New Dynamics in the US-UK Special Relationship Since Trump’s Presidency

Lin Limin

Professor, University of International Relations

DOI: 10.19422/j.cnki.cn10-1398/d.2019.04.007

Since President trump took office, the Special Relationship between the US and the UK has suffered a string of severe shocks. Its been an open secret that Trump intentionally ignored the Special Relationship, the prospect of which has once again become a hot topic in the academic and strategic circles at home and abroad. This article will discuss how the Trump Administrations UK policy takes its toll on and what does the future hold for the Special Relationship.

Does trump deliberately ignore the US-UK Special Relationship?

Early in his presidency, Trump ordered to be replaced in the Oval Office a bust of Churchill, the late British Prime Minister who coined the term Special Relationship, to give the impression that he valued the Special Relationship. When British Prime Minister Theresa May visited the White House for the first time, Trump made a public statement to “continue to support” the Special Relationship in a joint press conference with May. As it turned out, however, all this was a sham for a lack of sustainability. Trumps UK policy in the past two years since he took office showed that he deliberately ignored the Special Relationship to a greater extent than any other US President since the end of the Second World War.

First, in terms of etiquette, Trump does not go by rulebook and does not give the British side “face”. In January 2017, May flew to Washington as soon as Trump entered the White House, becoming the first foreign leader to visit the US since Trump took office. According to the tradition of US-UK relations over the 70 years since the WWⅡ, Trump shouldve paid a return visit to the UK at an early date. In addition, the newly elected President of the US usually makes his first visit to the UK. However, Trump chose Saudi Arabia instead, and Israel and Vatican after that, and still bypass the UK when attending NATO summit in Belgium, a neighbor country of the UK. To avoid the troubled Britain was apparently not because “he cant afford the time”, but to put Britain at the back of his diplomatic agenda. Such a rarity in the postwar history of US-UK Special Relationship causes people to speculate whether Trump intentionally ignore the Special Relationship. Second, at the policy level, Trump clearly does not treat the bilateral relations as it is a special one. One, Trump didnt offer a helping hand to Britain when it was caught in the Brexit dilemma. Mays rush to visit the US and meet Trump just a week after he entered the White House was driven by the fact that she was trapped in the Brexit negotiations and was eager to secure the first bilateral trade deal for the UK when Britain leave the EU. However, Trump did not actively respond to the British sides desire, and did not reach any trade agreements or intentions with the UK that would suit its post-Brexit needs and benefit the UK. Two, Trump seldom played up the Special Relationship since he took office more than two years ago, which proves that he deliberately ignored the Special Relationship. Trumps visit to the UK in July 2018 was downgraded to a work visit because of the anti-US and anti-Trump atmosphere in the UK at that time. In June 2019, Trump finally made an official visit to Britain, during which he made no mention of the Special Relationship, not only making no contribution to “revive” the Special Relationship as hoped by the UK side, but instead showing to the world that to him, the so-called Special Relationship was nothing but unrequited supplication of the UK. Three, Trump went even further to throw indiscreet remarks over British affairs. He expressed rude comments on the mass terrorist attack in London in June 2017 instead of offering sympathy and understanding. He accused the British intelligence agencies for their espionage against him. He even cited military and intelligence security as grounds to coerce the British side away from 5G technology and projects offered by Chinese Huawei. Four, the US and the UK also have serious differences on some major issues in international affairs such as the operation of NATO and whether to maintain the so-called “rules-based post-war international order”.

Trumps series of disregard for the Special Relationship aroused strong anti-Trump and anti-America sensation in Britain. Nearly 2 million London citizens signed a petition ahead against Trumps first visit to the UK. Before his second visit, polls showed that 70 percent of the British public didnt approve of Trump, and the British parliament said it wouldnt accept Trumps delivery of speech there. In July 2019, the confidential cable by British ambassador to the US to the British government on how the Trump Administration is “incompetent” “unreliable” and “messily managed” was leaked, causing angry response from Trump, and the forced resignation of the ambassador. This was another heavy blow to the already precarious Special Relationship. The cable from the British ambassador reflected the anger of the British government and public at the Trump Administrations inaction and even schadenfreude towards the UKs Brexit dilemma, as well as the frustration of the British side of its helplessness at the Special Relationship.

Why does Trump deliberately

ignore the US-UK Special

Relationship?

The Special Relationship, forged after WWII and lasted for over 70 years, was based on two specific historical conditions. One, it was the strategic need of the US and UK as Cold War allies against Soviet Union. Two, as the third largest power after the WWII, Britain still had the strength and qualification to maintain the Special Relationship with the US, which can help the US in the implementation of its global strategy. The analysis of the evolution of these two specific historical conditions can be used as a starting point to explore why Trump deliberately ignores the Special Relationship.

The post-WWII international strategic situation had two major features: one was that the US, with the firm support of the UK, fought with the Soviet union for the dominance of the postwar world, geopolitical advantages and ideological superiority, and thus triggered the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union; two was that most non-western countries in colonial and semi-colonial status in Asia, Africa and Latin America were gradually awakened during the second world war, and demanded post-war independence, autonomy and breakaway from the European and American colonial rule or hegemony. Their fight took aim directly at the US and the UK, sending shocks across western countries against their colonial rule and hegemony. These two features determine the specific interlink of interests and mutual strategic needs between the US and the UK in the postwar world. For Britain, the biggest strategic challenge after the WWII was to maintain its “imperial legacy”, colonial rule and status as a global power in the face of the general awakening and independence demands of the vast number of colonies under its direct rule. For the US, its biggest strategic challenge was to stem the global tide that would go against it, contain Soviet Union, and realize the dream of “l(fā)eading” the postwar world. Therefore, the US and Britain urgently need to embrace each other for all-around strategic cooperation.

The end of the cold war was once regarded by the US, Britain and other western countries as a victory of the western “democratic system” over the socialist system and ideology and as the “end of history”. They celebrated that and sought to transplant western democratic system to non-western countries. While pursuing unipolar hegemony, the US was eager to promote westernization, democratization and America-style globalization in the world. The National Security Strategy reports from George Bush to Clinton administration were all about “expanding democracy” and “shaping” non-western countries. Although the strategic need of building the Special Relationship between the US and the UK was reduced to a certain extent due to the fact that the US lost its all-around “systemic rival” because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US still saw some value in the Special Relationship, as it helped in the process of building a general alliance among western countries led by itself after the cold war, as well as implementing its “expanding” and “shaping” strategy. More than that, a succession of the Gulf war, Kosovo war, Afghanistan war, Iraq war and the post-9?11 global war on terrorism after the cold war provided a certain opportunity for the continuation of the Special Relationship. All the American Presidents after the cold war more or less emphasized that the Special Relationship was still of great strategic value to the US, and that was also the case with the British side.

At present, the international strategic situation has undergone new changes not seen in a century. The biggest change is the relative decline of the US as the super power and the rise of China as the worlds second largest economy. China-US relations have entered the so-called “new normal”. Another major change is the “collective rise” of non-western countries mainly in Asia-Pacific region. The economic aggregate of non-western countries has surpassed that of western countries represented by the US, Europe and Japan, and the economic and trade aggregate of the Asia-Pacific has also surpassed that of Europe, and replaced the Europe-Atlantic region as the geopolitical center of the world. It is in this new dynamic that Trump has been thrusted onto the stage of history.

Different from his predecessors after the second world war that treat “l(fā)eading the world” as top priority, Trump recognized that the relative decline of American power made it difficult to shield its Western allies, thus put forward the “America first” “economy first” policy designed to protect American hegemony, and cut substantially its “responsibility” to and intervention policy in western countries and across the globe.

Trumps “America first” and “economic first” strategies have greatly weakened Americas strategic reliance on Britain, making it no longer an urgent strategic need to maintain the Special Relationship. In other words, Trumps deliberate disregard for the Special Relationship is caused by the interest and strategic repositioning of the US. Such a policy adjustment is the national behavior of the US government towards the UK, and Trumps personal preference is not a key factor. In addition, Trumps indifference to the Special Relationship is related to the decline of British power, which brings back to the conclusion that the Special Relationship is less helpful to the US due to the decline of British power. From the perspective of strength, the US was the worlds biggest power after WWII. The UKs military power, especially its long-range projection capability and global influence, still exceeded other western countries except the US despite the post-WWII decline of its national strength, making it the main military aid of the US in the cold war against the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the face of the complex post-WWII international situation, especially the cold war against the Soviet Union, not only was the US willing to maintain the Special Relationship with Britain, but Britain also had the corresponding strength to maintain it with the US. However, after the end of the cold war, Britains comprehensive power and its “usefulness” to the US in implementing its global strategy presented a freefall decline. Although Britain sought to maintain or even “revive” the Special Relationship after the cold war, and to keep pace with the US in some major international issues such as sending troops in the Gulf war, Kosovo war, Iraq war and Afghanistan war, the performance of the British army on the battlefields, due to the limit of its strength and capability, were often surprisingly below expectation, nowhere near its performance during the second world war. In addition, by 2017 when Trump took office, the GDP ranking of the UK had dropped from the third place in the world and the second place among western countries when Churchill proposed the Special Relationship between the UK and the US to the ninth place in the world and the seventh place among western countries. In terms of military spending, the UK dropped to seventh place in the world in 2017 from the third place at the early post-WWII days, behind countries such as Saudi Arabia and India.

In a word, in the 20 years since the end of the cold war, British power and the mutual strategic needs between the US and the UK have been declining. However, the Special Relationship between the US and the UK has continued to this day, only to experience a freefall drop after Trump took office. Compared with his predecessors, Trump neglects the Special Relationship to a greater degree, not only because of the two factors of less mutual strategic need and less usefulness of Britain to US strategy due to its power decrease, but also triggered by Trumps leadership style and his “America first” “economy first” policy.

Will the Special Relationship “End” in Trumps Presidency?

The answer to the question of whether the Special Relationship will “end” in Trumps presidency depends on how to define “end”. If “end” is defined by the discontinuation of strategic cooperation between the US and Britain in international arena, the answer then is no, because such cooperation will continue in some areas of international affairs in the future, such as their tacit understanding on and cooperation in suppressing Irans oil exports. If “end” means the two sides no longer work closely and support each other as they did in all kinds of actions against the Soviet Union during the cold war, then indeed, the Special Relationship is coming to its end, and reduced to “normal state-to-state relations”. Under such circumstances, although the US and the UK do not exclude strategic cooperation on certain issues and at certain occasions, such cooperation is only the “general state-to-state” one, away from the so-called Special Relationship. It is worth noting that although both Britain and the US believe that “common language, values, democratic system”, economic and political ties and personnel exchanges are the basis of their bilateral relations, the two countries have different rhetoric and emphases on the Special Relationship and its cultural and social foundation. The British side set great store by the Special Relationship, while the US side only mention the “history of the Special Relationship”, without referring to the specific term Special Relationship. It is not difficult to see that the British sides particular emphasis on the cultural, social and value foundation of the relationship between Britain and the US is a lament for the shaky Special Relationship when it can do nothing to save it, whereas the US side makes similar statements only with a perfunctory tone. In judging whether the US-UK Special Relationship will “end” in Trump presidency, three factors need to be highlighted.

First, the US and Britain do share common “cultural identity”, “history and values”, and the “shared inheritance” of Anglo-Saxon blood lineage, languages and laws, the exact important basis for Churchill to put forward the concept of Special Relationship. More than that, from the strategic cooperation during world war I and world war II to the long-term cooperation over the 70 years after WWII, the US and Britain have accumulated over 100 years of cooperative assets, experience and “inertia”, as well as extensive economic and social ties. So far, the US is still the UKs largest export market and one of its biggest sources of imports. In addition, the two countries have cooperation foundation in multilateral mechanisms and international institutions, and such cooperation will go on in the future. Therefore, even if the Special Relationship comes to an end, the two countries will still maintain “normal” friendly and cooperative relations, or even strategic cooperation within a certain scope. In the short term, it is difficult to distinguish the bilateral cooperation to be the “general state-to-state one” or a special one within the framework of the Special Relationship. This will indeed increase the complexity and difficulty to judge whether the Special Relationship will “end”.

Second, the Special Relationship is a continuation and development of wartime alliance between the US and the UK during WWII centered on relations on strategy and security matters? and cooperative relations on military security, thus making cooperation between the two countries in peacetime take on the characteristics of wartime military alliance. British scholar Barry Buzan criticized such as a “supernormal security” phenomenon. During the cold war, the so-called “supernormal security” permeated every aspect of international politics, as the international community took the side either with the US or with Soviet Union at that time, with almost all of the international political and economic life being incorporated into the framework of the US-Soviet Union cold war, and with the cold war thinking of confrontation applied to problem solving. This constitutes another background against which the US and the UK maintained Special Relationship and long-term wartime alliance in peacetime. But under Trumps “America first” “economy first” strategy, he cut down Americas participation in and intervention of international affairs, suggesting the thinking of de-supernormal security. As Trump is not passionate about maintaining the Special Relationship in peacetime, he therefore acts in deliberate disregard for the Special Relationship. For Trump, the US only get to maintain Special Relationship with one country, and that country is none other than the United States!

Third, is there sustainability in Trumps deliberate disregard for the Special Relationship? This depends not only on whether trump can be re-elected, but also on whether Trumps “America first”, “economic first” and de-“supernormal security” strategy is his individual whim or represents the long-term interests of the US and thus enjoys broad popular foundation. The discussion on this issue will cause more controversy. If Trump wins a second term, it may not bode well for Britains efforts to “revive” its Special Relationship with the US.

Conclusion

In 2005, the then British liberal democrat foreign affairs spokesman William Wallace, in the presence of troubles in the US-UK relationship, wrote, there are Israel, Australia, Mexico, Italy, Poland, and even Saudi Arabia that have Special Relationship with the US , with the UK being just one of them. he believed that the US and Britains Special Relationship is “dead”. Since entering the White House, Trump paid less attention to the so-called Special Relationship than any other US President since the end of the cold war. If Wallace were to write another article on the Special Relationship, he would be surer than he did in 2005 of its “death”. Although this article does not fully agree with the “death” statement about the Special Relationship, it goes along with the view that it is transitioning to the “general state-to-state relationship”, and that the Special Relationship is approaching the “end”. It is clear that the future of the Special Relationship is no longer a matter of “ending” or not, but of how to prolong its last gasp.