Russia and the West: From Dialogue to Confrontation

Zhang Hong

Year 2021 and onward has seen the rivalry growing ever more acute between Russia and the West， centering on the relationship between NATO and Ukraine. In February 2022 as Russia launched “a special military operation” in Ukraine， the Russia-Ukraine tension intensified. Western countries thus imposed overall economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on Russia， pushing Russias relations with the West take a confrontational turn.

THE WEST DISMISSES RUSSIAS CONCERNS

Over the past three decades since the end of the Cold War， Russia has taken as one of its diplomatic priorities improving relations with the West for most of the time， and has always maintained great strategic patience with it. Although western countries support Russia to join the G7 and NATOs Partnership for Peace Programme， they have not genuinely accepted Russia. Regarding it as one major security threat， the West persists in eating away at Russias strategic space.

I. The West refuses to integrate Russia into its security system

Throughout the development of Russia-NATO relations after the Cold War， the West has always just aimed to ensure its security relations with Russia stay on track. Although NATO admitted Russia into its Partnership for Peace Programme and established the NATO-Russia Council， it hasnt thought in earnest about letting Russia become its full member. Moreover， it integrates former Warsaw Pact members into its political economic and security system， and even endeavors to embrace some post-Soviet states. The Wests disregard to Russias integration desire， compounded by the eastward expansion of both NATO and EU， has pushed Russia further away from it. Moscow has become more and more marginalized from Brussels.

II. The West ignores Russias efforts to join the western economic and diplomatic system

Russia and the EU are geographically close to each other and have maintained relatively close economic and cultural ties. Russia attaches great importance to its political and economic relations with EU countries， which partly defines Russia-West relations after the Cold War. However， with the eastward expansion of the EU， the cooperation between the two sides began to be disrupted by some eastern European countries on the grounds of security and human rights issues. In 2006， Poland voted down the EU-Russia negotiations to launch new partnership and cooperation agreement. Since the Ukraine crisis， the EU and the U.S. imposed several rounds of sanctions on Russia， covering financial， military， oil and other fields. In February 2022， after the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict， the EU upgraded its sanctions against Russia， including freezing the assets of the Russian Central Bank and major commercial banks in the EU， disconnecting major Russian banks from the SWIFT System， and closing airspace to Russian airlines.

III. The U.S. blocks diplomatic talks between Russia and Europe

Entering the 21st century， Russia has almost abandoned the idea of integration with the West. Instead， it sought to maintain dialogue and cooperation. However， such cooperation hasnt gone well due to the obstructions of the U.S.. In February 2014， the U.S. backed pro-West parties in Ukraine to escalate the political crisis and topple the pro-Russian government. After the Crimea Crisis， western countries imposed a raft of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on Russia， including expelling it from the G8 and suspending its rights in European Commission. Russias newly achieved detente with the EU has again been undermined by American obstruction. At this point， Putin became disillusioned with developing relations with the West， and Russia ended up with a complete failure in its efforts to embrace the West. He realized that without a strong hand， it will be hard to change Russias marginalized status in the future European security and global geopolitics landscape， much less in the global economy. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said resignedly that the conversation on Ukraine between him and his British counterparts turned out to be the one “between the dumb and the deaf”.

THE WEST UNDERESTIMATES RUSSIAS MIGHT AND WILL TO STRIKE BACK STRATEGICALLY

The end of the Cold War saw the international security environment improve significantly. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact， Europe headed back to dialogue and cooperation. However， the West has chosen to exclude Russia from the security， diplomatic， and regional economic integration system， more than that， in its denial of Russias opposition， it has expanded NATO membership and improved relations with Ukraine and Georgia by virtually granting them membership-to-be status. All those moves underestimate Russias might and will for strategic counter-strike.

I. Dismiss Russias attempts to build European security mechanism

With the option of joining NATO off the table， Russia turns to seek cooperative relations with it in the face of its continuous eastward expansion. Russia sees its negotiations with NATO countries as its new attempts to achieve peace and stability in Europe. The dialogue between the two sides is no longer about accession or union， but about the search for a new way of coexistence. In 2010 at a foreign ministerial meeting of the Russia-NATO Council， Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov presented a draft of a new European security treaty to NATO countries， proposing to the West a unified European security mechanism. As Dmitry Medvedev put it， “it requires collective political will to achieve a future-oriented breakthrough and end nearly 20 years of uncertainty and instability”. With this proposal Moscow made an important attempt to reshape the strategic balance in Europe， by trying to create a unified and indivisible political-military security space in North America， Europe and Central Asia and thus changing the NATO-led European security framework. However， the West is quite aloof to the Russian security initiative.

II. Ignore Russias core security concerns

As a matter of fact， NATO has been expanding unceasingly with its member states increasing from 16 to 30 regardless of Russian opposition. Its sphere of influence has gradually stretched from the western， southern and central Europe during the cold war to the eastern and southeastern Europe， from the Baltic to the Black Sea region， forming a complete strategic encirclement of Russia. While including central and Eastern European countries into its club， NATO also turns to post-Soviet states and has established Partnership for Peace with them. By manipulating the historical grievances and territorial disputes between those post-Soviet states and Russia， NATO encourages them to move closer to the alliance， with Ukraine and Georgia being the most active. After Crimea Crisis in 2014， NATO has upped its support for Ukraine， and then recognized Georgia and Ukraine successively in 2019 and 2020 as its Enhanced Opportunities Partners， which is equivalent to granting them associate NATO membership. This has marked NATOs official entry into Russias traditional sphere of influence.

III. Neglect Russias last-ditch attempt to establish security guarantee

In June 2020， Ukraine was granted NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner status， signifying that it has access to all military resources except collective security commitments and enjoys the same treatment as a NATO member in terms of training， command， logistics and intelligence. In the view of Russia， NATOs substantive cooperation with Ukraine has threatened its security and crossed its strategic red line. In December 2021， Russia again proposed security negotiations to the U.S. and NATO. Submitted by Russia at the same time was the draft Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees and the draft Agreement on Measures to Ensure Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The two proposed treaties required NATO to call off its eastward expansion and drop Ukraines inclusion into NATO; both sides of Russia and NATO to stay away from deploying short and medium range missiles in areas where they can hit each other; and the military deployment of both sides return to the positions specified in the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations， Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. However， Russias diplomatic communication with the U.S. and NATO stumbled， as the West rejected Russias core concerns for security guarantee and was only willing to hold talks on the issues of restrictions on short and medium range missiles and military transparency.

By rejecting Russias core concerns， NATO clearly underestimates Russias might and will to respond strategically. In the case of fruitless negotiations on security guarantee with NATO， Putin chose to give up dialogue and turn to disarm Ukraine by military operation， so as to completely reverse the offensive track of NATO against Russia in Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine conflict meant the rupture in Russia-NATO relations as Russia chose to address its security concerns through extreme confrontational means.

THE RUSSIA-WEST RELATIONS DETERIORATES DUE TO MULTI-LAYERED FACTORS

There are many factors that reduce Russia and the West from cooperation to confrontation， including subjective ones arising from both sides and objective ones brought by the change of international system. The main subjective factor is the contradictory values， security concepts and international outlook between Russia and the West， while the major objective factor is the impact brought by evolving international landscape after the Cold War.

First， Russias security concept goes contrary to that of the West. As a legacy of the Cold War， NATO has kept the U.S.-led collective security system which is built on the concept of exclusive collective security. In the process of its eastward expansion， it has always kept Russia away from its security system， and ignored its appeal for integration. While expanding its security boundary， it concurrently squeezes Russias security space. Such an exclusive security concept denies the security reality of Europe， thus resulting in the eroding mutual security trust between Russia and NATO. In particular， the security cooperation between NATO and post-Soviet states has seriously threatened Russias security environment.

Second， the economic integration plan of the West is in rivalry with that of Russia. Entering the 21st century， both Russia and the EU put forward their own exclusive economic integration plan targeting the post-Soviet states， Ukraine in particular， against the backdrop of impossible mutual economic integration between the two. In 2009， the EU launched Eastern Partnership， a regional economic integration plan to lure post-Soviet states to join the EU through free trade agreements. In response， Russia proposed the Eurasian Economic Union in 2012 to attract post-Soviet states by offering special tariffs and cheap energy. At the end of 2013， a political crisis broke out in Ukraine over whether to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in order to join the Eastern Partnership Program. The crisis later escalated into a regime change due to the interference of the West led by the U.S. in Ukraines internal affairs. Both Russia and the West accused each other of doing so， which eventually led their relations into a crisis.

Third， Russia and the West have serious differences of values. After Putin came into power， a political thought with Russian characteristics has gradually taken shape —Putinism， which is a sovereign democratic thought based on Russian conservatism and a combination of western democratic system and Russian national conditions. Putin points out that， “as a sovereign state， Russia can and will decide on its own all the timelines on the path to democracy as well as the conditions for advancing democracy”， adding that “democratic values must be aligned with national interests”. Russian political theorist VladislavSurkov believes that Russian democracy is a “new state” theory developed in Russia， which is not only suitable for the country in the future， but also has significant “export potential”. Differences over the model of democracy have created value rivalry between Russia and the West. The West regards itself as the winner of the Cold War， and is prone to dictate others over both economic development and political reform. Jose Manuel Barroso， former president of the European Commission， acknowledged that the EU wants to exert value sway on post-Soviet states through the Eastern Partnership Program. Putin argues that “the West must learn its lesson and stop imposing its values on others”.

Fourth， the evolving international system has impacted the Russia-West relations. Since the beginning of the 21st century， the trend of multi-polarization has gathered steam. Emerging economies represented by China， Russia and India have risen rapidly. The West-centered theory has become increasingly questionable. Sense of insecurity is growing in the West. In order to maintain its world hegemony， the West began to contain and smear Russia， China and other emerging powers. The major country balance is broken due to the power shift in international arena. As a result of such change the Russia-West relations has gone from cooperative to confrontational.