East Asia 120 Years Ago

Powder Keg

Before the mid-19th Century， Asian geopolitics was characterized by three major players： China， Japan， and Korea. Due to its natural geographical disadvantage as an isolated island and the resulting insecure mentality， Japan has persistently desired a presence on the mainland. Thus， its neighbor Korea， and even China， richer in raw materials and products and accessible by water， were seen as paradise to ambitious Japan. In history， with this mindset， Japan twice entered Korea， and frequently tasted China. However， every attempt at piercing China failed during the powerful Tang （618-907） and Ming （1368-1644） dynasties， leaving Japan without a door or window.

However， such exploration still resulted in “going westward”as a traditional goal for Japan. Thus， when the Qing Dynasty（1644-1911） had become rotten to the core by the late 19th Century， Japan finally saw the possibility of achieving its centuries-old goal. At the time， the weak Qing was struggling to maintain its historic rights to the Korean Peninsula， Russia was gaining influence in Korea， and emerging Japan went all-out in every fight， in hopes of determining East Asia’s future and considering the battle for Korea most vital to the destiny of the nation.

Actually， before Japan openly revealed its ambitions， Korea was already considerably troubled. The reason Korea became a hotly contested spot for several powers was not only its central， peninsular geographical location， but more so its weak national power and corrupt ruling class. Geographically “encircled” by China， Russia， and Japan， small Korea was experienced in dealing with big powers and familiar with methods to buy some room in the past. However， since Korea’s two most influential aristocratic groups were depending on different countries and had been fighting each other for decades， struggles became even more ferocious.

In 1876， Japan forced Korea to sign the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876. The pact opened up Korea and granted Japan many “rights”such as consular jurisdiction. After that， Japan’s influence began penetrating the peninsula. In 1882 in Seoul， the Imo Incident， a revolt of some units of the Korean military， occurred. Various factions were confronted in the mutiny， and both China and Japan sent troops to restore order， as well as secure their respective interests in Korean politics. Although the Qing Dynasty took the upper hand in the disturbance， Japan later signed the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1882， also known as Treaty of Chemulpo， with Korea， gaining the right to station troops in Korea and laying a foundation for further action. In 1884， Japan pushed pro-Japan Korean leaders to launch the Gapsin Coup， an attempt to drive China’s influence out of the country. The coup was soon suppressed by Yuan Shikai， a Qing general who led the Chinese military in Korea. However， Japan， using the coup as an excuse， signed the Convention of Tientsin with China in 1885， which stipulated that both Japan and China would withdraw their troops from Korea and notify each other if they were dispatched to Korea again. Thus， with an explicit expansion strategy， Japan， which was not yet strong enough， began laying groundwork for its eventual rise.

In 1894， the Donghak Peasant Revolution broke out in Korea. Adherents of Donghak， a Korean folk religion， hoping to “drive out Japanese and Western powers，” launched an armed rebellion. At the request of the Korean government， the Qing administration sent troops to Korea. Japan， which had been hoping to invade Korea for a long time， also quickly sent troops， thus lifting the curtain for the First Sino-Japanese War.

Crossroads

When looking at the late Qing Dynasty today， most see darkness and believe that the declining power had deteriorated tremendously before the First Sino-Japanese War. However， a careful study of historical documents reveals that many Chinese and even foreigners felt good about short-term prosperity during the reigns of Emperors Tongzhi （1856-1875） and Guangxu （1875-1908）.

The Qing Empire had already wiped out many domestic rebellions. Over 30 years of learning from the West was yielding noticeable results. Many believed that with time， the centuriesold empire would become a completely modern country， with technological， military， and economic reforms unfolding. At the same time， China’s military equipment was already becoming more modern and advanced， and the country’s Beiyang Fleet was a dominant navy and the largest fleet in Asia. The Sino-French War in 1885， a limited conflict determining whether France would supplant China’s control of Tonkin （northern Vietnam）， didn’t even worry Qing rulers greatly. On the contrary， Chinese armies performed well in battles in Taiwan’s Keelung and Guangxi’s Zhennanguan， better than in other 19th-Century foreign wars， helping the Chinese public feel even more secure.

After the Sino-French War， France declared that Asia was in the hands of three powers： Russia， Britain， and China， with itself in distant fourth. From this statement， we can perceive China’s global standing at the time. Many observers， from both East and West， were optimistic about China’s future. They believed that China was about to rise， and the country， with vast territory and a huge population， would become the greatest power in the world and overtake power from both East and West if it carried out positive reform.

In such an environment flavored with lofty expectations， it’s easier to see how Chinese elites viewed their own country compared to Japan， a small neighbor to the east.

Japan also stood at a critical historical crossroads. In the late 19th Century， the Meiji Restoration （1868-1912） lasted more than two decades. Japan dove into a fast track towards modernization and its national strength was enhanced through various measures such as learning from the West and developing industry. However， small size and resource scarcity crushed outlooks on the country’s future.

In 1885， Fukuzawa Yukichi， an early Japanese liberal ideologist， published an essay， Escape from Asia， in a newspaper， testifying that Japan’s plans to break through such limitations had become more specific. In 1893， after Japan passed eight successive proposals for naval expansion， Yamagata Aritomo， then-Japanese President of the Privy Council， declared in an armament opinion book that Europe was maintaining the balance of power， and that war wouldn’t break out in the near future. However， Western powers were already planning invasions in the East. He predicted that 10 years later， after the Trans-Siberian Railway began operation， would the invasion plans finally reach the agenda. If a war with Russia was on the horizon， Japan absolutely had to secure dominance over Korea and engage in war with China as soon as possible， in order to emerge as the leading power of East Asia. Yamagata not only predicted the First Sino-Japanese War， but also the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War.

It was obvious that before the First Sino-Japanese War， after decades of efforts towards modernization， both China and Japan had reached critical points to break from their existing patterns. Compared to the Qing Empire’s passive and reluctant attitude， Japan， as a smaller country， was more aware of crisis and exhibited greater initiative. After the First Sino-Japanese War， Japan became the most powerful country in Asia： It not only expanded colonial interests through controlling Korea and Taiwan， but also established a gold standard system with the massive reparations paid by the Qing administration， thus beginning competition with other powers for the international market. It is fair to say that through the First Sino-Japanese War， Japan realized leapfrog development and set a foundation for becoming an international power of the future. After the war， the Qing slumped in international status and Western powers rushed into China to secure colonial interests. Few in the Qing administration supported further reform and small revolutions began to take place. The Qing’s “transformation” then veered down a road which had never been imagined.

One-Man Navy

In the summer of 1891， Ding Ruchang， admiral of the Beiyang Fleet， visited Japan with six cruisers. During his visit， at a banquet hosted by Kabayama Sukenori， an admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy， Ding suggested that the navies of China and Japan work together to defend against Western powers. If they oppose each other， it only provides opportunity for “outsiders”.

After the results of the First Sino-Japanese War were clear and negotiation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki began， Li Hongzhang， an important politician and diplomat of the late Qing Dynasty responsible for the negotiation， urged Japan many times to consider Sino-Japanese relations from a new starting point of establishing long-tern friendship. He stated that China and Japan were neighbors which shared similar genes and cultures and had both been victims of bullying by Western powers. “We should work together to maintain Asia’s stability and make sure Asian people are not oppressed by Europeans，” Li stated.

Although Ding and Li’s statements were diplomatic， the Qing administration indeed didn’t attach enough importance to Japan and didn’t consider it a major threat before the First Sino-Japanese War. Also， due to conflict amongst various internal factions， the Beiyang Fleet lacked solidarity. Thus， it is understandable that after the war， Li Hongzhang lamented that Japan fought with all its national power， while he was the only invested resource from China. Some Western publications even suggested that Japan was not fighting with the Qing Empire， but rather with one person， Li Hongzhang.

From available details， we can now see how Japan prepared for the war. Before the First Sino-Japanese War broke out， a game became popular in Japan’s primary schools. Kids were divided into two groups， one dubbed the Qing fleet and the other the Japanese fleet. The goal of the game was for the “Japanese fleet” to capture Dingyuan and Zhenyuan： two major battleships of the Qing navy. This child’s game has been widely discussed in books and essays on the First Sino-Japanese War. The majority of analysts deem it evidence of Japan’s profound military and civilian education efforts fostering fanatic aggression and expansion. Despite whatever efforts helped their cause， historians also see Japan’s pragmatism and rationality behind craze.

In 1885， the Qing administration purchased Dingyuan and Zhenyuan， two ironclad battleships. In August 1886， the Qing fleet sailed for Japan’s Nagasaki for “military repairs”. Qing’s intention to intimidate Japan was obvious， but they got the opposite result. When Japan saw the majestic fleet at Nagasaki port， they were overwhelmed with complicated feelings of jealousy， surprise， and anger. However， they quickly channeled their anger and selfabasement into practical and goal-oriented preparation for war.“We must beat down Dingyuan” even became a popular slogan for Japanese sailors.

From July 1889 to March 1891， Japan designed and constructed three cruisers， Itsukushima， Matsushima， and Hashidate in succession. Each of them consisted of one breech-loading 320-mm Canet gun to one-up Dingyuan and Zhenyuan’s 305-mm Krupp guns. And their top speeds eclipsed Dingyuan and Zhenyuan. To surpass the Beiyang Fleet in terms of firepower and speed， Japan purchased the armored cruiser Yoshino， then the fastest in the world， from the UK in 1892.

Against the background of Japan carrying out specific war preparations based on the Qing navy， the above-mentioned kids’game seems fitting. Japanese rulers’ change in mentality， from pure anger and envy to rationality， within such a short time， provides a banquet of thought even today.