationship,“Economic Coercion” is a global phenomenon and does not necessarily imply hegemonic practices.Through a comparative study of the policy logic and practice of“Economic Coercion”in China and the United States,it is argued that “Economic Coercion” of the U.S.is considered to be offensive and hegemonic in nature,which targets all countries around the world and often targets countries rather than state’s behavior.The U.S.implements economic securitization policies on security grounds and shifts from focusing on the use of bilateral asymmetric dependencies to the use of global relationship networks.The aim is always to consolidate and maintain the U.S.global leadership position.On the contrary,China’s “Economic Coercion” is typically defensive in nature,which targets specific countries and often takes countermeasures against anti-China practices.China mainly takes advantage of the target country’s dependence on China’s market and supply with a relatively limited scope of influence and damage.The aim is to correct the behavior of the target country and promote the return of normal bilateral relations.

coercive diplomacy,economic coercion,China-U.S.relations,economic diplomacy

From the perspective of economic logic,there is both competition and cooperation between China and the United States.The centrifugal force of competition and centripetal force of cooperation between China and the United States can be found at domestic,bilateral and multilateral levels.The Trump administration’s policy of decoupling towards China has not fundamentally changed the economic foundation of the coexistence of centrifugal force and centripetal force in Sino–U.S.economic relations.Therefore,the expression of recoupling by the Biden administration is more of a phased and partial retraction of the Trump administration’s lopsided decoupling policy,rather than a fundamental and overall reversal of U.S.economic and trade policy toward China.The government of United States will remain several measures of decoupling policy and also introduce some new measures to maintain Sino–U.S.economic cooperation in the economic and trade policy of the United States toward China.In this regard,China should make both short-term and long-term preparations.In the short term,China should actively maintain and expand the common interests between China and the United States.China also needs to deal

with the policy of precise decoupling in the field of industrial chain and technology.In the long term,China should focus on the long-term logic of the competition between the great powers,and try to hedge against the uncertainty of Sino-U.S.economic and trade relations with the certainty of its own economic development.

Sino-U.S.economic relations,Biden administration,trade policy,decoupling,recoupling

Maritime security is now drawing growing global attention.Because of the increasing complexity of maritime risks,maritime security concerns not only state actors but also nonstate actors,and involves marine environmental protection and “blue economy” development.Factors that affect maritime security have expanded and involves an increasing number of specialized and interacting issues.Because of its obvious limitations,the current international governance order is not robust enough to deal with emerging maritime security issues,including the international institutions,power political logic,the interwoven traditional and nontraditional security challenges,insufficient national capacity,and ecosystem imbalances.China’s approach to maritime security governance involves multiple actors and a multilevel security architecture,and combines short-term,mid-term,and long-term goals,in an effort to build its national capacity in maritime governance and contributing to global maritime security by adopting a multi-pronged strategy that includes ideational,political,economic,and ecological dimensions.

maritime security,security management,security dilemma,global governance

Space and cyberspace are closely interconnected,interdependent,and mutually reinforcing,and space systems are increasingly dependent on networks of communications.As a result,space systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks.Whether it is the ground sites of space systems,the launch vehicles,the industrial control systems that manufacture satellites and the designs of satellites and rockets,or the satellites in orbit themselves,there is the potential for an attack by a potential adversary or hacker.Cyber attacks on space systems can create significant security risks,but the United States has not regarded space systems as critical infrastructure.Since the 2010s,the U.S.government has issued policy directives,security memos,and other guidance to the space industry to focus on cybersecurity of space systems.The government and industry have established cybersecurity standards for space systems and shared information on cybersecurity threats to space systems.U.S.Congress has attempted to include space systems into critical infrastructure with a view to transforming cyber standards for space systems from voluntary compliance to mandatory obligations.The U.S.military,which is committed to building its Space Force into the first digital military service,is using a zero-trust architecture to procure satellite components;building cyber ranges for space systems;and forming a space cyber offensive and defensive force.The purpose of strengthening cybersecurity in space systems is to build U.S.capabilities to respond to other countries’ anti-space weapons;to secure the space industry supply chain and industrial control systems to prevent the proliferation of space technologies to non-allied countries;and to establish a space order based on U.S.rules from a position of strength.China needs to strengthen the supply chain security of space systems,actively issue initiatives such as cybersecurity governance rules for space systems,and build a cybersecurity architecture for space systems and international cyber governance rules for space systems.Beijing should plan the integration of space systems and cyberspace from the height of national security.

U.S.space policy,space system,cybersecurity,competition in space