The Economic Consequences of Social Distancing 社交隔離的經濟后果

杰西·羅瑟斯坦 賈瑞德·伯恩斯坦

The biggest threat posed by the covid-19 outbreak is， of course， the health risks it poses. But that is not the only risk： Avoidance， social distancing and panic may have enormous economic consequences， large enough to significantly slow growth， push up unemployment and even tip the economy into a recession.

On this front， the most vulnerable people are low-wage workers in low-income households without paid leave. Many employers are already telling their white-collar workers to work from home. But low-wage workers such as janitors， food service workers and retail cashiers cant work remotely， and they also often work for contractors2 with less-enlightened policies. If these workers are temporarily idled by specific quarantines， school closures affecting their children or workplace closures motivated by general social distancing efforts， they wont get paid. Their families tend to have little savings and live in an economically precarious state even in good times. Without work， these families face near-term risks of intense economic hardship and possible eviction.

So we need a quickly implementable policy that will maintain earnings for those who most depend on them. Many of these workers will be employed but temporarily idled; others may lose jobs as their employers try to manage shocks to their own businesses.

Unemployment insurance （UI） is the first line of defense in a downturn. In fact， workers who are able and available for work but are barred from their workplaces or otherwise idled are often eligible for unemployment benefits. But the UI system is not ready for the scale of claims that could result， and some state systems may not be set up to accommodate quarantined workers or caregivers. Often， UI benefits arent paid for several weeks， but workers will need money before that. Moreover， many low-wage workers who are most in need of assistance have interrupted work histories that do not qualify them for UI benefits.

A better solution is for employers to continue paying workers directly during shutdowns. In most cases， employers will want the workers back once the threat of the virus recedes， and continuation of wage and salary payments will help meet these workers and their households needs while supporting consumer spending in the broader economy.

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics， about 40 percent of private-sector workers paid below the median lack paid leave benefits. Thats about 23 million workers， with average hourly wages around $14. To help them through what we believe will be an extremely challenging period， we propose the creation of a temporary， national paid-leave program， funded by the federal government， for workers idled due to the coronavirus.

Heres how it would work. Employers would continue to pay workers who are prevented from working by the virus， through direct deposits or paychecks in the mail. They would report this to their state UI system， which would reimburse them through tax credits or direct payments and would in turn be reimbursed by the federal government.

Based on our experience working in the Obama administration on UI expansions during the Great Recession， this would be administratively challenging， but manageable， especially with extra federal dollars to expand UI administrative capacity. The specific implementation might vary across states. For example， California already has a state paid-leave program and might find it easier to administer this program through that. But the idea would be to reimburse employers for paying their workers through their coronavirus-caused leave， with as little disruption as possible.

This program would need to be strictly time limited—it is not intended to be permanent. It would be tied to local health authorities or the CDCs recommendations about prudent responses. It would be important to have two separate triggers： One when authorities recommend that sick or vulnerable individuals stay home， which would trigger benefits just for these workers and for affected caregivers; and another if authorities recommend that larger groups take these social-distancing measures， which would trigger benefits for everyone affected.

The program would provide an essential lifeline for workers. It would also support employers， many of whom recognize the hardship that shutdowns will impose on loyal workers but whose hands will be forced as quarantines reduce their revenue streams to a trickle. An assist from the government will help these employers do what they know is right and will make it easier to restart their businesses when the health threat passes.

Because so much more is unknown than known about the spread of the virus and potential public health responses， coming up with a reliable cost estimate for our proposal is impossible. But if half of lower-wage workers without paid leave cant go to work， replacing their paychecks would have a monthly cost of around $20 billion. If quarantines are localized to particular areas， the cost would be much lower， but an attractive attribute of the program is that it would contract or expand with need.

Borrowing costs for the federal government are remarkably low right now， so the program would be inexpensive to finance. But even were that not the case， wed still pull for this sort of intervention. Ripple effects from quarantines risk devastating our economy， as workers without incomes have nothing to spend. “Countercyclical spending”—temporarily ramping up government support in periods of economic disruptions—has a long and venerable track record of helping both economically vulnerable families and the broader economy.

As this crisis unfolds， the Trump administration will be forced to launch some sort of fiscal response to offset the economic impact of the virus. The question is： Will the measures it deploys be targeted to those who need them， or will it default to their knee-jerk， muscle-memory， tax-cut mode？ Millions of households who are on the precipice3 of economic despair depend on policymakers getting this right.

新冠肺炎爆發所造成的最大威脅，毫無疑問是隨之而來的健康風險。但那并非唯一風險：回避、社交隔離和恐慌可能會帶來巨大的經濟后果，大到足以嚴重拖慢增長、推高失業率，乃至使經濟陷入衰退。

在這方面，最脆弱的群體是來自低收入家庭沒有帶薪假期的低薪工人。 許多雇主已讓其白領雇員在家工作。 但是，低薪工人（例如清潔工、餐飲業服務工人和零售業收銀員）無法遠程工作，而且他們通常也為政策不太開明的合同雇主工作。如果這些人因具體的隔離措施、孩子學校停課或關閉工作場所等一般性社交隔離措施而賦閑，他們將沒有報酬。 他們的家庭往往積蓄微薄，即使在好年景也難免捉襟見肘。 失去工作，這些家庭短期內就會面臨劇烈的經濟困難，乃至被房東驅逐。

因此亟需可以迅速落實的政策，以使得對收入最依賴的人群能維持收入。這些工人中許多人將被雇用，但暫時空閑;其他人可能會失去工作，因為雇主要設法應對自己生意面對的沖擊。

失業保險（UI）是低迷時期的第一道防線。其實，有能力且可以工作但被禁止進入工作場所或因其他原因閑散的工人通常有資格領取失業救濟金。 但UI系統尚未準備好應對可能產生的索賠規模，而且某些州系統也沒準備好吸納被隔離的工人或看護人員。UI福利通常幾周后才支付，但工人們在那之前就會缺錢。此外，許多最需要幫助的低薪工人工作經歷不連續，因而沒有領取UI福利的資格。

優化解決方案之一，是由雇主在停工期間繼續直接向工人發薪。多數情況下，一旦病毒威脅消失，雇主就會希望工人返崗，繼續支付薪資有助于滿足這些工人及其家庭的需求，且有利于宏觀經濟中的消費者支出。

根據（美國）勞工統計局的數據，在工資低于中位數的私營部門工人中，約40%沒有帶薪假福利。這群工人總數大約有2300萬，平均小時工資約為14 美元。我們認為會有一段極端挑戰時期，為了幫助因冠狀病毒而賦閑的工人安然渡過，我們建議設立一個由聯邦政府出資的臨時性的全國帶薪休假計劃。

運作方式如下：雇主繼續通過直接打款或郵寄支票的方式，向因病毒感染而無法工作的工人付薪。他們將其申報給所在州失業保險系統，系統將通過稅收抵免或直接付款予以報銷，并最終向聯邦政府報銷。

根據我們在大衰退期間在奧巴馬政府中進行的失業保險擴張工作的經驗，這項工作管理上具有挑戰性，但可以操作，尤其是用額外的聯邦資金來擴充失業保險的管理能力。具體實現可能因州而異。例如，加利福尼亞州已經有其州帶薪休假計劃，并且可能會發現通過既有計劃更容易管理本計劃。總之，這個理念就是，雇主在冠狀病毒引起的賦閑期間發生的人工支出應予報銷，盡量減少中斷。

本計劃設立嚴格的時限——計劃不是永久性的。計劃將與地方衛生部門或CDC關于謹慎應對的建議相掛鉤。重要的是要有兩個單獨的觸發因素：一是當局建議患病或脆弱的人居家時，這只會使這些工人和受影響的看護人員獲益;二是如果當局建議更大的群體采取這些社交隔離措施，這將會使所有受影響的人獲益。

本計劃將為工人提供不可或缺的生命線。這也將為雇主提供支持。許多雇主也能認識到停工將使忠誠的工人生計維艱，但也是形勢所迫，因為隔離措施導致業務收入縮水。政府的協助有助于雇主做出正確的行動，更易于在健康威脅過去后重啟生意。

由于對病毒的傳播和潛在的公共衛生應對措施知之甚少，因此不可能針對我們的提案做出可靠的成本估算。但是，如果一半無帶薪假的低薪工人無法工作，承包他們的薪水每月將產生約200億美元的成本。如果隔離只限于特定地區，則成本會低得多，但是本計劃一個吸引人的特點在于，它可根據需要收縮或擴展。

目前，聯邦政府的借貸成本非常低，因此該計劃的融資成本不高。但即使不是這樣，我們仍然會支持這類干預措施。隔離產生的漣漪效應有可能摧毀我們的經濟，因為工人沒有收入就沒有錢可以消費。 “逆周期支出”——即在經濟動蕩時期臨時增加政府支持——在幫助經濟脆弱的家庭和經濟大環境方面有著悠久的歷史和良好的口碑。

隨著危機的蔓延，特朗普政府將被迫采取某種財政應對措施，以抵消病毒的經濟沖擊。問題是：采取的措施是否針對需要的人，還是政府會下意識采取慣用的減稅模式？數以百萬計的家庭正因嚴峻的經濟形勢而瀕臨絕境，他們指望著政策制定者能不走錯路。? ? ? □