英文摘要

Abstracts

Institutional Coordination and the Future Asian Security Architecture

LI Kaisheng

Due to the diversity and complexity of security issues in Asia， the highest priority of Asian security in the long run is how to coordinate all kinds of security regimes， rather than to construct a strong and integrated security architecture at the regional level. The current architecture is facing fundamental challenges. Firstly， the offensive， confrontational alliances are proliferating while defensive， collective regimes are scarce. Secondly， the current regimes are always irrelevant to the existential problems， which results in the weird co-existence of redundancy and deficit of security regimes. Lastly， the China-U.S. structural conflict has not been managed effectively because of little coordination among major security regimes and great powers. To overcome these challenges， the China-U.S. interaction is the key to find the fundamental solution. Then， a system of security regimes based on Asian realities should be built on three levels. The first level is a forum which is led by Asian countries and participated by China and the U.S. in order to achieve more dialogues and mutual trust. The second level is a regional concert of regimes or even collective security regime incorporating neighboring countries or countries sharing common security concerns. The third level is coercive regimes established to address specific problems， which are led by China and the U.S. and participated by other parties. A coordinated security architecture will thus come into being when these regimes of different levels， domains， and issues are integrated.

Prospects of an Asia-Pacific Security Framework：

Path Difference and Spectrum of Models

FENG Shuai

The current security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region come from three directions： the remnants of the Cold War structure， structural strategic conflict， and non-traditional security issues. These security problems， with different timeframes， appear in the Asia-Pacific region simultaneously and result in a complex systemic security dilemma. Therefore， the basic standard to assess the effectiveness and feasibility of the future security framework is the ability to deal with all the three types of security issues at the same time. Since Asia-Pacific countries have obvious different attitudes on the key issues such as the root of security problems， basic theory， core structure， target of construction， and basic principles， different countries in the process of building the security framework will inevitably result in path difference. Six models of regional security architecture are now taking shape in the Asia-Pacific region： the alliance system model， EAS model， Sino-American joint governance model， CICA model， sub-regional coordination model， and ASEAN-led model. Base on the assessment of their efficacy， the author depicts the basic spectrum of models of the Asia-Pacific security framework， in order to forecast its future evolution.

The Evolution of Security Concept and Security Cooperation within the CICA Framework

QIANG Xiaoyun

The complexities and urgency of Asian security situations calls for a new Asian security architecture. The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia （CICA）， with most Asian countries as its members， could help establish such a new Asian security architecture. CICA has played a unique role in promoting peace and security， enhancing mutual trust and understanding among member states. Nowadays， Asia is facing common， comprehensive， cooperative， sustainable security challenges， and the security concept is also evolving and improving. The New Security Concept for Asia， which China advocates， has become CICAs core security concept. The dynamics behind CICAs focus on security cooperation include respecting and accommodating the security concerns of CICA members， and upholding mutual security trust via dialogue and cooperation. The future security cooperation under the CICA framework should advocate the New Security Concept， overcome the lack of community awareness， the lack of community of interests， the lack of community of responsibility， the lack of a common destiny， actively implement the confidence-building measures， and contribute to Asias security and stability.

Private Security Companies in Security Governance in Southeast Asia

XING Ruili and LIU Yanfeng

Against the background of economic globalization， the main actors of governance are multiplying and the trend of security privatization is becoming increasingly prominent. Riding on the two inexorable trends， private security companies proliferate and thrive. On the one hand， because of their own advantages and characteristics， private security companies in Southeast Asia have gradually become a new actor of governance and play a different role from others in regional security and governance. On the other hand， private security companies also give rise to new troubles， including challenging the state monopoly of violence， excessive use of violence， and unruly behavior， to name just a few. Therefore， it is necessary and urgent to strengthen the regulation， guidance， supervision， and evaluation of private security companies. We should bring private security companies into the Asia-Pacific new security architecture and make it work together with the state to play a supporting role in security governance， and maintain regional security and stability.

On Building a Chinese Counterterrorism Mechanism Led by the National Security Commission

LI Benxian， MEI Jianming， and LIN Yunxiang

Terrorism poses a serious security challenge to China. Terrorist organizations are multiplying， their members younger and better networked. Explosive and suicidal terror attacks result in heavy casualties. Extremist groups in the Middle East proliferate and make inroads into Chinese territory， compounding the existing security risks. The establishment of the National Security Commission is an inevitable choice to compensate for the shortcomings in Chinas counterterrorism architecture， intelligence system， armed forces， logistics， and international counterterrorism cooperation. To be more specific， a Chinese counterterrorism architecture aims to erect a national security commission-led security barrier against terrorism to facilitate the implementation of the “Belt and Road” strategy by improving organizational structure， intelligence， expertise， and resources for counterterrorism.

Strategic Choices for Chinas Sea Power and Navy Buildup：

A Maritime Security Perspective

YANG Zhen and FANG Xiaozhi

After the Cold War， China has devoted itself to the development of its sea power potential to become a maritime power. However， China is facing severe maritime security challenges， and its sea power development is constrained by the U.S. maritime supremacy， disputes between China and its neighbors over maritime rights and interests， and non-traditional maritime security threats. For the moment， there are three predictions relating to Chinas sea power strategy development， i.e. irrelevant sea power， supporting sea power， and dominant sea power. In consideration of Chinas actual demands and maritime security environment， neither irrelevant sea power nor supporting sea power can guarantee Chinas sea interests. Dominant sea power is the ideal choice for China to develop its sea power to become a maritime power. As the constituent core of Chinas sea power， the Navy must realize overall transformation in operational concept and capabilities， service strategy， and organizational structures.

Path Analysis of Chinese International Energy Security Agenda-Setting

WEI Jinshen

Energy security is of great strategic importance in Chinas peaceful development strategy. Involvement in international agenda-setting is an effective way of ensuring Chinas energy security. The author proposes an analytical framework for international energy security agenda-setting， analyzes the feasibility of Chinas setting the international energy security agenda in terms of practical needs， capabilities， will， experience and opportunity， and assesses the constraints on Chinas agenda-setting efforts. The article reaches the following conclusion： the Chinese government should seek deeper integration into the multilateral regimes on international energy security by broadening its access to international agenda-setting. Taking both Chinese and global interests into account， China should define energy issues accurately， unveil more practical alternative policy， and introduce workable policy options.

TTIP Negotiations：

Process， Trends， and the China Factor

NIU Weigan & WANG Xuekai

Currently， between United States and Europe， the negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement （TTIP） are becoming increasingly specific. Preliminary agreement has been reached on market access. But in terms of specific regulations and rules， opinions between the two sides are so largely divided that it is estimated that a general agreement will not be reached until at least 2017. Even so， more comprehensive agreements and more specific topics are pending and need to be further optimized， improved， and enriched. Recalling the process of TTIP negotiations， the first three rounds focused on market access； the fourth and the fifth shifted focus onto the transitional， initial text， while the sixth to the ninth rounds focused on regulations and rules. Although TTIP will pose challenges to China， it cannot ignore the China factor. Therefore， the most important thing for China is to continue to deepen its own comprehensive reform， to make itself more powerful， and in this course put forward new theories and ideas on international relations， advocate innovation in international economic rules and mechanisms， and build partnerships to the extent of economic alliance， in order to prepare for its leadership role in the economic sphere. China should also further promote its partnership with Europe and make the best use of the divisions between the United States and the European Union to better serve Chinas interests.

A Study of the U.S. Foreign Aid System and Implications for China

SUN Mingxia

The United States is one of the first countries that have established an integrated legal system for its foreign aid. The U.S. foreign aid system is mainly composed of a legal framework revolving around the Foreign Assistance Act and an organizational structure which has USAID as the core executive agency. Such a system ensures the stability and the main principles of implementation and management of U.S. foreign aid programs. At the same time， the U.S. Congress passes related legislations and the executive branch gives executive orders according to requirement of specific foreign policy goals in different periods. Besides， new foreign aid agencies and other federal agencies are established when needed， which ensures the feasible and real-time implementation of American foreign aid programs. It is also important to point out four problems in the U.S. foreign aid system which includes the outdated Foreign Assistance Act and numerous complicated executive orders encumbering the operation of foreign aid agencies， the lack of a cabinet-level foreign aid agency， failure to distinguish between foreign aid goals and less effective interagency cooperation. As China rises， its foreign assistance has increased drastically. How to make its foreign assistance programs effective and useful has become an important concern for China. It is strategically important to study the advantages and disadvantages of the U.S. foreign aid system so as to draw some useful lessons for China in this regard.