俄羅斯200海里以外大陸架劃界案介評

潘 軍

俄羅斯200海里以外大陸架劃界案介評

潘 軍*

劃定200海里以外大陸架的外部界限,對于沿海國的政治、經濟和軍事具有深遠的戰略意義,對于世界海洋的新格局至關重要。聯合國大陸架界限委員會對首例200海里以外大陸架劃界案——俄羅斯2001年劃界案的審議和建議,使俄羅斯以及各沿海國切實體會到依據國際法將本國大陸架擴展至領?；€200海里以外的復雜性和艱巨性。首次受挫的俄羅斯目前一方面以務實的態度不斷與周邊國家協調并通過各種方式積極營造國際氛圍,一方面在科學數據等方面繼續勘測,為重新提交劃界案積極準備。俄羅斯劃界案的得與失對于各沿海國,尤其是海洋劃界困難重重的中國,提供了可借鑒的科學和法律實踐。

俄羅斯 大陸架界限委員會 200海里以外大陸架 外部界限劃界案

俄羅斯①俄羅斯劃界案2001年12月20日提交,參見俄羅斯劃界案主頁,下載于http://www.un. org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm,2012年5月1日。是第一個根據1982年《聯合國海洋法公約》②The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(1833U.N.T.S.3),at http:// treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en. pdf,1 May 2012.(以下簡稱“《公約》”)向聯合國大陸架界限委員會③聯合國大陸架界限委員會,聯合國系統的一個專門委員會,設立于1997年,專司200海里以外大陸架外部界限事項,其職能為審議沿海國200海里以外大陸架劃界案并提出建議以及應沿海國要求對其編制劃界案提供技術咨詢,迄今已歷3屆(1997年、2002年、2007年)。(以下簡稱“委員會”)提交200海里④1海里等于1852米。以外大陸架劃界案的國家,涉及4個不同的海域,其中兩個位于北極地區(中北冰洋和巴倫支海),兩個位于西北太平洋(鄂霍次克海和白令海),涉及200海里以外大陸架總面積約158萬平方公里。①匡增軍:《俄羅斯的外大陸架政策評析》,載于《俄羅斯中亞東歐研究》2011年第2期,第74頁。委員會經過審議,于2002年7月27日通過建議書, 4個海域的申請當時均未獲得委員會的認可。自建議書通過之后至今的近10年內,俄羅斯進行了一系列鍥而不舍的艱苦努力,預計在2012年重新提交劃界案。本文擬結合發達國家的最新研究成果,對俄羅斯劃界案的來龍去脈作一簡要回顧及粗淺評述。

一、200海里以外大陸架法律制度及《公約》第76條對大陸架外部界限的界定

(一)200海里以外大陸架法律制度

歷時9年(1973—1982)的第三次聯合國海洋法會議,②第三次聯合國海洋法會議創造了以往國際關系史上參加國最多、規模最大、時間最長的3個之“最”,也是國際法編纂史上所擬公約條文最多的一次,《公約》包括一個序言、17部分共320條以及9個附件。中國代表團自始至終參加了第三次聯合國海洋法會議的各期會議。經過艱苦卓絕的談判誕生了一項涵蓋先前數項公約③1958年聯合國第一次海洋法會議時所訂立的4項公約:《領海與毗連區公約》、《公海公約》、《捕魚及養護公海生物資源公約》以及《大陸架公約》。的全新海洋法公約——1982年《聯合國海洋法公約》?！豆s》是人類歷史上迄今為止最為全面、最為完整的海洋法典(各海洋區域范圍的示意參見圖1)?！豆s》根本性地變革了大陸架的法律概念,④一般認為,大陸架的法律概念經歷了從1945年美國總統杜魯門的《大陸架公告》,到1958年第一次聯合國海洋法會議的《大陸架公約》(第1條),再到1973—1982年第三次聯合國海洋法會議的《聯合國海洋法公約》(第76條)的演化過程。其第76條及附件二成為目前劃定200海里以外大陸架外部界限的綱領性國際法文件。

(二)《公約》第76條對大陸架外部界限的界定

《公約》第76條第1款規定:“沿海國的大陸架包括其領海以外依其陸地領土的全部自然延伸,擴展到大陸邊外緣的海底區域的海床和底土,如果從測量領海寬度的基線量起到大陸邊的外緣的距離不到200海里,則擴展到200海里的距離。”該款提出了大陸架外部界限的兩個標準:“自然延伸”標準和“200海里距離”標準。沿海國可對號入座選擇符合本國大陸邊狀況的標準。大陸邊外緣超過領?；€200海里時,則須根據第76條第4～7款劃定界限。

第4款規定:“(1)為本《公約》的目的,在大陸邊從測量領海寬度的基線量起超過200海里的任何情況下,沿海國就應以下列兩種方式之一,劃定大陸邊的外緣:(a)按照第7款,以最外各定點為準劃定界線,每一定點上沉積巖厚度至少為從該點至大陸坡腳最短距離的1%[即“愛爾蘭公式”①由參加第三次聯合國海洋法會議的愛爾蘭地質學家P.R.R.加德納提出,故命名為“愛爾蘭公式”。線];或(b)按照第7款,以離大陸坡腳的距離不超過60海里的各定點為準劃定界線[即“海登堡公式”②由參加第三次聯合國海洋法會議的美國地質學家H.D.海登堡提出,故命名為“海登堡公式”。線]。(2)在沒有相反證明的情形下,大陸坡腳應定為大陸坡底坡度變動最大之點。”第4款界定的兩條線稱為“公式線”,沿海國亦可對號入座聯合適用這兩條公式線,即取其外部包絡線成為最大公式線而盡量擴展外部界限。

第5款規定:“組成按照第4款(1)項(a)和(b)目劃定的大陸架在海床上的外部界線的各定點,不應超過從測算領海寬度基線量起350海里,或不應超過連接2500米深度各點的2500米等深線100海里。”第5款界定的兩條線稱為“制約線”,沿海國同樣可對號入座聯合適用這兩條制約線,即取其外部包絡線成為最大制約線而盡量擴展外部界限。

最后將分別由第4款得到的最大公式線和第5款得到的最大制約線進行內部包絡,即可初步建立符合沿海國最大利益的200海里以外大陸架的外部界限(參見圖2)。當然這條界限的具體位置及組成線段的長度還要受《公約》第76條第3款③《公約》第76條第3款規定,大陸邊包括沿海國陸塊沒入水中的延伸部分,由陸架、陸坡和陸基的海床和底土構成,它不包括深洋洋底及其洋脊,也不包括其底土。(深洋洋脊條款)、第6款④《公約》第76條第6款規定,雖有第5款的規定,在海底洋脊上的大陸架外部界限不應超過從測算領海寬度的基線量起350海里。本款規定不適用于作為大陸邊自然構成部分的海臺、海隆、海峰、暗灘和坡尖等海底高地。(海底洋脊條款)以及第7款⑤《公約》第76條第7款規定,沿海國的大陸架如從測算領海寬度的基線量起超過200海里,應連接以經緯度坐標標出的各定點劃出長度各不超過60海里的若干直線,劃定其大陸架的外部界限。(定點間距條款)等條款的制約。

圖1 《公約》各海洋區域范圍示意圖①

圖2 沿海國大陸架最大可能的外部界限示意圖①

二、俄羅斯2001年劃界案的提交和審議

(一)俄羅斯劃界案的提交

俄羅斯2001年12月20日根據《公約》第76條第8款以及《公約》附件二第4條通過聯合國秘書長(以下簡稱“秘書長”)向委員會提交劃界案。②聯合國海洋事務和海洋法司官方網站(以下簡稱“海法司官網”)同日發布了自委員會設立以來的第一份大陸架公告,①See CLCS.01.2001.LOS,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_English.pdf,1 May 2012.并聲明:本公告分發給聯合國全體成員國以及《公約》締約國……對劃界案審議完畢后,委員會應按照《公約》第76條對俄羅斯提出建議,秘書長應妥為公布這些建議,俄羅斯在這些建議的基礎上劃定的大陸架界限應有確定性和約束力。海法司官網第二天又發布了更為詳細的新聞公告,②See Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf Receives Its First Submission,at http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sea1729.doc.htm,1 May 2012.列明對俄羅斯劃界案的審議應包括在委員會第10屆會議的議程中,正式表明受理俄羅斯劃界案。在秘書長按照《大陸架界限委員會議事規則》③See Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf(CLCS/ 40/Rev.1),at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/309/23/PDF/ N0830923.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.(以下簡稱“《議事規則》”)第50條④《議事規則》第50條規定,秘書長應通過適當渠道,迅速將收到劃界案一事通知委員會和聯合國全體成員國,包括《公約》締約國在內,并在完成翻譯第47條第3款所述的執行摘要后公布執行摘要,包括委員會《科學和技術準則》(以下簡稱“《準則》”)第9.1.4節所述載于摘要內的所用海圖和坐標。散發大陸架公告并公布俄羅斯劃界案執行摘要的部分信息后,加拿大、丹麥、日本、挪威以及美國5個國家做出反應,5國對俄羅斯劃界案中涉及與本國利益相關的直接或間接事項紛紛提交了維權照會。這些照會涉及的相關問題對委員會審議俄羅斯劃界案以及做出的建議產生了重要影響。

(二)俄羅斯對劃界案提交期限的處理

《公約》于1997年4月11日對俄羅斯生效,因而2007年4月11日應是俄羅斯提交劃界案10年期限的原始截止日期。2001年5月第11屆《公約》締約國大會決定將提交劃界案的截止日期更改為2009年5月13日。⑤《公約》附件二第4條的規定,沿海國家必須向委員會提交劃界案,“……應盡早而且無論如何應于本公約對該國生效后10年內提出……”?！豆s》于1997年4月11日對俄羅斯生效,意味著俄羅斯將必須在2007年4月11日之前提交劃界案?！豆s》締約國大會主要是考慮提交劃界案的技術難度以及發展中國家提交劃界案的具體困難,將10年提交期限的起算日期更改為1999年5月13日,即《準則》的公布日期。See SPLOS/72,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/387/64/PDF/N0138764.pdf? Open Element,1 May 2012.俄羅斯本可以享受上述待遇,但俄羅斯最終決定在2001年提交劃界案,比最后期限提前了7年半。分析其背后的原因有幾個方面:首先,由于是首例劃界案,委員會的審議在法律程序、數據的科學性等諸環節上肯定會存在一些不確定性和漏洞,俄羅斯很想鉆這個空子;其次,科技進步有可能使舊數據到2009年時變為不再被廣泛接受的次優數據,提交國不得不為新數據采集和重新計算邊界進行昂貴投資;再次,劃界案的編制需要長期規劃,包括對大量關鍵的科學和法律方面的技術專長的維護,間斷性意味著由于關鍵工作人員的變更而使政府失去這種技術專長;最后,締約國大會對10年期限的更改并不完全符合修訂《公約》的相關規定,①參見《公約》第312、313條涉及的《公約》的修正及簡化修正程序。只是一種假定的功能等同,這種更改不能約束隨后加入或批準《公約》的任何國家,如果在《公約》界定的原始期限之外提交劃界案則有可能會遭到它們的挑戰。但提前提交劃界案也有負面影響,比如委員會為了樹立其聲譽,對首例劃界案的審議必定會異常嚴格;再如由于對一些頗具爭議的科學問題(如羅蒙諾索夫海嶺的性質)的處理無先例可循,委員會對一些關鍵問題不敢妄下結論等等。

(三)委員會對俄羅斯劃界案的審議

委員會根據《公約》附件二第5條和《議事規則》第42條成立了審議俄羅斯劃界案的7人小組委員會。②《公約》附件二第5條規定,除委員會另有決定外,委員會應由7名委員組成的小組委員會執行職務,小組委員會委員應以平衡方式予以任命,同時考慮到沿海國提出的每一劃界案的具體因素……向委員會提出劃界案的沿海國可派代表參與有關的程序,但無表決權?！蹲h事規則》第42條第1款規定,如果委員會根據《公約》附件二第5條的規定,決定設立小組委員會審議一個劃界案,委員會應……從被提名候選人中任命小組委員會成員7人。負責審議俄羅斯劃界案的7人小組委員會由Galo Carrera Hurtado(墨西哥,主席)、Karl H.F.Hinz(德國,副主席)、Peter F.Croker(愛爾蘭,報告員)、Alexandre Tagore Medeiros de Albuquerque(巴西)、Lawrence Folajimi Awosika(尼日利亞)、Iain C.Lamont (新西蘭)以及Yong Ahn Park(韓國)組成。俄羅斯劃界案的最初審議列入了委員會2002年3月25日至4月12日在紐約舉行的委員會第10屆會議的議程中。在該次會議上,俄羅斯自然資源部副部長I.葛魯莫夫介紹了俄羅斯劃界案,并認為加拿大、丹麥、日本、挪威以及美國的照會不構成委員會審議劃界案的障礙。③See CLCS/31,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/318/60/ PDF/N0231860.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.葛魯莫夫還邀請委員會以實地核查相關數據庫為目的訪問俄羅斯,但委員會從未光顧。小組委員會在2002年4月1日至4月12日期間共召開了20次會議,其中6次是專門以問答形式與俄羅斯專家團之間進行磋商,共提出了36個問題,俄羅斯專家團提供了書面答復。小組委員會要求俄羅斯就劃界案的某些事項提交額外的數據和資料,然后在第一屆委員會成員任期2002年6月15日屆滿前的6月10—14日重新召開會議繼續審議劃界案,包括俄羅斯2002年5月15日提交的補充資料。為獲得包含地震軌道線、多波道地震及條狀水深方面的最新數據,海法司還安排委員會訪問了美國拉蒙特—道荷地球天文臺,④拉蒙特—道荷地球天文臺,下載于http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamont%E2%80% 93Doherty_Earth_Observatory,2012年5月1日。并對比了美國“科學冰川探索”①SCICEX(Science Ice Exercise),at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCICEX and http:// nsidc.org/scicex/,1 May 2012.項目的SCICEX/99數據。②Suzette V.Suarez,The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf-Legal Aspects of their Establishment,Berlin/Heidelberg/New York:Springer Press Ltd.,2008,p.193.小組委員會的建議于2002年6月14日編制完畢,并提交委員會于2002年6月24—28日舉行的第11屆會議。在按照《公約》附件二第5條的相關法律程序處理了有關俄羅斯代表參會的程序性事項后,委員會繼續以非公開會議的形式審議俄羅斯劃界案和小組委員會的建議。小組委員會主席卡雷拉先生介紹了小組委員會的工作及其建議,委員會提出若干修訂后于2002年7月27日協商一致通過了小組委員會的建議,并按《公約》將書面建議書提交了秘書長和俄羅斯。

(四)委員會對俄羅斯劃界案建議的簡短摘要

與處理對澳大利亞劃界案的建議③See Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Australia on 15 November 2004,recommendations adopted by CLCS on 9 April 2008,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_ new/submissions_files/aus04/aus_summary_of_recommendations.pdf,1 May 2012.相比,委員會和秘書長處理俄羅斯劃界案相當低調,委員會迄今未編寫一份較為完整對外公布的關于俄羅斯劃界案的建議的摘要,④See CLCS/60,paragraph 59,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N08/523/33/PDF/N0852333.pdf?OpenElement,1 May 2012.秘書長只是將建議高度濃縮為極其簡短的結論性摘要后,作為向第57屆聯大提交的《海洋年度報告的增編》(以下簡稱“《增編》”)⑤See Oceans and the law of the sea/Report of the Secretary-General*Addendum(A/57/ 57/Add.1),paragraphs 38～41,at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/SG2002Oceansan dthelawoftheseareport.pdf,1 May 2012.對外公布。如此操作的原因應該是:其一,委員會受理的首例劃界案基本上是無果而終,大肆宣揚似乎很不相襯;其二,未決爭端是劃界案未果的重要原因之一,利益相關國異常敏感,聯合國盡量避免在國際社會挑起更多事端;其三,當事國俄羅斯受挫后也不愿意讓國際社會過多了解其劃界案的核心內容,不利于其后續申請;其四,由于無先例可循,委員會在處理劃界案的科學問題上更多是嘗試性的,成熟后擴大公開內容和公開范圍較為妥當。

《增編》在概要性介紹劃界案的審議過程之后指出,委員會的建議載有對俄羅斯所提交數據和資料的審查結果,其中特別提到俄羅斯對200海里以外大陸架的權利,以及是否按《公約》第76條規定適用了公式線和制約線的問題。關于巴倫支海和白令海,委員會建議,與挪威在巴倫支海以及與美國在白令海的劃界協定一旦生效,即向委員會提供劃界線的海圖和坐標,①《議事規則》第54條第2款規定,根據《公約》第84條,在劃定海岸相向或相鄰國家間大陸架界限時,標明依照《公約》第83條規定劃定的分界線的海圖和坐標,應交存聯合國秘書長和國際海底管理局秘書長。作為俄羅斯在兩海域的200海里以外大陸架外部界限。關于鄂霍次克海,建議俄羅斯就其在該海域北部的200海里以外大陸架提交一份資料完備的劃界案,該部分劃界案不應妨害南部相關國家的海洋劃界問題。南部劃界案可在其后提出,建議俄羅斯盡最大努力按《議事規則》附件一第4條與日本達成協定。關于中北冰洋,建議俄羅斯根據建議所載的審查結果,修訂其在該海域的劃界案,顯然委員會認為俄羅斯提供的數據不足以證明相關主張依據與俄羅斯陸塊存在自然聯系。另外,此處未提及任何其他國家,表明該海域的劃界案與存在《議事規則》附件一意義上的領土或海洋爭端并無直接聯系。

如果沿海國不同意委員會的建議,《公約》和《議事規則》均允許沿海國在合理時間內向委員會提交修訂的或新的劃界案。②《議事規則》第53條第4款規定,沿海國不同意委員會建議的,應依照《公約》附件二第8條規定,在合理時間內向委員會提出訂正的或新的劃界案。《公約》附件二第8條規定,在沿海國不同意委員會建議的情形下,沿海國應于合理期間內向委員會提出修訂的或新的劃界案。但對“合理時間”一語未作定義,亦未規定沿海國通知委員會對其建議表示異議的最后期限。迄今為止未曾有任何修訂或新的劃界案(相對原始劃界案而言)提交給委員會。俄羅斯于2003年6月3日函復了委員會的建議,信內載有一些問題和評論但內容未公布,尚不清楚俄羅斯是否同意委員會的建議。負責審議劃界案的小組委員會編寫了回復,委員會同意了回復內容和所采取的方法并隨后轉交給俄羅斯。③See CLCS/39,paragraph 20 and http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N04/359/63/PDF/N0435963.pdf?OpenElement,1 May 2012.至此,俄羅斯劃界案的第一階段(即2001年的申請)告一段落。

三、俄羅斯2001年劃界案概況

沿海國劃界案的執行摘要按規定應該在海法司官網對外公布,由于存在劃界爭端和科學數據可信性兩項主要原因,俄羅斯只同意公布部分信息,公布信息的條目和數量都是最低限度的,邏輯上也不很清楚,給人一種不得已而為之的印象。由是觀之,俄羅斯不希望公眾了解其劃界案的清晰脈絡,澳大利亞劃界案的執行摘要則與之形成鮮明對比,公眾通過海法司官網很快就能對澳大利亞劃界案形成清晰的輪廓。

俄羅斯同意公布的信息包括3幅海圖以及5個單頁文字信息(單頁1至單頁5)。①See page 1～5,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ RUS_page1_Arctic.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ rus01/RUS_page2_Arctic.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ files/rus01/RUS_page3_Pacific.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page4_Pacific.pdf and http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page5_Legend.pdf,1 May 2012.3幅海圖分別為俄羅斯大陸架外部界限總圖②See the map,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS _CLCS_01_2001_LOS_1.jpg,1 May 2012.以及在北冰洋和太平洋的大陸架外部界限示意圖(參見圖3、圖4),值得注意的是3幅海圖在繪圖方式、顏色選取以及圖例說明上各不相同,羅列在一起不太符合常規表達,相比之下,澳大利亞所有性質相同的海圖均使用統一方式繪制。單頁1是關于俄羅斯在北冰洋擬議大陸架界限以及執行摘要行文中所使用的縮寫和符號的簡短說明;單頁2是確定俄羅斯在北冰洋擬議大陸架外部界限的32個定點的信息(較詳細);單頁3是確定俄羅斯在白令海擬議大陸架外部界限的21個定點信息(較粗,只提供了經、緯度坐標),且該頁前部的行文中存在明顯的矛盾之處;③例如,該頁第一段載明“北冰洋大陸架的外部界限由圖3顯示……”,但執行摘要的圖3卻是關于西北太平洋的海圖。單頁4是關于俄羅斯在白令海和鄂霍次克海擬議大陸架界限的簡短說明(無任何定點坐標信息);單頁5僅是將3幅海圖的圖例說明羅列在一起而沒有其它內容,并無多少參考價值。以上5個單頁明顯是從俄羅斯劃界案執行摘要主文及海圖中截取、拼湊而成,處理得又較粗,所以在行文文字、單頁內容的邏輯順序、繁簡以及頁面效果等方面的問題比較明顯。

由于委員會內部嚴格的保密規則,④《議事規則》附件二第2條第1款規定,提出劃界案的沿海國,可以將依照第45條規定提交的任何未予公開發布的數據和其他材料列為機密……;第3款規定,沿海國列為機密的材料,在劃界案審議完畢后,應繼續予以保密,除非委員會在有關沿海國的書面同意下另有決定。無法直接得知俄羅斯2001年劃界案中援引的法律條款和科學依據的具體細節,本文只能利用各有關國家的反應以及學者們的著述來探討俄羅斯劃界案的詳細內容。⑤T.Gorski,A Note on Submarine Ridges and Elevations with Special Reference to the Russian Federation and the Arctic Ridges,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol. 40,2009,pp.51～60.

四、俄羅斯2001年劃界案的主要相關問題

(一)在巴倫支海與挪威的海洋劃界爭端

巴倫支海是北冰洋靠近歐洲大陸的陸緣海之一,以16世紀荷蘭探險家W.巴倫支的姓氏命名,為斯堪的那維亞半島、斯瓦爾巴群島、熊島、法蘭士約瑟夫地群島、新地島、科爾古耶夫島、卡寧半島以及科拉半島所包圍(參見圖5),南部為深入俄羅斯大陸的海灣白海。巴倫支海面積約141萬平方公里,平均水深229米,最大水深600米,南部的大陸架面積達127萬平方公里,中西部橫亙著幾處深海溝,北部局部海底有臺地,東南多淺灘。①Barents Sea,at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/53189/Barents-Sea,1 May 2012.

挪威和前蘇聯1957年曾在瓦朗厄爾峽灣劃定部分海洋邊界,但多年來未能就巴倫支海的海洋邊界達成一致。爭端區域位于東部挪威主張的中間線與西部俄羅斯聯邦主張的經線之間。由于存在劃界爭端,俄羅斯提交劃界案后,挪威隨即提交了較為溫和的照會。②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/NOR,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__NORtext.pdf,1 May 2012.挪威照會主要強調以下幾點:其一,巴倫支海中部相當大的區域是挪威和俄羅斯各自領?；€200海里以外的區域,其重疊部分的未決劃界應是《議事規則》附件一第5條意義上的海洋爭端(挪威提交了兩份體現挪威和俄羅斯各自劃界立場的坐標表);其二,該區域是完全位于兩國領?；€350海里界限之內的大陸坡腳向陸區域;其三,根據《公約》第76條第3、4及5款,該區域可由兩國直接協議劃界而無須委員會進行技術評估;其四,挪威同意委員會審議俄羅斯劃界案中的爭端區域,但不得妨害挪威與俄羅斯聯邦之間的海洋劃界事項;其五,該照會是與俄羅斯在相關問題上達成一致后提交的。

另外,挪威2006年11月27日也向委員會正式提交劃界案,③See Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean,the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea,Executive Summary,at http://www.un.org/Depts/ los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf,1 May 2012.涉及東北大西洋和北冰洋三處200海里以外大陸架的主張:巴倫支海的“環形圈區域”、西南森海盆區域以及挪威海的“香蕉洞”區域。俄羅斯同樣引用《議事規則》附件一第5條對挪威劃界案提交照會,要求委員會對挪威劃界案的審議不得妨害俄、挪間的劃界事項。④See Russia’s Note,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/ rus_07_00325.pdf,1 May 2012.委員會對巴倫支海區域提出的建議與對俄羅斯的建議如出一轍:一

旦兩國締結的劃界協定生效,即向委員會提供該海域劃界線的海圖和坐標,以標明兩國在巴倫支海200海里以外大陸架的外部界限。①See Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean,the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2006,at http://www.un. org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf,1 May 2012.

圖5 2010年俄羅斯—挪威《巴倫支海條約》劃界示意圖①

(二)在鄂霍次克海與日本的海洋劃界爭端

鄂霍次克海是西北太平洋的一個邊緣海,為堪察加半島、千島群島、北海道島、庫頁島(亦稱薩哈林島)以及東西伯利亞的一段海岸所包圍。通過薩哈林灣、韃靼灣以及拉彼魯茲海峽與日本海相連(參見圖6),因俄羅斯在遠東的第一個殖民地鄂霍次克而被命名。鄂霍次克海面積約158萬平方公里,平均深度859米,最大深度3372米,北部和西部的大陸架約占海底面積的42%,中部的帶狀大陸坡約占48%,南部的千島海盆約占9%,蘊藏約12億噸石油和15億立方米天然氣。

俄羅斯與日本在該海域長期存在未決爭端,焦點是北方四島(以下簡稱“四島”)的領土主權。①擇捉島、國后島、色丹島以及齒舞島四島,是位于太平洋西北部的千島群島的向南延伸部分,日本稱之為北方領土或北方四島,俄羅斯稱為南千島群島,總面積約5000平方公里。目前隸屬俄羅斯薩哈林州,居民絕大多數是來自前蘇聯各地的移民?！岸稹苯Y束后四島被前蘇聯占領,日本一直堅持認為這是非法占領,并堅持四島的主權始終屬于日本。See Kuril Islands Dispute,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuril_Islands_dispute,1 May 2012.四島北連堪察加半島,南接日本海,西瀕鄂霍次克海,東臨太平洋,扼守鄂霍次克海進入太平洋的海上通道,具有重要軍事戰略意義。②冷戰期間,鄂霍次克海是美國海軍監控前蘇聯海軍海底通信電纜的幾次成功軍事行動(包括“常春藤之鈴”行動)的地點,也是1983年前蘇聯斯特拉尼防空部隊攻擊大韓航空007航班的現場。目前俄羅斯將鄂霍次克海用作太平洋艦隊彈道導彈潛艇的隱蔽所。日、俄17世紀后期就開始了對四島的爭奪。自19世紀中期至“二戰”結束的近一百年間,經過1855年的《日俄和親通好條約》(又稱《下田條約》)、1875年的《圣彼得堡條約》、1905年的《樸茨茅斯條約》、1945年的《雅爾塔協定》和《波茨坦公告》以及1951年的《舊金山和約》,③See Treaty of Shimoda,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Shimoda;Treaty of Saint Petersburg,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Saint_Petersburg_(1875); Treaty of Portsmouth,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Portsmouth;Yalta A-greement,at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c04.html;Potsdam Declaration, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration;Treaty of San Francisco,at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm,1 May 2012.包括四島在內的千島群島的主權輾轉于俄(蘇)、日之間,目前四島在俄羅斯的實際掌控之下。

如果失去四島,僅憑北海道將使日本在鄂霍次克海的利益幾乎喪失殆盡。俄羅斯劃界案擬議的大陸架界限侵入了北海道和四島的近海海域,而且將四島的基點和基線作為基準使用,因而受到日本強烈挑戰。④Michael Sheng-Ti Gau,Third Party Intervention in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Regarding a Submission Involving a Dispute,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,pp.61～79.日本指出,由于目前四島主權爭端的存在,俄羅斯劃界案存在程序性缺陷。日本請求委員會審議時不要僅參考由俄羅斯提交的海圖及附屬資料,不要預斷兩國間的四島主權爭端以及大陸架的劃界問題。①See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/JPN,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions _files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__JPNtext.pdf,1 May 2012.日本認為,按照《議事規則》附件一第5(b)款和《準則》第9.1.4(d)款,②《議事規則》附件一第5(b)款規定,向委員會提出的劃界案和委員會就劃界案核定的建議,不應妨害陸地或海洋爭端當事國的立場。《準則》第9.1.4款規定,執行摘要將含有以下資料:……(d)委員會《議事規則》第44條和附件一所述任何爭端。俄羅斯應告知委員會爭端存在,并應采取措施確保其劃界案不會妨害兩國的劃界事項。

(三)在白令海與美國的海洋劃界爭端及1990年美蘇邊界協定

白令海是太平洋沿岸最北的邊緣海,面積約230萬平方公里,平均水深1636米,最大水深4773米,北以白令海峽與北冰洋相通,南以阿留申群島與太平洋相隔(參見圖7),因1728年丹麥船長V·白令首先發現而命名。③Bering Sea,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Sea,1 May 2012.前蘇聯與美國在楚科奇海、白令海以及北太平洋的海洋邊界線長達1390海里,為國際海洋邊界長度之最,由1990年《美利堅合眾國與蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟之間的海洋邊界協定》(以下簡稱《1990年協定》)確定。④See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary,at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/USA-RUS1990MB.PDF,1 May 2012.該協定由當時的蘇聯外長謝瓦爾德納澤與美國國務卿貝克代表兩國政府于1990年6月1日在華盛頓簽署,俄方習慣將這條海洋邊界線稱為“謝瓦爾德納澤線”。這條海洋邊界線比中間線向蘇聯一側靠近了大約200海里,導致白令海和楚科奇海原屬前蘇聯約2萬平方公里的經濟海域劃歸美國,但協定規定只有在兩國議會獲得通過以后才能正式生效。由于明顯對美國有利,該協定在美國國會沒費任何周折一年內便順利通過,而蘇聯最高蘇維埃未批準該協定,但當時兩國外長互換了照會,同意以臨時協議的形式生效。俄羅斯自獨立以來一直認為前蘇聯在《1990年協定》中吃了大虧(白令海未按中間線劃界),讓俄羅斯承受這一結果不公平,故俄羅斯國家杜馬亦未批準該協定。

俄羅斯一反常態在劃界案中采用了1990年邊界,背后有幾個原因:其一,感到在其它幾個海域(尤其是鄂霍次克海和中北冰洋)立刻獲得委員會認可的可能性不大,俄羅斯欲“借”1990年邊界在白令海先有所突破;其二,《1990年協定》已通過臨時協議形式生效,俄羅斯心理上已有接受傾向;其三,如果廢除該協定,另行談判劃界代價較大,即使再次談判美國也不會輕易接受俄羅斯的中間線方案;其四,向美國暗示俄羅斯非正式接受《1990年協定》,期望盡可能減小美國對俄羅斯劃界案的阻力;其五,模糊處理是為了日后與美國在白令海的劃界上討價還價,以彌補前蘇聯造成的損失。但采用1990年邊界會創設俄羅斯以一般慣例方式遵守《1990年協定》的國際義務,如果美國證明俄羅斯基于法律義務或必要性遵守了該協定,俄羅斯就要受其約束,①D.J.Bederman,International Law Frameworks,2nd ed.,New York:Foundation Press, 2006,pp.16～17.這就意味著俄羅斯將可能失去與美國重新劃界的可能性。

對于俄羅斯直接采用1990年邊界的做法,美國一方面竊喜,另一方面又不失時機地在照會中重提俄羅斯國家杜馬未批準的事實。②美國在照會中指出,盡管俄羅斯國家杜馬事實上尚未批準該條約,但俄羅斯的劃界案使用了《1990年協定》中的邊界。美國還指出,使用該邊界與俄羅斯和美國的預期穩定的共同利益是一致的,而且與《公約》附件二第9條規定的委員會的行動不應妨害海岸相向或相鄰國家之間有關界限劃定的事項一致。美國這樣做是因為:其一,雖然《1990年協定》已通過互換照會的方式生效,但由于蘇聯解體導致了國際法上的條約繼承問題,所以美國一直希望俄羅斯國家杜馬早日批準協定,以便使美、俄間的海洋邊界在國際法上確定下來;其二,美國暗示俄羅斯,美國不接受俄羅斯以在劃界案中提及的方式表態,希望俄羅斯以正式方式批準《1990年協定》,防止俄羅斯日后節外生枝;其三,由于美國迄今尚未批準《公約》而無法有效參與200海里以外大陸架的劃界,只能從側面對俄羅斯劃界案設置障礙、施加壓力。

圖8 北冰洋海底示意圖①

(四)在中北冰洋的地質數據問題以及與北極周邊國家的糾紛

1.北冰洋海底地形概況

北冰洋海底(參見圖8)被羅蒙諾索夫海嶺、α-門捷列夫海嶺及加科爾海嶺分割。羅蒙諾索夫海嶺靠近歐亞大陸一側的歐亞海盆被加科爾海嶺分割為南森海盆和弗拉姆海盆,深度3300～3700米,最大深度5499米。羅蒙諾索夫海嶺靠近北美大陸一側的美亞海盆被α-門捷列夫海嶺分割為加拿大海盆和馬卡洛夫海盆,深度3000～3500米,最大深度4683米。

羅蒙諾索夫海嶺從加拿大北極群島的埃爾斯米爾島開始,沿西經60°北延伸至北極點附近轉向,然后沿東經140°向南延伸至俄羅斯的新西伯利亞群島,是北冰洋的主要水下洋脊,高峻而陡峭,支配著整個海盆的地形,全長約1800公里,高于海底3300～3700米,最小深度是954米。①Lomonosov Ridge,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lomonosov_Ridge,1 May 2012.現已證明羅蒙諾索夫海嶺雖有火山活動但不具備《準則》所描述的地震活動的相關特點,且表面褶皺不明顯,主要由沉積巖和變質巖組成,并非全球洋中脊系統的一部分。前蘇聯北極勘探隊1948年首次發現該海嶺,后以俄羅斯科學家M·V·羅蒙諾索夫的姓氏命名。

α-門捷列夫海嶺是由α海嶺和門捷列夫海嶺組成的一個海嶺系統,與羅蒙諾索夫海嶺大致平行,規模稍小,起自俄羅斯北部弗蘭格爾島北側,延伸至加拿大北部埃爾斯米爾島東北側與羅蒙諾索夫海嶺匯合,全長約1500公里,相對高度較小,坡度平緩,距洋面約2000米,最高峰距洋面約800米,形成年代約8000萬年前。前蘇聯北極勘探隊1948年首次發現該海嶺,1987年起以俄羅斯科學家D·I·門捷列夫的姓氏命名。

加科爾海嶺,也稱南森海嶺,自俄羅斯勒那河口延伸至丹麥格陵蘭島北側,與穿過冰島而來的北大西洋海嶺連接,長約2000公里,與羅蒙諾索夫海嶺大致平行。加科爾海嶺上有許多裂巖,有平行于軸向延伸的磁異常條帶,還有垂直于軸向的橫向斷裂帶,因此是全球洋中脊體系的組成部分。前蘇聯北極勘探隊1948年首次發現該海嶺,1987年起以俄羅斯探險家Y·Y·加科爾的姓氏命名。

以上三大海嶺的名稱,均獲大洋水深制圖委員會②GEBCO,at http://www.gebco.net/,1 May 2012.下屬的國際海底地理名稱命名分委員會③Undersea Feature Names,at http://www.gebco.net/data_and_products/undersea_feature_names/,1 May 2012.批準。④International Hydrographic Organization/Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, IHO-IOC GEBCO Gazetteer,at http://www.gebco.net/about_us/meetings_and_minutes/documents/gebco_scufn_15_report.pdf,1 May 2012.美國地質勘探局經過為期4年的勘察,2008年7月首次證實了北冰洋可能蘊藏830億桶石油和44萬億立方米的天然氣。⑤M.Byers,Who Owns the Arctic?Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North,Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.42,2009,p.89.正是由于北冰洋巨大的資源儲備以及日趨重要的軍事戰略地位,使得北極周邊各國在數百年前就開始的北冰洋爭奪愈演愈烈。

2.俄羅斯爭奪北冰洋的歷史淵源

俄羅斯有1/3的領土位于北極圈內,一直將北極視為其傳統勢力范圍。早在彼得大帝時期,沙俄就多次組織對北極的考察,收集相關地理和地質信息。⑥在18-19世紀的所謂“北方探險”期間,沙俄就已有居民進住北極地區。到19世紀前半葉,俄羅斯建立了12個大規模的居民區分散在阿拉斯加,直到1867年將阿拉斯加賣給美國。1926年4月15日,前蘇聯演繹了加拿大根據“扇形原則”①1907年加拿大參議員P.波伊采爾首次提出“扇形原則”,即位于兩條經線之間直至北極點的一切土地應當屬于鄰接這些土地的國家。進行的主張北極海域的國家實踐,由前蘇聯中央執行委員會主席團單方面宣布《關于蘇聯在北冰洋的土地和島嶼領土公告》(也稱《1926年命令》),宣告東經32°04′35″至西經168°49′30″之間以科拉半島、楚科奇自治區及北極點為基準的約119萬平方公里(占北冰洋45%)的三角形地帶(以下簡稱“三角地”)為前蘇聯所有,并將其正式標注在前蘇聯時期的國家地圖上(俄羅斯在前蘇聯解體后仍然延續這一標注)。②L.Timtchenko,The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept:Past And Present,ARCTIC,Vol. 50,1997,pp.29～35,or at http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/arctic/Arctic50-1-29.pdf,1 May 2012.20世紀30年代,前蘇聯開始在北極冰蓋上建立考察站,并向北極地區“適度移民”。前蘇聯1948年首次發現羅蒙諾索夫海嶺,至今仍是俄羅斯自稱的對北極地區領土訴求的“科學和歷史依據”。

但時至1997年,情況發生重大變化。出于經濟、戰略等因素的綜合考慮,俄羅斯不想置身于1982年《公約》之外。北極海域事實上屬全球未劃界海域之一,《公約》締約國只能根據《公約》的規定主張領海、毗連區、專屬經濟區以及大陸架等國家管轄海域,因此俄羅斯不得不在1997年簽署《公約》,從而喪失對“三角地”單方面主張的所有權。俄國內一直有人指責加入《公約》非常荒謬,但隨著國力復蘇,俄收回“三角地”的愿望與日俱增。一旦收回“三角地”,俄羅斯在經濟上將攫取北冰洋的大部分油氣資源,在軍事上將憑借獨特的地緣優勢贏得戰略主導權而確保大國地位。③近年來,俄羅斯的戰略生存空間不斷被歐美國家擠壓,出海口也被西方封堵,爭奪北冰洋、打開北冰洋出海口成為維護俄羅斯戰略安全的重要考慮。一旦收回“三角地”,如果北冰洋通航,俄羅斯的北方艦隊便可隨時進出北大西洋和北太平洋。俄羅斯一直處心積慮想把羅蒙諾索夫海嶺這條北冰洋的“脊梁”納入囊中,并于2001年向委員會提交200海里以外的大陸架劃界案,以“扇形原則”、羅蒙諾索夫海嶺以及α-門捷列夫海嶺為主要支撐主張中北冰洋區域200海里以外的大陸架,但未被委員會認可。

3.其它利益相關國對北冰洋的爭奪

(1)加拿大

近代國際法中獲得領土的一項重要原則就是“先占”原則,即對“無主地”的發現和有效占領,18—19世紀英國憑借其航海優勢率先對包括北極列島和西北航道④Northwest Passage,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest_Passage,1 May 2012.在內的諸多北極區域“先占”,但并未獲得國際社會的廣泛承認。1880年英國將上述區域的所謂“主權”移交給加拿大,成為目前加拿大對包括西北航道在內的部分北極區域主張主權的根源。20世紀50年代加拿大曾宣布對北極擁有主權,亦未得到國際社會的承認。此外,加拿大與美國對西北航道(美國主張是國際開放水域和國際航道)以及波弗特海一塊2.1萬平方公里區域的主權歸屬長期存在爭端;與丹麥對漢斯島主權的爭奪持續了近40年(自1973年起),①漢斯島位于北緯80°西經66°,長1.3公里,寬1.2公里,面積約1.3平方公里,為鄰近北極且無人監管、居住的小荒島。如果在未來的海洋劃界中給予效力,其周圍海床蘊藏的石油和天然氣資源相當可觀,而且對于連接北冰洋和內爾斯海峽航道的控制權至關重要,因此受到丹麥、加拿大、俄羅斯等國家的爭奪。1973年丹麥與加拿大試圖在內爾斯海峽劃界未果,引起迄今未決的主權爭端。1984年時任丹麥格陵蘭事務大臣的T.H?yem曾到訪漢斯島,在當地插上丹麥國旗并在旗竿底埋下一瓶白蘭地酒,留下一張“歡迎丹麥”的字條。此后丹麥和加拿大經常開展“旗幟”戰爭,雙方考察人員輪番登島宣布主權。2005年加拿大軍隊登島后插上加拿大國旗,并在旗竿底埋下一瓶加拿大黑麥威士忌。加拿大郵局還煞有介事地正式給北極分配了編號“HOHOHO”,圍繞漢斯島的沖突近年來大有升級之勢。漢斯島對于未來劃界以及航道的控制權具有重要意義。

對于俄羅斯劃界案的中北冰洋部分,當時尚未成為《公約》締約國的加拿大的照會僅一般維權性指出,在無進一步支持數據供分析的情況下,加拿大無法確定是否同意俄羅斯的劃界案,且無法評論不應解釋為同意或默許,俄羅斯劃界案以及委員會做出的任何建議不得妨害加、俄間的大陸架劃界問題。②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/CAN,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__CANtext.pdf,1 May 2012.國際北冰洋海底地形圖③IBCAO,at http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/IBCAO_betamap. jpg,1 May 2012.顯示,α-門捷列夫海嶺和羅蒙諾索夫海嶺距加拿大埃斯米爾島非常近,加拿大也想日后基于兩海嶺提出北冰洋的大陸架主張。雖然加拿大與俄羅斯就兩海嶺存在潛在重疊劃界問題,但由于兩海嶺的地質特征目前尚無定論,加上加拿大照會未提及任何具體問題且措辭平淡,故委員會未對加拿大照會做出特別回應。加拿大為提交自己的劃界案,自委員會對俄羅斯劃界案做出建議后,便把加入《公約》以及收集北冰洋海底數據提到議事日程之上。

(2)丹麥

丹麥對北極區域的爭奪主要是基于格陵蘭島。移居冰島的挪威人公元982年發現了格陵蘭島,1261年格陵蘭成為挪威的殖民地。1397年丹麥、瑞典及挪威締結《卡爾馬條約》,組成斯堪的納維亞共主邦聯,格陵蘭處于三國共管之下。1524年該邦聯瓦解后,格陵蘭又轉屬于丹麥—挪威雙重君主國。1814年丹麥、挪威分治,丹麥根據《基爾條約》重獲格陵蘭。④See Treaty of Kalmar,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kalmar; Treaty of Kiel,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kiel,1 May 2012.后挪威與丹麥對格陵蘭歸屬又起爭執,海牙國際法庭1933年判歸丹麥。1979年5月1日起格陵蘭實行內部自治,2008年11月25日格陵蘭舉行了自治公投,2009年6月21日格陵蘭成為一個內政獨立但外交、國防以及財政相關事務仍由丹麥掌管的過渡政體。⑤Greenland,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland,1 May 2012.此外,格陵蘭島與埃爾斯米爾島之間內爾斯海峽內的漢斯島,是丹麥在北極區域爭奪的另一個焦點。

對于俄羅斯劃界案的中北冰洋部分,當時尚未成為《公約》締約國的丹麥提出的維權性照會與加拿大照會相似,即指出:丹麥不能對俄羅斯劃界案形成意見,專業評估需要更具體的數據,不發表意見并不意味同意或默許俄羅斯劃界案,并且俄羅斯劃界案和委員會的任何建議不得妨害丹麥與俄羅斯之間的大陸架劃界。①See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/DNK,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__DNKtext.pdf,1 May 2012.國際北冰洋海底地形圖顯示,羅蒙諾索夫海嶺的一端位于格陵蘭的大陸架上,丹麥正是基于這一點試圖證實該海嶺是格陵蘭大陸架的自然延伸,藉此主張北冰洋200海里以外的大陸架?；谂c加拿大相似的原因,委員會亦未對丹麥照會做出特別回應。自委員會對俄羅斯劃界案做出建議后,丹麥亦把加入《公約》以及收集北極區域海底數據提到議事日程之上,為提交劃界案積極準備。

(3)美國

由于美國對北極地區不具備地緣優勢,又不甘忍受俄羅斯、加拿大等北極大國搶占北極利益,所以美國一直堅持北冰洋屬于國際水域。美國國會1984年正式通過《北極考察和政策法案》,把美國對北極的科學研究、經濟利益以及戰略考量三者聯系在一起以法律的形式確定下來。1993—2000年美國海軍協助科學界共進行了6次“科學冰川探索”項目的北極任務。作為該項目的后續研究計劃,美國2010年6月又制定了“科學冰川探索II”②SCICEX Phase II Science Plan,at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/scicex_plan.pdf, 1 May 2012.項目計劃,意在與其它北極大國進行科考較量,為日后爭奪北極做準備。

對于俄羅斯2001年劃界案,美國是唯一提到科學和技術方面問題的國家。美國2002年2月28日向委員會提交的照會認為,③See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.俄羅斯劃界案涉及北極大陸架主張的部分存在重大缺陷,最要害的部分就是關于羅蒙諾索夫海嶺和α-門捷列夫海嶺地質構造問題。美國照會首先指出,根據《公約》第76條第3款,大洋洋脊不能被認為是第76條意義上的自然延伸,為質疑俄羅斯劃界案埋下伏筆,即如果羅蒙諾索夫海嶺和α-門捷列夫海嶺被定性為大洋洋脊,俄羅斯將失去其主張的依據。為給俄羅斯劃界案設置障礙,美國利用其在海洋地質領域的科技優勢,極力提出相關反證。

關于α-門捷列夫海嶺,美國直接提供了地質解釋:日益增多的地質和物理證據表明,α-門捷列夫海嶺是巖漿從“熱液口”④“熱液口”是發源于地幔至少持續存在數千萬年的巖漿源,其上覆地殼在大陸漂移跨越熱液口的過程中,熱液口間歇產生火山噴發。溢出并向一億兩千萬至三千萬年前沿在北冰洋發育的美亞海盆的擴散軸擴散、堆積,在新形成的大洋地殼上形成的約35公里厚的熱液口火山洋脊,即大洋地殼上的熱液口通過火山噴發機制形成的一個單一連續的地質特征的表層形態。美國從水深、航磁、地震以及基巖等4個方面提出了α-門捷列夫海嶺與俄羅斯大陸邊不相連的具體證據:航空磁測和水深數據顯示該洋脊整個橫跨北冰洋,其航磁特征在大陸邊的兩端消失,而且未在相鄰的大陸架出現……該海嶺上發現的巖石是典型的遠離陸地的深洋洋脊類型,而非大陸架上發現的更迅速沉積且通常較粗粒度的流層類型,且基巖類型全部起源于加拿大西北部,并廣泛分布于北冰洋的美亞海盆。因此,α-門捷列夫海嶺是僅發育在美亞海盆大洋地殼上的、具有海洋起源的火山型洋中脊,而不是任何國家大陸架的組成部分。這個論點對俄羅斯劃界案是致命的,因為《準則》指出,與熱液口處地殼運動相關的火山活動形成的洋脊,很可能是大洋洋脊而非大陸架的自然延伸。

關于羅蒙諾索夫海嶺,美國認為該海嶺是由于海底擴張從斯堪的納維亞和俄羅斯西北部大陸邊分離出來的大陸性地質結構,是北冰洋海盆大洋深處一個獨立的地形特征,不是火山活動的產物,是由玄武巖組成的洋中脊,因而不是俄羅斯或任何其它國家大陸邊的自然組成部分。美國還提供了大量在α-門捷列夫海嶺發現巖石源的證據。但近年來,美國國內各種政治勢力圍繞是否批準《公約》以及美國未來的海洋權益的博弈始終沒有停止。目前,美國政府主導美國學界對羅蒙諾索夫海嶺性質的態度發生根本性轉變,有極力主張羅蒙諾索夫海嶺與相關陸塊存在較強地質聯系的趨勢,預示了美國將重新界定其在北極海域的利益和策略。

(五)其它問題

隨著以前蘇聯為首的社會主義集團的衰落以及“冷戰”的結束,美國迎來了絕對主導國際事務的時代。由于美國出于其它利益考慮尚未批準《公約》,導致其在200海里以外大陸架劃界領域的話語權受到嚴重削弱,但它絕不會心甘情愿讓其它國家搶得先機。面對世界上首個、又是老對手提出的劃界案,應該說美國下了大功夫從側面發動了強有力的攻勢。除了直接挑戰羅蒙諾索夫海嶺和α -門捷列夫海嶺的性質外(如前所述),還利用《準則》的相關規定進一步設置難度,其目的就是一方面遏制俄羅斯,一方面加強自己的話語權并維護潛在利益。美國指出,委員會《議事規則》允許委員會考慮其它國家對執行摘要所載數據的意見以及任何與劃界案相關的爭端的資料。美國對俄羅斯劃界案提出了一系列異議,其它幾個問題也相當有分量,如果情況屬實,將嚴重阻礙俄羅斯的任何后續主張。

1.需要提供客觀的數據來源確定2500米等深線和大陸坡腳的位置

美國的照會指出,俄羅斯劃界案對2500米等深線和大陸坡腳位置兩項信息不明確,這些信息對任何劃界案而言是不能忽略的。盡管《準則》不要求將2500米等深線定點包含在劃界案執行摘要中,①See CLCS/11,paragraph 9.1.4,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.但美國擔心俄羅斯劃界案中涉及2500米等深線和大陸坡腳的保密信息,可能與國際北冰洋海底地形圖數據庫中的數據有出入,②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.因此美國呼吁委員會對俄羅斯的相關定點進行客觀評價。③美國敦促委員會立足于相關的科學界,特別是公開的、同行評議的科學文獻報告作出決定,美國極力主張參考最新的國際北冰洋等深線圖(IBCOA),因為它是國際北極科學委員會、政府間海洋學委員會以及國際海道測量組織的合作成果。如果俄羅斯2001年及未來的劃界案與國際海洋學委員會提供的國際公認數據有明顯出入,俄羅斯必須使用國際公認數據消除這一差別。關于這一問題的審議結果尚未公開,尚不能得知俄羅斯2001年劃界案中的2500米等深線和大陸坡腳位置是否符合委員會《準則》的要求。

2.俄羅斯2001年劃界案執行摘要中未提及“海底洋脊”術語

美國照會還指出,由于“海底洋脊”術語未被俄羅斯用于建立大陸架的外部界限,“海底洋脊”條款就不能適用于這一目的。④See paragraph“SUBMARINE RIDGES”on page 3 of CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__ USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.但美國照會實際上只涉及俄羅斯劃界案執行摘要所公開的部分信息,尚不清楚未公開部分及劃界案主文是否引用了該條款。盡管委員會的《準則》要求劃界案必須包含所援引第76條具體條款的說明,但《準則》或《議事規則》均未提及省略這一環節的后果。有些學者⑤For example,B.Spielman(Notes&Comments Editor of Emory International Law Review),An Evaluation of Russia’s Impending Claim for Continental Shelf Expansion:Why Rule 5 Will Shelve Russia’s Submission,Emory International Law Review,Vol.23, 2009,p.329.(包括美國學者)認為,如果俄羅斯首次劃界案不引用該條款會導致其未來的劃界案也不能引用該條款,這種觀點值得商榷。俄羅斯2001年劃界案不太可能違反說明援引第76條具體條款的規定,只是鑒于對數據的科學性沒有把握而不愿公開,以免招致更多非議。如果確實未引用“海底洋脊”條款,對俄羅斯的影響應僅限于2001年劃界案不能基于海底洋脊主張200海里以外大陸架,不應影響其后續劃界案。

從所公開的海圖判斷,俄羅斯最有可能引用的是“海底高地”條款,⑥M.Benitah,Russia’s Claim in the Arctic and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in UNCLOS, ASIL INSIGHTS,Vol.11,Issue 27,2007,or at http://www.asil.org/insights071108. cfm,1 May 2012.因為該條款不受350海里限制,可依據2500米等深線加100海里主張大陸架,與俄羅斯的海圖相符。雖然“海底高地”和“自然組成部分”術語在《公約》中未被定義,但如果俄羅斯認為羅蒙諾索夫海嶺和α-門捷列夫海嶺屬于海底高地,那就要冒天下之大不韙了,這也許是俄羅斯不愿公開其所引用條款的真正原因。一旦委員會認可羅蒙諾索夫海嶺可界定為海底高地,將給未來200海里以外大陸架劃界帶來相當的負面影響,即鼓勵各沿海國效仿俄羅斯牽強地將并非海底高地的海底地形特征“異構”,從而動搖《公約》及《準則》的一致性和權威性。此外美國還指出,委員會無權處理基線問題,不論這些基線是否符合國際法。美國設置的難度是最大的,所拋出的也是俄羅斯未來劃界案最棘手的問題。

五、俄羅斯2001年劃界案之后相關國家的動態

(一)俄羅斯

俄羅斯2001年劃界案受挫后,考慮到巨大的能源、軍事等方面的潛在利益以及未來俄羅斯在國際社會的地位和影響力等因素,俄羅斯并沒有放棄努力。基于委員會2002年對其劃界案提出的建議,俄羅斯已把努力的方向及時調整到海洋劃界爭端和數據的科學性兩個關鍵問題上。在解決海洋劃界爭端方面, 2010年與挪威簽訂的《巴倫支海條約》為俄羅斯成功且創造性地掃清了在巴倫支海海域主張200海里以外大陸架的障礙,但在白令海和鄂霍次克海還沒有太大起色。白令海的問題并不嚴重,主動權在俄羅斯手中,從某種角度看可能稱不上是問題,但在鄂霍次克海南部解決與日本的爭端就目前形勢看絕非易事,可能會曠日持久。

在數據的科學性方面,由于委員會的《準則》要求按自然延伸提出大陸架的主張必須找到大陸邊緣,包括大陸坡坡腳轉折點、大陸坡坡底區域、2500米等深線以及1%沉積巖厚度等等,至少需要單波束回聲測深、多波束回聲測深、測深側掃聲納測量、相干側掃聲納測量以及地震反射測深共5種數據,俄羅斯近幾年的努力最主要就集中在這幾方面。俄羅斯2004年編制出世界上第一幅北冰洋海底地形圖;2005年夏天俄羅斯開始了新一輪大規模北極科考,調查α-門捷列夫海嶺和西伯利亞大陸邊之間在地質、構造方面的聯系,并在美國地球物理聯合會2005年秋季會議上提交了初步結果;①V.D.Kaminsky,V.A.Poselov,V.Y Glebovsky,A.V.Zayonchek and V.V.Butsenko,Geophysical and Geological Study of the Transition Zone between the Mendeleev Rise and the Adjacent Siberian Shelf:Preliminary Results,2005,at http://www.agu.org/meetings/fm05,1 May 2012.作為2007—2008國際極地年②國際極地年是全球科學家共同策劃、聯合開展的大規模極地科學考察活動,被譽為南北極科學考察的“奧林匹克”盛會,自1882年至今僅組織了4次:1882—1883年、1932—1933年、1957—1958年及2007—2008年。1957—1958年的國際極地年直接促成了《南極條約》的誕生。由于歷史原因,我國未參加前3次國際極地年。作為第4次極地年的發起國之一,中國政府非常重視,且制定了行動計劃,反映了中國極地科考的影響逐步加大?；顒拥囊徊糠?俄羅斯2007年8月進行了名為“北極2007”的第二輪大規模北極科考。③在該次科考中,知名北極專家、時任俄羅斯國家杜馬副主席的A.奇林加洛夫率領的由50名科學家組成的科考隊乘MIR-1和MIR-2深海潛水器從北極點下潛至4261米深的北冰洋洋底,操縱深海潛水機器人取回地表和海洋生物樣品,并在洋底安插了一面高1米、能保存100年左右的鈦合金俄羅斯國旗,此舉在國際社會引起軒然大波。

此外,自委員會2002年對其劃界案做出建議后,俄羅斯在營造國際氛圍方面也進行了大量的努力。針對委員會提出的問題,俄羅斯2003年在圣彼得堡舉辦了旨在與推進北極地區執行第76條以及地球科學相關的專題國際研討會。為緩解日趨緊張的北極局勢,同時也為打開國際對話之窗,俄羅斯2010、2011年成功舉辦了兩屆高層次、高水平的以“北極:領土對話”為主題的國際論壇,擬將其打造為常設國際論壇。值得一提的是,俄羅斯煞費苦心地挑選了羅蒙諾索夫④米哈伊爾·瓦西里耶維奇·羅蒙諾索夫(1711—1765),俄國百科全書式的科學家、語言學家、哲學家和詩人,被譽為俄國科學史上的彼得大帝。1748年創建了俄國第一個化學實驗室,1755年創辦了俄國第一所大學——莫斯科大學。的誕生地——阿爾漢格爾斯克作為第二屆論壇的舉辦地。

2009年3月,俄羅斯出臺《2020年前及更遠的未來俄羅斯聯邦在北極的國家政策原則及遠景規劃》,⑤Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and Beyond,at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html,1 May 2012.明確界定了在北極的各種利益。由于法律和科學數據方面的艱巨性,致使俄羅斯不得不一次次推遲再次提交劃界案的時間?；?010年在北極地區9000公里斷面的測量以及2011年對兩大海嶺的最新勘測,俄羅斯聲稱獲得了北極領土主權的重要證據,再次提交劃界案可能定在2012年。此舉反映出俄羅斯不想讓加拿大和丹麥搶得先手的強烈愿望。

(二)挪威

經過長達40年的談判后,挪威和俄羅斯終于在2010年簽署了《挪威王國和俄羅斯聯邦之間關于海洋劃界和合作條約》(以下簡稱“《巴倫支海條約》”),①《巴倫支海條約》于2010年9月15日在摩爾曼斯克簽署,挪威議會和俄羅斯國家杜馬分別于2011年2月8日和3月25日批準該條約,2011年6月7日在挪威首都奧斯陸舉行的儀式上,挪威外交大臣斯特勒和俄羅斯外長拉夫羅夫交換了條約文本,條約已于2011年7月7日起生效。條約的英、俄文版分別參見http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/ UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf和http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/ Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_russisk.pdf,2012年5月1日。同意劃定巴倫支海17.5萬平方公里爭端區域內的分界線。俄羅斯和挪威根據該條約建立了單一劃界線,200海里之內專屬經濟區和大陸架單一劃界,200海里之外大陸架劃界(參見圖5)。條約第1條確定了定義劃界線的8個坐標,將爭端區域調整為面積大致相同的兩個部分,劃界線的調整考慮了俄羅斯較長的海岸線這一因素,②兩國在這一問題上參考了2009年黑海劃界案,重點考慮爭端區域的海岸線。See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea(Romania v.Ukraine),Judgment of 3 February 2009, paragraph 77～78,at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf,1 May 2012.這一事實表明非法律因素也可以在劃界中給予權重。《巴倫支海條約》在國際法上獨具特色的是,俄羅斯在劃界線以東行使主權權利的區域中,有一小部分是位于挪威200海里界限之內、俄羅斯200海里界限之外的。這是一個超越國際法將一國的主權權利移至原屬另一國管轄范圍的案例,再次體現了國際法作為國際間意志協調的“軟法”的特性?！栋蛡愔Шl約》不僅為兩國掃清了劃界障礙,而且為世界各國間解決海洋爭端,尤其是與200海里以外大陸架劃界相關的爭端提供了新模式。

(三)日本

直接影響俄、日在鄂霍次克海南部劃界的北方四島領土主權爭端2004年再次出現轉機,普京表示俄方意欲根據1956年《蘇日聯合宣言》③See 1956 U.S.S.R.-Japan Joint Declaration,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Japanese_Joint_Declaration_of_1956,1 May 2012.將齒舞、色丹二島歸還日本,但小泉堅持1993年《日俄東京宣言》④See Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations,at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n -america/us/q&a/declaration.html,1 May 2012.的底線即四島同時歸還,從而失去了一次解決爭端的佳機。2006年日本外相麻生太郎提出以四島面積的等分線作為日俄邊境,但俄方未予理會,反而同年通過了9年內用179億盧布開發千島群島(包括四島在內)的《2007年至2015年千島群島社會經濟發展專項計劃》。日方不甘示弱,2009年通過《〈促進北方領土問題解決特別法〉修正案》,首度明確賦予“日本擁有北方四島主權”的國內法地位,2010年度《日本防衛白皮書》中亦稱,竹島和四島皆為日本領土。自2010年年底開始,俄、日圍繞四島的沖突不斷升級,俄羅斯總統梅德韋杰夫2010年11月1日以國家元首身份首次視察國后島。梅德韋杰夫的登島彰顯了俄方在四島問題上的強硬立場,用意是向國際社會強烈昭示四島是俄羅斯的重要組成部分,同時也為俄羅斯早日劃定在鄂霍次克海南部的200海里以外大陸架向日本加壓。

(四)丹麥

2001年俄羅斯劃界案之后,丹麥2004年11月16日批準《公約》,同時加快了申請本國大陸架的基礎工作。為勘測海底和減少研究成本,丹麥與加拿大2005年6月27日簽署諒解備忘錄,合作收集埃爾斯米爾島和格陵蘭島周邊海底數據。①T.L.McDorman,The Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm:Law and Politics in the Arctic O-cean,Journal of Transnational Law and Policy,Vol.18,2009,pp.155～193.丹麥的專項大陸架項目包括LORITA-1、LOMROG 2007、Spring 2009以及LOMROGⅡ2009。②Expeditions and fieldwork,at http://a76.dk/greenland_uk/north_uk/gr_n_expeditions_ uk/index.html,1 May 2012.2009年丹麥科技部部長H·桑德指出,初步調查表明羅蒙諾索夫海嶺是格陵蘭島北部海岸的地質延伸。③M.Rajabov,Melting Ice and Heated Conflicts:A Multilateral Treaty as a Preferable Settlement for the Arctic Territorial Dispute,Southwestern Journal of International Law, Vol.15,2009,p.427.從2010年開始,丹麥科考專家運用聲波定位儀、地震學儀器及全球衛星系統提供的數據再度科考,旨在確定格陵蘭島大陸架及北冰洋海床的邊緣。為預防圍繞爭奪北冰洋大陸架的潛在軍事爭端,丹麥議會2009年6月24日通過《2010—2014年防務協定》,④See Danish Defence Agreement,at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Denmark2010-2014English.pdf,1 May 2012.擬在格陵蘭島設立軍事基地以加強其北極軍事力量。為營造申請北冰洋大陸架的氛圍,丹麥政府又于2011年8月22日發布了《2011—2020年丹麥王國北極戰略》,共對法羅群島和格陵蘭島周圍包括北極點在內的5個區域的北極大陸架提出了主權要求。此外,丹麥還獨樹一幟地于2012年1月17日宣布新增北極大使職位,負責協調實施丹麥的“北極戰略”。按照《公約》規定的10年的劃界案提交期限,丹麥預計在2014年年底提交200海里以外大陸架劃界案。

(五)加拿大

事實上,早在俄羅斯“北極2007”科考以“插旗”的方式高調宣稱北極主權前的2007年4月,加拿大和丹麥就已開始了北極冰層下的測繪工作。加拿大總理S·哈珀自2006年上任以來,其北極之旅已成為一年一度的宣示加拿大主權之旅。加拿大政府2009年7月27日公布最新的北極政策報告——《加拿大北方策略:我們的北方、我們的遺產、我們的未來》,2010年8月20日又發表《北極外交政策聲明》,再次強調加拿大對北極地區擁有主權。另外,在北極相關問題上加拿大特別注重與美國的合作(盡管兩國對波弗特海海底區域的歸屬存在爭議),兩國2008、2009及2010年連續三次聯合對北極進行科考,收集有關北極大陸架和海底的科學數據,為將來提交劃界案做準備。加拿大的研究指出,加拿大在北極東部區域的主張是基于α-門捷列夫海嶺和羅蒙諾索夫海嶺。加拿大2003年11月7日批準《公約》,按照10年的劃界案提交期限,加拿大預計在2013年年底提交劃界案。

(六)美國

由于美國是所有環北極圈諸國中唯一未批準《公約》的國家,①158個國家批準了《公約》。關于美國為什么不批準一直存在爭論,一些觀點認為不批準是因為擔心侵犯美國主權;另一些觀點則認為,這是因為批準《公約》會要求美國支付采礦權的費用以及會妨害美國在公海管轄與武器相關的事項等等。在未來有關200海里以外大陸架劃界的較量中,美國將只能從側面干預。美國深知,一旦將來擇機批準《公約》后申請200海里以外大陸架,至少也要經歷自己為俄羅斯劃界案設置的難度。因此,美國2003年設立大陸架專項工作組,并于2003、2004及2007年進行了三次大規?！氨睒O海洋國土”測繪,新罕布什爾大學的海洋和海道聯合測繪中心還繪制了楚科奇海等相關區域的海底三維地形圖。美國目前一方面積極準備科學數據,做北極爭端和平解決而最后不得不批準《公約》、爭取有限的北極利益的打算;另一方面,美國不會很快批準《公約》,可能會重演在“一戰”、“二戰”中的故伎想坐收漁利,即等北極其它4國對北極問題失去耐心而火拼時伺機行動。另外,美國歷來無視國際法,雖不批準《公約》,但已著手軍事及國內法方面的準備:美國海軍、海岸警衛隊、海軍陸戰隊2007年10月聯合發布《21世紀海軍合作戰略》;②See A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,at http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf,1 May 2012.2009年1月9日,時任總統布什簽署“國家安全總統指令第66號(NSPD-66)”和“國土安全總統指令第25號(HSPD-25)”,③See National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, at http://www.arctic.gov/news/2009%20Arctic%20Region%20Policy.pdf,1 May 2012.全面闡述了美國的北極政策;2009年11月批準《海軍北極路線圖》,④See U.S.Navy Arctic Roadmap,at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/ 2009/11/us-navy-arctic-roadmap-nov-2009.pdf,1 May 2012.制訂了美國海軍針對北極地區的相關政策和戰略;自1993年以來幾乎每年在北極地區舉行代號“北方利刃”⑤Northern Edge,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Edge,1 May 2012.的聯合軍事演習。軍事威懾是美國從側面遏制包括俄羅斯在內的其它國家主張北冰洋200海里以外大陸架的又一利器。

六、俄羅斯劃界案未來的展望

由于受聯合國和《公約》的約束,加上在目前國際問題上的影響力與前蘇聯時期相比已大大削弱,俄羅斯在當今的國際事務中不可能像美國及其主導的北約那樣肆意超越國際法?？梢酝茰y,俄羅斯未來的劃界案不太會突破委員會對其各海域建議的框架,事實上近10年俄羅斯一直在這一框架下努力。

(一)巴倫支海區域

如前所述,2010年俄—挪《巴倫支海條約》的簽訂基本上掃清了俄羅斯在巴倫支海主張200海里以外大陸架的障礙,剩下的只是一些輕微的、程序性的事項(如提交坐標和海圖、宣布界限等)。從目前形勢看,俄羅斯尚無單獨宣布該海域200海里以外大陸架界限的打算,應該是等委員會對其未來再次提交的整體劃界案審議后,與其它幾個區域的200海里以外大陸架界限同時宣布。

(二)白令海區域

如前所述,俄羅斯在2001年劃界案中直接采用了1990年邊界作為其在白令海區域200海里以外大陸架的外部界限,間接表明俄羅斯已傾向接受1990年邊界。但由于1990年邊界仍屬于與美國的未決邊界,俄羅斯在白令海的主張仍然會成為《議事規則》附件一第5條意義上的爭端。為杜絕美國以此為由提出異議,俄羅斯國家杜馬必須在適當時間履行批準協定的程序,這也是美國一直所期望的,所以俄羅斯是有主動權的。如果按照這一方式進行,俄羅斯劃定該海域200海里以外的大陸架也不會有多大困難。但如果俄羅斯在未來提交的修訂劃界案中不采用1990年邊界而是采用其它邊界,將表明俄羅斯認為本身不愿受《1990年協定》的法律約束,這勢必將創設另一項《議事規則》附件一第5條意義上與美國的海洋邊界爭端,嚴重妨害委員會對其修訂劃界案的審議,也將大大增加劃界難度,面對美國這個強勁的對手,估計俄羅斯會謹慎行事,不會貿然重新劃界。

(三)鄂霍次克海區域

委員會建議的簡短摘要隱含了認可鄂霍次克海的全部海底是法律大陸架的一部分,加上北方四島的爭端不會波及到鄂霍次克海北部,因此俄羅斯提交關于該海域的北部劃界案沒有什么障礙。南部的情況較為棘手,日、俄在北方四島這一關鍵問題上的互不相讓,可能導致兩國在該海域的劃界會曠日持久,從而直接影響俄羅斯在鄂霍次克海南部劃定200海里以外的大陸架。但目前的情勢顯示,俄羅斯似乎漸漸失去與日本進行持久戰的耐心,意欲憑借地緣優勢,擱置爭端而搶先開發鄂霍次克海的油氣資源,以強硬立場威懾日本并擇機劃界。日本由于在地緣、軍事等方面處于劣勢,加上與中國的釣魚島爭端以及其在西北太平洋200海里以外大陸架劃界案并不十分樂觀的結果,目前在與俄羅斯在鄂霍次克海的爭端中明顯處于被動局面。所以,在鄂霍次克海出現突變形勢而使俄羅斯劃定在該海域全部200海里以外大陸架的可能性仍然存在,當然這取決于俄、日在諸多方面的背后較量。

(四)中北冰洋區域

對于俄羅斯來說,最困難的200海里以外大陸架劃界還是在中北冰洋,因為首先要面對3個強勁對手(丹麥、加拿大將直接參與爭奪,美國則在側面設置障礙),其次又要在海洋地質科學取證方面傾注巨大的努力,再次還需積極營造國際氛圍以期與委員會以及國際法律、科學界達成有效的共識。應該說俄羅斯在該海域主張200海里以外大陸架的前景最不樂觀,但該區域的潛在利益卻是巨大、誘人的。

學術界對北極問題探討過多種方案:中間線方式、扇形方式、《南極條約》①See Antarctic Treaty System,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctic_Treaty_System,1 May 2012.方式、《斯瓦爾巴條約》②See Svalbard Treaty,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svalbard_Treaty,1 May 2012.方式、軍事方式以及《公約》方式等等,就目前的形勢看,采取《公約》方式的可能性最大,但也不排除相關國家由于巨大利益的誘惑而無視國際法,采用極端方式的可能性。根據《公約》,主張中北冰洋區域的大陸架(目前看只有俄羅斯、丹麥以及加拿大有可能)必須首先通過《準則》規定的從屬權利檢驗。③See CLCS/11,paragraph 2.3,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.俄羅斯、丹麥及加拿大3國近年來正緊鑼密鼓通過北極科考搜集相關科學數據,可能在2012—2014年相繼提交劃界案。如果經委員會審議后只有一個國家的數據獲得認可,問題就簡單了,該國只要履行后續的程序性事項即可。如果3國中有兩個以上國家的數據獲得認可,就會產生第二個問題,即相關國家間關于重疊主張區域的劃界問題。如果進行到這一步,委員會基本上就脫離了干系,之后相關國家必須經談判、協議劃界后將海圖和坐標交存秘書長,方可獲得國際社會認可的200海里以外大陸架邊界,但重疊區域的劃界難度較大,往往會曠日持久。

鑒于目前地質科學界對于北冰洋海底的構造歷史和地質特征尚未達成廣泛的共識,只有一些學者基于迄今為止的科考提出了一些待定的觀點。比如澳大利亞的P·西蒙茲將α-門捷列夫海嶺描述為大陸周邊附近的一個微大陸,其發源及與主大陸分離的方式難以界定;①P.A.Symonds,Ridge Issues,in P.J.Cook and C.M.Carleron,ed.,Continental Shelf Limits:The Scientific and Legal Interface,New York:Oxford University Press,2000,p. 290.美國的A·格蘭茲指出,α-門捷列夫海嶺與北大西洋的冰島—法羅海嶺起源類似,是包含較深大洋地殼的陸架明顯斷裂后與周圍大陸邊分離形成的;②A.Grantz,Treatment of Ridges and Borderlands Under Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:the Example of the Arctic Ocean,in M.H.Nordquist, J.N.Moore and T.H.Heidar,ed.,Legal and Scientific Aspects of Continental Shelf Limits,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2004,pp.206～207.加拿大的R·麥克納布則認為,要解釋潛在的形態斷裂,就需要更好地了解海嶺端部與大陸邊之間的形態斷裂或深海溝等等。③R.Macnab,Submarine Elevations and Ridges:Wild Cards in the Poker Game of UNCLOS Article 76,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.39,2008,p.226.委員會未來審議3國劃界案時,特別是關于羅蒙諾索夫海嶺和α-門捷列夫海嶺的地質特征是否符合各沿海國陸塊的“自然延伸”標準問題,勢必與地質科學界進行深入的交流才能做出結論。如果3國間此前能達成諒解,將極大地增加委員會認可各國主張的可能性。

俄羅斯能否利用《公約》第286條的強制性機制④《公約》第286條規定,……在第3節限制下,有關本公約的解釋或適用的任何爭端,如已訴諸第1節而仍未得到解決,經爭端任何一方請求,應提交根據本節具有管轄權的法院或法庭。解決北冰洋的潛在劃界爭端?答案是否定的,因為俄羅斯在簽署《公約》時明確聲明,它將不受“與海洋邊界劃界相關的爭端的強制性程序的有約束力的決定”的約束。⑤Declarations and Statements,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm#Russian%20Federation%2OUpon%20signature,1 May 2012.除非俄羅斯撤回保留,否則無法利用這種機制。即使俄羅斯撤回保留也無法鼓動強制劃界,因為加拿大、挪威及丹麥都拒絕使用仲裁法庭來解決海洋劃界爭端,況且強制劃界是一種被動之舉,不會給俄羅斯帶來更大利益。

在國際政治層面,成立于1996年的北極理事會⑥Arctic Council,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_Council,1 May 2012.和北極5國2008年的《伊盧利薩特宣言》⑦See The Ilulissat Declaration,at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_ Declaration.pdf,1 May 2012.均從側面暗示國際社會,北極是北極國家的,外人不應染指。南極之所以相對平靜是因為《南極條約》的存在,誰也不愿意輕易去碰南極這顆“硬釘子”。但由于沒有類似的《北極條約》,況且北極各國極不情愿再增加任何束縛來阻礙對北極的爭奪,《公約》目前只能暫緩爭奪的局面,隨著3國劃界案的相繼提出,《公約》肯定無法遏制相關國家爭奪北極。各國爭奪的套路基本相似,即法律和軍事途徑并行,法律途徑不通下一步就必然借助軍事和地緣優勢搶先開發資源,再伺機劃界,以避免它國插足。

另外,美國對遏制俄羅斯2001年劃界案的中北冰洋部分起到了決定性作用。美國的“科學冰川探索”項目仍在繼續,美國一方面為自己將來有可能申請做準備,另一方面肯定會在俄羅斯(再次)、加拿大、丹麥相繼提交北冰洋200海里以外大陸架劃界案時使用更加有力的方式遏制3國的主張,它絕不會坐視3國瓜分北極利益。因此,俄羅斯未來再次提出劃界案主張中北冰洋200海里以外的大陸架,肯定會比其2001年難度更大、變數更多。

七、俄羅斯劃界案對中國200海里以外大陸架劃界問題的啟示

探究俄羅斯2001年劃界案受挫的原因,最主要集中在三個方面:一是未能在提交劃界案前處理好與利益相關國間的爭端,來自相關國家的強大阻力最起碼導致委員會不愿介入其中而挑起更多國際爭端;二是其劃界案中提供的地質科學數據未能獲得國際社會(特別是委員會)的認可,與《準則》的要求尚存較大差距;三是第一個向委員會提交劃界案就觸及極地區域(中北冰洋),招致了對此極為敏感的國際社會(主要是美國)的有力抵觸。①D.A.Colson,The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf between Neighboring States,The American Society of International Law,Vol.97,2003,pp.91～107.但受挫后俄羅斯并未坐以待斃,而是努力調整、準備,并為其下次提交劃界案積極營造國際氛圍。

中國2009年5月11日已正式提交東海200海里以外大陸架外部界限的初步信息,下一步就是提交東海、南海真正的劃界案,我們應未雨綢繆,從各方面做好應對大陸架界限委員會、《公約》締約國以及周邊海洋鄰國的準備。中國要想順利主張東海、南海的200海里以外大陸架,緩和、化解直至解決在兩海域與周邊鄰國的爭端勢在必行。實踐證明,千篇一律地用一種方式處理爭端,往往會付出較大的成本。巴倫支海爭端的解決以及澳大利亞劃界案中澳大利亞與周邊鄰國多項海洋爭端的解決,為我國和其它正在或準備提交劃界案的國家提供了有價值的法律實踐。此外,劃界案整體的規范性、詳實的科學數據以及對國際法的諳熟應是得到支持的重要支柱。中國的200海里以外大陸架劃界之路任重而道遠,需要用更加靈活的手段來處理東海、南海的海洋爭端,最大限度地爭取國家的海洋權益。

Russia①Russia’s submission was submitted on December 20,2001,see home page of Russia’s submission,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus. htm,1 May 2012.is the first country that presented to the UN Commission on theLimits of the Continental Shelf①The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf(CLCS),a special committee of UN system,was established in 1997,dedicated to handling matters concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.The function of CLCS is to consider submissions concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm submitted by coastal States,make recommendations and provide scientific and technical advice,if requested by coastal States concerned during their preparations.It so far has lasted for three terms(1997,2002 and 2007).(hereinafter as“the Commission”)its submission for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm②1 nm(nautical mile)is equal to 1852 m(meter).in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea③The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(1833U.N.T.S.3),at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en.pdf,1 May 2012.(hereinafter as“the Convention”),involving four different waters including two in the Arctic region(Central Arctic and Barents Sea)and two in the Northwest Pacific region(Sea of Okhotsk and Bering Sea),with a total area of 1.58 million km2of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.④Kuang Zengjun,Russia’s Policy on Outer Continental Shelf,Studies on Russia,Central A-sia and Eastern Europe,No.2,2011,p.74.(in Chinese)The recommendations by the Commission were issued on May 27,2002 with non-approval for each of the four waters.In the ten years after the recommendations,Russia has made a series of painstaking and persevering efforts and is expected to resubmit in 2012.In light of the latest research from developed countries,this paper intends to make a brief review of,and comments on,the ins and outs of Russia’s submission.

Ⅰ.The Legal System on the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm and the Definition on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Set by Article 76 of the Convention

A.The Legal System on the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm

The third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea⑤The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea created three MOSTs in the history of international relations:number of participating countries,scale and duration.It was also the convention with the most provisions in the history of international law codification.The Convention includes a preamble,17 parts comprising 320 articles,and 9 annexes.China’s delegation had participated in all sessions.,which lasted nine years(1973～1982)with arduous negotiations,gave birth to a brand-new convention on the law of the sea-The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of theSea covering several previous conventions.①The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 established four Conventions:Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone;Convention on the High Seas;Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas and Convention on the Continental Shelf.The Convention is the most comprehensive and complete maritime code in the history of mankind by far(for maritime space set by the Convention,see Fig.1).The Convention has radically renovated the legal concept of the continental shelf.②It is generally acknowledged that the legal concept of the continental shelf has gone through an evolutionary process from The Continental Shelf Notice by US President Harry Truman in 1945 to The Convention on Continental Shelf(article 1)in 1958,and then to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(article 76)in 1982.Its article 76 and AnnexⅡhave become programmatic documents in international law in the field of delimitation of the outer limits on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm for the time being.

B.The Definition on Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Set by Article 76 of the Convention

Article 76,paragraph 1 of the Convention reads,“The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin,or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”This paragraph puts forward two kinds of criteria for the outer limits of the continental shelf:“natural prolongation”and“200-nm distance”.A coastal State may choose either of them according to its continental margin.Paragraphs 4～7 in article 76 should be followed in delineating the continental edge which is more than 200 nm from the territorial baselines.

Paragraph 4 reads:“(a)For the purposes of this Convention,the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,by either(ⅰ)a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 percent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope[namely“IrishFormula”①It was put forward by the Irish geologist P.R.R.Gardiner participating in the Third U-nited Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,thus named“Irish Formula”.line],or(ⅱ)a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope[namely“Hedberg Formula”②It was put forward by the American geologist H.D.Hedberg participating in the Third U-nited Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,thus named“Hedberg Formula”.line];(b)in the absence of evidence to the contrary,the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.”The two lines defined by paragraph 4 are known as“formula line”,which coastal States can apply singly or jointly according to their specific situations to maximize their outer limits by taking the outer envelope of the lines as the formula line farthest from shore.

Paragraph 5 reads:“The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed,drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a)(ⅰ)and(ⅱ),either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath,which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.”The two lines defined by paragraph 5 are known as“constraint line”,which coastal States can apply singly or jointly according to their specific situations to maximize their outer limits by taking the outer envelope of them as the constraint line farethest from shore.

Finally,the greatest outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm for the best interests of coastal States can be established initially by inner-enveloping of the maximum formula line from paragraph 4 and constraint line from paragraph 5(see Fig.2).Of course,the specific location of this line and the lengths of composing segments are also subject to such terms of article 76 of the Convention as paragraph 3③Article 76,paragraph 3 of the Convention reads:“The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State,and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf,the slope and the rise.It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.”(oceanic ridges),paragraph 6④Article 76,paragraph 6 of the Convention reads:“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5,on submarine ridges,the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin,such as its plateaus,rises,caps,banks and spurs.”(submarine rid-ges)and paragraph 7①Article 76,paragraph 7 of the Convention reads:“The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf,where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length,connecting fixed points,defined by coordinates of latitude and longitude.”(segmental length)etc.

Fig.1 Maritime Space Set by the Convention②

Fig.2 Possible Maximum Outer Limit of Continental Shelf①

Ⅱ.The Presentation of and the Consideration on Russia’s 2001 Submission

A.The Presentation of Russia’s 2001 Submission

Russia presented its submission to the Commission through the UN Secretary-General on December 20,2001 pursuant to article 76,paragraph 8 and arti-cle 4 of AnnexⅡin the Convention.①Article 76,paragraph 8 of the Convention reads:“Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under AnnexⅡon the basis of equitable geographical representation.”Article 4 in AnnexⅡto the Convention reads:“Where a coastal State[…]shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that state.”The official website of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea(hereinafter as“DOALOS”)released the first continental shelf notice on the same day as the establishment of the Commission,②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_English.pdf,1 May 2012.announcing:the bulletin would be distributed to all UN members and parties to the Convention[…]following consideration of the submission,the Commission ought to make recommendations to Russia in accordance with article 76 of the Convention;the UN Secretary-General should make due publicity;and Russia’s limits of continental shelf based on these recommendations would be final and binding.The DOALOS issued a more detailed press release the next day stating that consideration of Russia’s submission should be included in the agenda of the Commission’s 10thsession,indicating the official hearing on Russia’s submission.③See Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf Receives Its First Submission,at http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sea1729.doc.htm,1 May 2012.After the UN Secretary-General distributed the notice and made public part of the information in the executive summary of Russia’s submission in accordance with article 50④Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure reads:“UN Secretary-General shall,through the appropriate channels,promptly notify the Commission and all UN States Members,including States Parties to the Convention,of the receipt of a submission,and make the executive summary known for public including all charts and coordinates referred to in paragraph 9. 1.4 of the Guidelines and contained in that summary,upon completion of the translation of the executive summary referred to in rule 47,paragraph 3.”in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf(hereinafter as“Rules of Procedure”)⑤See Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf(CLCS/ 40/Rev.1),at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/309/23/PDF/ N0830923.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.,Canada,Denmark,Japan,Norway and the United States responded by presenting their diplomatic notes to safeguard their rights because the five countries were directly or indirectly involved in Russia’s submission. The problems related to those notes exerted serious impacts on theCommission’s consideration and recommendations on Russia’s submission.

B.Russia’s Treatment of the Deadline of its Submission

The Convention entered into force for Russia on April 11,1997,thus making April 11,2007,the original terminal date for Russia’s submission,against the 10-year deadline.The 11thsession of the Assembly of State Parties to the Convention in May 2001 postponed the deadline for submission to May 13, 2009.①The Assembly of States Parties to the Convention considered the technical difficulty of a submission especially prepared by developing countries,and postponed the date of commencement for the 10-year deadline to May 13,1999,also the date on which the Guidelines were made public.The Convention came into force for Russia on April 11,1997,which means Russia would have to put forward its submission before April 11,2007.See SPLOS/72,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/387/64/PDF/ N0138764.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.Russia would have taken this advantage,but finally decided to present its submission in 2001,seven and a half years earlier than its deadline.There are several aspects behind this to be analyzed.Firstly,there was some uncertainty and vulnerability in the Commission’s consideration in terms of such aspects as legal proceeding and the scientific nature of data because it was the first submission,from which Russia sought to gain an advantage.Secondly, scientific and technological progress may have rendered the old data sub-optimal(and in fact it was no longer widely accepted by 2009),thus forcing the submitting State to make costly investments for new data and recalculate their limits.Thirdly,preparation of submission requires long-term planning including maintenance for a number of key scientific technical and legal areas of expertise,and intermittence means that governments would lose the expertise due to the turnover of key staff.Finally,the alteration of the 10-year deadline by the Assembly of States Parties does not fully comply with relevant procedures on amendment to the Convention,②See articles 312,313 of the Convention involving the amendment and simplified amendment procedure of the Convention.but is merely a putative functional equivalent,thus resulting in an inability to bind those who accede to or ratify the Convention subsequently.Presenting a submission beyond the original deadline set by the Convention may be subject to their challenges.However,presentation ahead of schedule would have negative impacts including extremely strict consideration by the Commission for the purpose of establishing its reputationin its first case.In addition,the Commission dares not jump to conclusions on some key issues since there are no precedents on a number of controversial scientific issues(such as the nature of Lomonosov Ridge).

C.The Consideration on Russia’s Submission by the Commission

In accordance with article 5 of AnnexⅡto the Convention and article 42 of the Rules of Procedure,the Commission established a seven-member subcommittee responsible for considering Russia’s submission.①Article 5 in AnnexⅡto the Convention reads:“Unless the Commission decides otherwise,the Commission shall function by way of sub-commissions composed of seven members,appointed in a balanced manner taking into account the specific elements of each submission by a coastal State…the coastal State which has made a submission to the Commission may send its representatives to participate in the relevant proceedings without the right to vote.”Paragraph 1 in rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure reads:“If,in accordance with article 5 of AnnexⅡto the Convention,the Commission decides to establish a subcommittee for the deliberation of a submission,it shall…appoint from among the nominated candidates seven members of the subcommittee.”The 7-people subcommittee considering Russia’s submission consisted of Galo Carrera Hurtado(Mexico,the President), Karl HF Hinz,(Germany,Vice-Chairman),Peter F.Croker(Ireland,Rapporteur),Alexandre Tagore Medeiros de Albuquerque(Brazil),Lawrence Folajimi Awosika(Nigeria), Iain C.Lamont(New Zealand)and Yong Ahn Park(South Korea).The initial consideration on Russia’s submission was included in the agenda of the Commission’s 10thsession held from March 25 to April 12 in New York in 2002.Russia’s Vice Minister of Natural Resources Ivan F.Gloumov introduced Russia’s submission at the session,and believed that diplomatic notes from Canada,Denmark,Japan,Norway and the U.S.did not constitute a barrier to the Commission’s consideration on Russia’s submission.②See CLCS/31,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/318/60/ PDF/N0231860.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.Gloumov also invited the Commission to visit Russia for the purpose of verifying data on the spot,though this was followed by no response from the Commission.The subcommittee held a total of twenty sessions from April 1 to 12 in 2002,six of them only for exchanging views with a team of Russian experts in the form of question-and-answer,and a total of thirty-six questions being put forward followed by written reply from the Russian experts.The subcommittee required Russia to submit additional data and information concerning certain matters, and went on with the consideration from June 10 to 14 just before expiration of the first term of the Commission on June 15,2002,including considering addi-tional data submitted by Russia on May 15.In order to get the latest data on seismic track line,multi-wave channel seismic and strip depth,the DOALOS had also arranged for the Commission to visit Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory①Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamont%E2% 80%93Doherty_Earth_Observatory,1 May 2012.in the U.S.and compare them with SCICEX/99②Suzette V.Suarez,The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf-Legal Aspects of their Establishment,Berlin/Heidelberg/New York:Springer Press Ltd.,2008,p.193.data from the U.S. Scientific Ice Expeditions project.③SCICEX(Science Ice Exercise),at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCICEX and http:// nsidc.org/scicex/,1 May 2012.Recommendations from the subcommittee were completed on June 14,2002 and submitted to the Commission’s 11thsession held from June 24 to 28,2002.After the settlement on procedural matters related to Russian members’involvement in consideration in accordance with relevant legal procedures set by article 5 of Annex II to the Convention,the Commission continued to consider recommendations by the subcommittee on Russia’s submission in a closed session.Mr.Carrera,chairman of the subcommittee,introduced the work of the subcommittee and its recommendations. The Commission’s recommendations based on certain amendments after consultation were unanimously adopted on May 27,2002,and were passed on to the UN Secretary-General and Russia in writing according to the Convention.

D.Brief Summary of Recom mendations on Russia’s Submission by the Com mission

Compared with the recommendations on Australia’s submission,④See Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Australia on 15 November 2004,recommendations adopted by CLCS on 9 April 2008,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_ new/submissions_files/aus04/aus_summary_of_recommendations.pdf,1 May 2012both the Commission and the UN Secretary-General addressed Russia’s submission in a very low-profile manner.The Commission has not worked out a more complete summary of recommendations on Russia’s submission for the public so far,⑤See CLCS/60,paragraph 59,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N08/523/33/PDF/N0852333.pdf?OpenElement,1 May 2012.while the UN Secretary-General has merely summarized the recommendations into an extremely brief,conclusive version submitted to the 57thsession of the UN General Assembly as Addendum to the Report of the Secre-tary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea(hereinafter as the“Addendum”)①See Oceans and the law of the sea/Report of the Secretary-General*Addendum(A/57/ 57/Add.1),paragraphs 38～41,at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/SG2002Oceansan dthelawoftheseareport.pdf,1 May 2012.for publicity.The reasons might be as follows:firstly,as the first and an essentially fruitless case considered by the Commission,it seems better not to trumpet it;secondly,the outstanding disputes are extraordinarily sensitive to other stakeholders,and the UN avoided stirring up more trouble in the international community;thirdly,frustrated Russia was unwilling to make the international community more informed of the core contents of its submission in order to avoid negative effects on its resubmission;finally,because the Commission dealt with scientific data in a tentative manner due to the absence of any precedent,it would be more appropriate to publicize the contents and range concerned carefully.

The Addendum,with a brief introduction to the consideration on Russia’s submission on its front page,pointed out that the Commission’s recommendations contained results of its deliberations on data and information submitted by Russia,specifically mentioning Russia’s rights on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm and whether formula and constraint lines set by article 76 of the Convention had been applied.As to the Barents Sea and the Bering Sea,the Commission recommended that Russia,upon entry into force of the maritime boundary agreements with Norway in the Barents Sea and with the U.S.in the Bering Sea,transmit the charts and coordinates of delimitation lines to the Commission as they would represent Russia’s outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nm in these two seas.②Paragraph 2 in rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure reads:“Pursuant to article 84 of the Convention,in the case of delimitation on continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts,charts and/or coordinates describing the lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 83 of the Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.Regarding the Sea of Okhotsk,the Commission recommended that Russia make a well-documented,partial submission for its extended continental shelf in the northern part of that sea,stating that this partial submission shall not prejudice questions relating to delimitation of boundaries between States in the south for which a submission might subsequently be made,and do its best to effect an agreement with Japan in accordance with paragraph 4 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.As regards the Central Arctic Ocean,the Commission recommended thatRussia present a revised submission in respect of its extended continental shelf based on the findings contained in the recommendations.Apparently,the Commission found that the data provided by Russia were insufficient to prove that there is a natural link between the Russian landmass and its related claims.In addition,there is on mention of any other State here,which means that there was no direct connection between the part of submission concerning this water with any territorial or maritime disputes in the sense of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

In the event that a coastal State disagrees with the Commission’s recommendations,both the Convention and the Rules of Procedure allow the coastal State to resubmit a revised or new submission to the Commission within a reasonable time.①Paragraph 4 in rule 53 of the Rules of Procedure reads:“In the case of disagreement by the coastal State with the recommendations of the Commission,the coastal State shall,in accordance with article 8 of Annex II to the Convention,make a revised or new submission to the Commission within a reasonable time.”Article 5 in Annex II to the Convention reads:“In the case of disagreement by the coastal State with the recommendations of the Commission,the coastal State shall,within a reasonable time,make a revised or new submission to the Commission.”However,the term“reasonable time”is not defined,nor is the deadline for a coastal State to have the Commission informed about its objection.There has been no revised or new submission(relative to original submission)from Russia to the Commission so far.On June 3,2003,Russia replied to the Commission’s recommendations in a document containing a number of questions and comments yet unpublished,and thus whether Russia agreed to the Commission’s recommendations is unknown.The subcommittee considering Russia’s submissions prepared a written reply,while the Commission agreed with the content and the method adopted and subsequently transferred it to Russia.②See CLCS/39,paragraph 20,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N04/359/63/PDF/N0435963.pdf?OpenElement,1 May 2012.At this point,the first phase of Russia’s submission(2001 Submission)came to an end.

Ⅲ.Overview of Russia’s 2001 Submission

As stipulated,the executive summary of coastal States’submissions should be made publicly available on the official website of the DOALOS.Because of the demarcation disputes and scientific data credibility,Russia had on-ly agreed to release part of its information,while the open items and quantity of information is at the lowest level without clear logic,thus leaving a“last resort”impression.In view of this,Russia did not want the public to have a clear understanding of its submission.In stark contrast,the executive summary of Australia’s submission gives the public a clear outline readily available on the official website of the DOALOS.

The information Russia agreed to make public included three charts and five single-pages of text(pages 1～5①See pages 1～5,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ RUS_page1_Arctic.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ rus01/RUS_page2_Arctic.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ files/rus01/RUS_page3_Pacific.pdf,http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page4_Pacific.pdf and http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/ submissions_files/rus01/RUS_page5_Legend.pdf,1 May 2012.).The three charts include Russia’s general outer limit of the continental shelf②See the map at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_ CLCS_01_2001_LOS_1.jpg,1 May 2012.and two individual ones in the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean(see Fig.3,Fig.4).It is noteworthy that the three charts are drawn in different ways,and with different colors and legends, which,listed together,seem to be unconventional.By contrast,all of Australia’s charts of the same nature were drawn in a unified approach.Page 1 of Russia’s executive summary is a short description of the abbreviations and symbols employed in the summary and the proposed limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean;page 2 provides the information of thirty-two fixed points which determine Russia’s proposed outer limits in the Arctic Ocean (more detailed);page 3 reflects the information of twenty-one fixed points which determine Russia’s proposed outer limits in the Bering Sea(more simple,with only longitude and latitude coordinates),followed by apparently inconsistent wording on the front of the page;③For example,the first paragraph on this page reads,“The outer limit of continental shelf in Arctic Ocean is shown on map 3…”,but map 3 in the executive summary is the chart for Northwest Pacific.page 4 is a brief description of Russia’s proposed continental shelf limits in the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk(without any coordinate information on the fixed points);page 5 is only a list of legends to the three charts without further reference value.Apparently,these five pages are coarsely clipped and scraped together from the executive summary of Russia’s submission and charts,with obvious problems in wording,logical order,and extent of coverage by the contents of a single page,a-mongst other issues.

Due to the Commission’s strict internal rules of confidentiality,①Article 2(1)in Annex II to the Rules of Procedure reads:“The coastal State making a submission may classify as confidential any data and other material,not otherwise publicly available,that it submits in accordance with rule 45…;article 2(3)reads:“Confidential material so classified by the coastal State shall remain confidential after the consideration of the submission is concluded unless decided otherwise by the Commission with the written consent of the coastal State concerned.”it is impossible for the public to become directly informed on the specific legal and scientific details which Russia cited in its 2001 Submission.This article can only trace the details of Russia’s submission from the reaction of related countries and scholarly writings.②T.Gorski,A Note on Submarine Ridges and Elevations with Special Reference to the Russian Federation and the Arctic Ridges,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol. 40,2009,pp.51～60.

Ⅳ.The Main Issues Related to Russia’s 2001 Submission

A.The Dispute on Maritime Delimitation with Norway in the Barents Sea

The Barents Sea,named after the 16thcentury Dutch explorer W.Barents, is a marginal sea of the Arctic Ocean near the European continent,and is surrounded by the Scandinavian Peninsula,Svalbard,Bear Island,Franz Josef Land,Novaya Zemlya,Kolguyev Island,the Kanin Peninsula and the Kola Peninsula(see Fig.5).The southern part of the sea is a gulf called the White Sea, extending deep into Russia’s mainland.The Barents Sea covers an area of about 1.41 million km2,with an average depth of 229 m,and a maximum depth of 600 m,having a continental shelf of 1.27 million km2in the south,several deep trenches in the center and west,a platform in the north and shoals in the southeast.①Barents Sea,at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/53189/Barents-Sea,1 May 2012.

Norway and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(U.S.S.R.) had delimited part of the maritime boundary between them at Varangerfjord in 1957,but failed to reach agreement on maritime boundary in the Barents Sea. The disputed area is located between a middle line claimed by Norway in the east and a longitude line claimed by Russia in the west.Due to the dispute, Russia’s submission was immediately followed by a moderate note from Norway.②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/NOR,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__NORtext.pdf,1 May 2012.Norway’s note emphasized the following points:firstly,because a large area in the central Barents Sea is beyond 200 nm from Norway’s and Russia’s baselines,pending delimitation on the overlap should be categorized as a maritime dispute in the meaning of rule 5 in Annex I to the Rule of Procedure (Norway submitted two lists of coordinates reflecting Norway’s and Russia’s respective stances on delimitation);secondly,the region is entirely located within the landwards area from the foot of the continental slope,and within the 350-nm limits from the baselines of the two countries;thirdly,according to paragraphs 3,4 and 5 in article 76 of the Convention,the delimitation of this region can be directly settled by an agreement between the two countries withouta technical evaluation by the Commission;fourthly,Norway agreed that the Commission could consider the disputed area in Russia’s submission but without prejudice to the issues of maritime delimitation between Norway and Russia;and finally,the note was submitted upon an agreement with Russia on the relevant issues.

In addition,Norway made a formal submission of its own to the Commission on November 27,2006,①See Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean,the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea,Executive Summary,at http://www.un.org/Depts/ los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf,1 May 2012.involving three parts of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Northeast Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean:Ring in the Barents Sea,western Nansen Basin and Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea.Citing rule 5 in Annex I to the Rules of Procedure,Russia also put forward a note on Norway’s submission requesting that the Commission’s consideration on Norway’s submission be without prejudice to the delimitation between Norway and Russia.②See Russia’s Note,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/ rus_07_00325.pdf,1 May 2012.The Commission’s recommendations on the Barents Sea for Norway are exactly the same as those for Russia:in order to mark the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm for both countries in the Barents Sea, both parties should submit the charts and coordinates of their maritime boundary to the Commission,as soon as the delimitation agreement concluded between them enters into force.③See Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission Made by Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean,the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2006,at http://www.un. org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf,1 May 2012.

Fig.5 Russia-Norway Barents Sea Treaty Line in 2010①

B.The Dispute on Maritime Delimitation with Japan in the Sea of Okhotsk

The Sea of Okhotsk is a marginal sea comprising the northwestern part of the North Pacific Ocean,surrounded by Kamchatka,Kuril Islands,Hokkaido, Karafuto(also known as“Sakhalin Island”)and a section of the coast of east Siberia,and connected to the Sea of Japan by Sakhalin Gulf,Gulf of Tartary and La Pérouse Strait(see Fig.6).The sea is named after Okhotsk,Russia’s first settlement in the Far East.The Sea of Okhotsk covers 1.58 million km2, with a mean depth of 859 m,and a maximum depth of 3,372 m.Its continental shelf in the north and west accounts for about 42%of the total seabed,its continental slope strip in the center about 48%,and the Kuril Basin in the south 9%,with reserves of 1.2 billion tons of oil and 1.5 billion m3of natural gas.

There has been a long-standing dispute focusing on territorial sovereignty of the four northern islands(hereinafter the“Four Islands”)between Russia and Japan in these waters.①Etorofu,Kunashir,Shikotan and Habomai are the southern extension of the Kuril Islands in the Northwest Pacific,with a total area of about 5,000 km2.Japan calls them Northern Territory or Four Northern Islands,while Russia names them South Kuril Islands.They are currently under the control of Russia’s Sakhalin,and the vast majority of their residents are immigrants from various regions of the former U.S.S.R.,which occupied these four islands after World War II.Japan has deemed the occupation illegal,and insists that the sovereignty of the four islands belong to Japan all the time.See Kuril Islands Dispute, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuril_Islands_dispute,1 May 2012.Four Islands connecting Kamchatka in the north, the Sea of Japan in the south,the Sea of Okhotsk in the west and the Pacific O-cean in the east,guard the sea lanes connecting the Sea of Okhotsk with the Pacific Ocean,with important strategic military significance.②During the Cold War,the Sea of Okhotsk was the location of several successful military operations in which the U.S.Navy had monitored undersea communications cable of U. S.S.R.Navy(including Ivy Bells action),and was also where U.S.S.R.Strany Air-defense Forces attacked Flight 007 of ROK Airlines in 1983.Russia takes the Sea of Okhotsk as the shelter for ballistic-missile submarines of its Pacific Fleet by now.Both Japan and Russia began to contend for them in the late 17thcentury.During nearly a hundred years from the mid-19thcentury to the end of World War II,the sovereignty of Kuril Islands including Four Islands was tossed about between Russia (the U.S.S.R.)and Japan by a series of treaties such as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia(also known as“Treaty ofShimoda”)(1855),the Treaty of Saint Petersburg(1875),the Treaty of Portsmouth(1905),the Yalta Agreement(1945),the Potsdam Proclamation(1945) and the San Francisco Peace Treaty(1951).①See Treaty of Shimoda,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Shimoda;Treaty of Saint Petersburg,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Saint_Petersburg_(1875); Treaty of Portsmouth,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Portsmouth;Yalta A-greement,at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c04.html;Potsdam Declaration, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration;Treaty of San Francisco,at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm,1 May 2012.Four Islands is currently under the actual control of Russia.

Losing Four Islands and with Hokkaido alone,Japan would be deprived of almost all of its interests in the Sea of Okhotsk.The limits of the continental shelf proposed in Russia’s submission invaded the coastal waters of Hokkaido and Four Islands by employing base-points and the baseline of Four Islands as a benchmark,thus provoking Japan’s intense challenge.②Michael Sheng-Ti Gau,Third Party Intervention in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Regarding a Submission Involving a Dispute,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,pp.61～79.Japan pointed out that Russia’s submission reflected a procedural flaw due to the presence of sovereignty disputes on Four Islands.Japan requested that the Commission not just refer to charts and ancillary data submitted by Russia,or prejudge the sovereignty disputes between the two countries on Four Islands as well as the delimitation issues on the continental shelf.③See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/JPN,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions _files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__JPNtext.pdf,1 May 2012.Considering paragraph 5(b)in Annex I to the Rules of Procedure and Section 9.1.4(d)in the Guidelines,④Article 5(b)of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure reads:“The submissions made before the Commission and the recommendations approved by the Commission thereon shall not prejudice the position of States which are parties to a land or maritime dispute.”Article 9.1.4.of the Guidelines reads:“The executive summary will contain the following information:…(d)Any disputes as referred to in rule 44 and annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.”Japan believed that Russia ought to inform the Commission of the existing disputes,and should take measures to ensure that its submission would not prejudice the delimitation issues between the two countries.

C.The Dispute on Maritime Delimitation with the U.S.in the Bering Sea and the 1990 U.S.-U.S.S.R.Agreement on Maritime Border

The Bering Sea is the northernmost marginal sea of the Pacific Ocean, with an area of 2.3 million km2,an average depth of 1,636 m and a maximum depth of 4,773 m,connected with the Arctic Ocean by the Bering Strait in the north,and separated from the Pacific Ocean by the Aleutian Islands in the south(see Fig.7).It was named after Danish captain V.Bering who was the first European to discover it in 1728.①Bering Sea,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Sea,1 May 2012.The maritime boundary between the U. S.S.R.and the U.S.in the Chukchi Sea,the Bering Sea and the northern Pacific was determined by an agreement between them in 1990(hereinafter“the 1990 Agreement”),②See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary,at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/USA-RUS1990 MB.PDF,1 May 2012.The agreement was signed by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker on behalf of their governments in Washington on June 1,1990.Russia used to call the boundary line“Shevardnadze Line”.The line moved to USSR side about 200 nm against the medium line,resulting in the fact that an economic zone about 20,000 km2which originally belonged to the U.S.S.R.was transferred to the U.S.in the Bering Sea and the Chukchi Sea.However,the agreement provided that it could only come into effect subject to the approval by their parliaments respectively.and is the longest international maritime border at 1,390 nm.The 1990 Agreement was smoothly adopted by the U.S.Congress within a year without any twists or turns because it was obviously favorable to the U.S.,while it was not ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.However,the foreign ministers of the two governments exchanged a note and agreed to make the 1990 Agreement enter into force in the form of an interim agreement.Since its independence,Russia has believed that the U.S.S.R.suffered a great loss in the 1990 Agreement(delimitation in the Bering Sea not by the medium line),and that it is unfair for Russia to bear the consequences;Russia’s Duma has not ratified the 1990 Agreement.

The reasons behind the scenes for Russia’s taking the boundary set by the 1990 Agreement(hereinafter as“the 1990 Boundary”)uncharacteristically in its submission might be as follows:firstly,realizing the gloomy prospect of getting immediate approval by the Commission in other waters(especially in theSea of Okhotsk and the Central Arctic Ocean),Russia wanted to“borrow”the 1990 Boundary in the Bering Sea as a breakthrough;secondly,the 1990 Agreement entered into force against a provisional agreement,Russia has been inclined to accept it;thirdly,the cost would rise dramatically if another negotiation on delimitation were to be carried out,and the U.S.would not accept Russia’s medium-line precept easily on a second negotiation;fourthly,Russia’s willingness to accept the 1990 Agreement informally was based on the hope that U.S.resistance to Russia’s submission would be minimized;fifthly, Russia’s obfuscation could pave the way to a bargain with the U.S.concerning delimitation on the Bering Sea in the future in order to compensate for the losses caused by the U.S.S.R..However,taking the 1990 Boundary would create an international obligation for Russia to comply with the 1990 Agreement in the manner of following general practice.If the U.S.could prove that Russia complied with the 1990 Agreement based on legal obligation or necessity, Russia would be bound by the agreement.①D.J.Bederman,International Law Frameworks,2nded.,New York:Foundation Press, 2006,pp.16～17.That means Russia would lose the possibility for a“re-delimitation”with the U.S..

The U.S.chuckled to itself on Russia’s taking the 1990 Boundary directly,while losing no opportunity to bring up again the fact that the 1990 Agreement had not been sanctioned by Russia’s Duma,②The U.S.pointed out in its note that,the 1990 Agreement border had been employed in Russia’s submission although Russia’s Duma had not ratified the Agreement in fact.The U.S.also stated that taking this border would be consistent with the common stable expected interests of Russia and the U.S.,and in conformity with article 9 in Annex II to the Convention which provides that the actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.for the following reasons: firstly,although the 1990 Agreement has become effective by means of the exchange of notes,in order to make the maritime boundary between the U.S. and Russia confirmed in international law,the U.S.has been hoping for the Russian Duma’s ratification of the agreement at an early date because there would be a problem on the succession of the treaty in international law due to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.;secondly,the U.S.intimated to Russia that it did not accept Russia’s manner by only mentioning the 1990 Agreement in its submission,and that it hoped Russia could approve it in a formal manner in order to avoid a branch-off in the future;thirdly,the U.S.cannot effectively participate in the delimitation on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm due to itsnon-ratification on the Convention,and is therefore only able to obstruct and exert pressure on Russia’s submission indirectly.

Fig.8 Arctic seabed①

D.The Geological Data in the Central Arctic Ocean and the Disputes with Bordering Countries in This Region

1.Overview of the Seabed Topography of the Arctic

The Arctic seabed(see Fig.8)is split by the Lomonosov Ridge,theα-Mendeleev Ridge and the Gakkel Ridge.The Eurasian Basin,a basin of the Lomonosov Ridge close to Eurasia,is divided into the Nansen Basin and the Fram Basin by the Gakkel Ridge,with an average depth of 3,300～3,700 m, and a maximum depth over 5,499 m.The Amerasian Basin,a basin of the Lomonosov Ridge close to North America,is divided into the Canada Basin and the Makarov Basin by theα-Mendeleev Ridge,with an average depth of 3,000～3,500 m,and a maximum depth over 4,683 m.

The Lomonosov Ridge governing the Arctic Basin is the main underwater ridge of the continental crust in the Arctic Ocean,spanning 1,800 km from Ellesmere Island of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago to the Arctic Point northwards along west longitude 60°,then to Russia’s New Siberian Islands southwards along east longitude 140°,rising 3,300～3,700 m above the seabed with a minimum depth of 954 m.①Lomonosov Ridge,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lomonosov_Ridge,1 May 2012.It has been proven that the Lomonosov Ridge does not possess relevant characteristics of seismic activity described in the Guidance,despite of its volcanic activity.It consists mainly of sedimentary and metamorphic rocks with obscure folds on the surface,and is not part of the global oceanic ridge system.It was first discovered by a U.S.S.R.Arctic exploration crew in 1948 and named after the Russian scientist M.V.Lomonosov.

Theα-Mendeleev Ridge,a ridge system with a total length of 1,500 km and roughly parallel to but smaller than the Lomonosov Ridge,is composed of theαRidge and the Mendeleev Ridge,starting from the northern side of Wrangel Island in the north of Russia to the northeastern side of Ellesmere Island in the north of Canada,and eventually converging with the Lomonosov Ridge. The Mendeleev Ridge,aged about 80 million years,is of relatively low height and gentle slope,and is about 2,000 m below sea level with a minimum depth over the ridge of approximately 800 m.It was discovered in 1948 by a U.S.S. R.high-latitude expedition and named after the Russian scientist D.I.Mendeleev.

The Gakkel Ridge(or Nansen Ridge),stretching from the estuary of Russia’s Lena River to the northern side of Denmark’s Greenland and connecting with the North Atlantic Ridge which crosses Iceland,is about 2,000 km long and roughly parallel to the Lomonosov Ridge.Since there are many cracked rocks,abnormal extensions parallel to the magnetic axis as well as perpendicular transverse fault zones,it is an integral part of the global oceanic ridge system.The ridge was first discovered by a U.S.S.R.polar expedition in 1948 and named after the Russian explorer Y.Y.Gakkel.

The names of the above ridges were all approved by the SCUFN②Undersea Feature Names,at http://www.gebco.net/data_and_products/undersea_feature_names/,1 May 2012.(subcommittee on geographical names and nomenclature of ocean bottom features)of the GEBCO①GEBCO,at http://www.gebco.net/,1 May 2012.(General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans).②International Hydrographic Organization/Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, IHO-IOC GEBCO Gazetteer,at http://www.gebco.net/about_us/meetings_and_minutes/documents/gebco_scufn_15_report.pdf,1 May 2012.After four years of investigation,the US Geological Survey confirmed for the first time in May 2008 that the Arctic Ocean could hold 83 billion barrels of oil and 44 trillion m3of natural gas.③M.Byers,Who Owns the Arctic?Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North,Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.42,2009,p.89.The huge energy reserves in the Arctic Ocean and its growing importance as a military-strategic position have increasingly intensified the contention among the Arctic nations for the Arctic Ocean,which began several hundreds of years ago.

2.The History of Russia’s Contention for the Arctic Ocean With one third of its territory located within the Arctic Circle,Russia has always taken the Arctic as its traditional sphere of influence.As early as the period of Peter the Great,Tsarist Russia organized several investigations on the Arctic collecting relevant geographic and geological information.④During the so-called“Northern Adventure”in the 18thand 19thcenturies,some residents from Tsarist Russia had moved to live in the Arctic.Russia had established 12 large-scale settlements scattered in Alaska by the first half of the 19thcentury before it was sold to the United States in 1867.Following state practice by Canada claiming Arctic waters under the Sector Principle,⑤For the first time in 1907,Canada’s Senator P.Poirier put forward the“Sector Principle”which holds that all land between two meridian lines and the Arctic point should belong to the country whose territory abuts up there.the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.announced“On the Declaration of Soviet Land and Island Territories Located in the Arctic Ocean”(“1926 Decree”)unilaterally on April 15,1926,declaring that the Gore Area(or“the Triangle”)about 1.19 million km2(accounting for 45%of the Arctic Ocean)between the meridian 32°04′35″E and the meridian 168°49′30″W.Fixed by the three points of Kola Peninsula,Chukchi Autonomous Region and North Pole belonged to the U.S.S.R.,which was officially marked on its national map(Russia followed suit after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. with the same marking).⑥L.Timtchenko,The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept:Past And Present,ARCTIC,Vol. 50,1997,pp.29～35,or at http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/arctic/Arctic50-1-29.pdf,1 May 2012.The U.S.S.R.set up research stations on the Arctic ice cap in the 1930s,and encouraged moderate emigration to the Arctic.TheU.S.S.R.discovered the Lomonosov Ridge in 1948,which remains the scientific and historical basis for Russia to claim Arctic territory.

However,the situation came to a significant turning point in 1997.Out of comprehensive consideration of such factors as economy and strategy,Russia did not want to stay outside the Convention.As the Arctic waters in fact have not been demarcated,members to the Convention may only claim such national jurisdiction waters as contiguous zone,EEZ or continental shelf in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.Russia had to sign the Convention in 1997,thus losing the ownership it had unilaterally claimed over the Triangle. There has been censure in Russia stating that joining the Convention was absurd,while the desire for Russia to recover the Triangle is growing with its recovery of national power.Once the Triangle was recovered,Russia would grab most of the oil and gas resources in the Arctic Ocean for its economy,and secure its great-power status by gaining strategic military dominance with its unique geographical advantage.①In recent years,Russia’s strategic living space has been squeezed by the Western States,its estuaries also blocked thereby.Striving for the Arctic Ocean and opening the Arctic sea outlet has become an important consideration for Russia to maintain its strategic security. Once the“Triangle”was taken over again,Russia’s Northern Fleet could easily pass in and out of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific at any time provided that the Arctic Ocean is navigable.Russia has been seeking all means to gain control of the Lomonosov Ridge,the backbone of the Arctic Ocean,and presented its submission on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm to the Commission in 2001 by means of the Sector Principle,to claim the continental shelf beyond 200 nm,mainly comprising the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges in the Arctic,although ultimately in vain because of the adverse recommendations of the Commission.

3.Other Stakeholders’Contentions for the Arctic Ocean

a.Canada

An important principle of acquiring territory in modern international law is“Occupation”,namely discovery and effective preemption over“terra nullius”.During the 18thand 19thcenturies,the U.K.took advantage of its navigation strength to preempt vast amounts of the Arctic regions including Arctic Islands and the Northwest Passage②Northwest Passage,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest_Passage,1 May 2012.followed by non-recognition by the international community.The above so-called“sovereignty”was handed over to Canada by the U.K.in 1880,and became a source by which Canada claims sov-ereignty over parts of the Arctic regions including the Northwest Passage. Canada declared sovereignty over the Arctic in the 1950s but its claim was not recognized by the international community.In addition,there has been a longstanding sovereignty dispute between Canada and the U.S.over the Northwest Passage(the U.S.views it as open waters and an international waterway)and an area of 21,000 km2in the Beaufort Sea.The sovereignty dispute with Denmark over Hans Island,①Hans Island near the Arctic is a small,unsupervised and uninhabited barren knoll measuring 1.3 km2,1,300 m long and 1,200 m wide.If being awarded efficacy in future maritime delimitation,it would be entitled to considerable reserves of oil and gas resources within the surrounding sea-bed.In addition,it has been contended by Denmark,Canada and Russia for control over fairway which is vital for connecting the Nares Strait and the Arctic Ocean.Denmark and Canada tried to make demarcation in the Nares Strait in 1973 but failed,thus causing unresolved sovereignty dispute so far.T.H?yem,former Denmark’s minister for Greenland affairs,visited Hans Island in 1984,planting a flagpole with Danish flag,burying a bottle of brandy at the end of the pole and leaving a note marked“Welcome Denmark”.Since then,Denmark and Canada often carry“banner war”,taking turns landing and declaring sovereignty.Canadian Army landed,planted Canadian flag and buried a bottle of Canadian rye whiskey at the end of the polein 2005.Canadian post-office also pretentiously assigned HOHOHO,a postal code created for the Arctic officially.Conflict concerning Hans Island in recent years appears to upgrade potentially.which is of great significance for future delimitation and waterway control,has existed for nearly forty years(since 1973).

As to the Central Arctic Ocean in Russia’s submission,Canada as a nonmember to the Convention at that time put forward a note of right protection pointing out that,in the absence of further supporting data for analysis,Canada could not determine whether to agree to Russia’s submission,but that the comment should not be construed as consent or acquiescence to Russia’s submission,and also that any recommendations by the Commission should not prejudice delimitation on the continental shelf between Russia and Canada.②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/CAN,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__CANtext.pdf,1 May 2012.The International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean(IBCAO)③IBCAO,at http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/IBCAO_betamap. jpg,1 May 2012.shows that theα -Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges are very close to Canada’s Ellesmere Island from Ace Kashmir.Canada also wants to claim the continental shelf in the Arctic based on the two ridges.Despite a potential problem on overlapping demarcation concerning the two ridges between Canada and Russia,the Commission did not respond in particular to Canada’s note because the geologicalfeatures of the two ridges have not been determined and Canada’s note was of plain wording and avoided mentioning any specifics.In order to prepare its own submission,Canada has put two issues on agenda,namely joining the Convention and collecting seabed data of the Arctic Ocean,after the recommendations of the Commission to Russia’s submission were made.

b.Denmark

Denmark’s contention for the Arctic regions is based mainly on Greenland.Norwegians emigrating to Iceland in AD 982 discovered Greenland,which became a colony of Norway in 1261.Denmark,Sweden and Norway concluded the Kalmar Treaty in 1397 which resulted in a Scandinavian confederation to place Greenland under a condominium.After the collapse of the confederation in 1524,Greenland was transferred to a dual monarchy of Denmark-Norway. Denmark regained Greenland by the Kiel Treaty after the separation between Denmark and Norway in 1814.①See Treaty of Kalmar,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kalmar; Treaty of Kiel,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kiel,1 May 2012.Norway and Denmark faced another rough spot concerning Greenland later on,when the International Court of Justice in the Hague awarded Greenland to Denmark in 1933.Greenland was granted home rule by Denmark on May 1,1979 and an autonomy referendum on November 25,2008 resulted in a transitional regime in which its internal affairs are independent while its foreign affairs,defense and financial-related matters are still in the charge of Denmark after June 21,2009.②Greenland,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland,1 May 2012.In addition,Hans Island in the Nares Strait between Greenland and Ellesmere Island is another bone of contention for Denmark in the Arctic region.

As to the central Arctic Ocean part of Russia’s submission,the note of rights protection presented by Denmark,then a non-member of the Convention,was similar to Canada’s in the sense that Denmark could not propose a comment on Russia’s submission because professional evaluation needs further supporting data,and that non-comment does not mean a consent or acquiescence to Russia’s submission,and further that any recommendations by the Commission should be without prejudice to delimitation on the continental shelf between Russia and Denmark.③See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/DNK,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__DNKtext.pdf,1 May 2012.The IBCAO shows that one bottom of the Lomonosov Ridge is located on the continental shelf of Greenland.It isbased on this point that Denmark attempts to prove that the ridge is a natural prolongation of the continental shelf of Greenland,thus claiming a continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Arctic Ocean.The Commission made no particular response to Denmark’s note just as it did not make a response to Canada’s.In order to make active preparation for its own submission,Denmark has also put the same things on agenda:joining the Convention and collecting seabed data of the Arctic Ocean after the recommendations on Russia’s submission by the Commission.

c.The U.S.

As the U.S.is in an inferior geographical position in the Arctic and unwilling to tolerate losing its Arctic interests to Russia,Canada and other Arctic countries,it has insisted that the Arctic Ocean be international waters.The U. S.Congress adopted the Arctic Research and Policy Act(ARPA)formally in 1984,binding U.S.Arctic scientific research,economic interests and strategic consideration in a form of law.From 1993 to 2000,the U.S.Navy carried out six missions for the Scientific Ice Expeditions(SCICEX)in assisting the U.S. scientific community.The U.S.enacted the SCICEX PhaseⅡScience Plan①SCICEX Phase II Science Plan,at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/scicex_plan.pdf, 1 May 2012.as a follow-up study plan in June 2010 for the purpose of contesting with other Arctic countries and preparing for future competition in the Arctic.

The U.S.was the only country referring to scientific and technical aspects in Russia’s 2001 Submission.In its note submitted to the Commission on February 28,2002,②See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.the U.S.stated its belief that the part of Russia’s submission concerning the claim of Arctic continental shelf had significant defects,the most crucial problem being the nature of geological structure of the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges.In order to pave a way to questioning Russia’s submission,the U.S.’s note pointed out at its front that according to article 76, paragraph 3 of the Convention,oceanic ridges cannot be considered as natural prolongation in the meaning of article 76.That means that if the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges are defined as oceanic ridges,Russia will lose the basis of its claim.The U.S.has strongly put forward relevant evidence to the contrary by means of its technological advantages in the field of marine geology for the purpose of setting obstacles to Russia’s submission.

As to theα-Mendeleev Ridge,the U.S.gave a geological interpretation directly:much geological and physical evidence has indicated that theα-Mendeleev Ridge,thirty-five km thick,is a newly formed volcanic ridge on the oceanic crust from a“hot spot”①A“hot spot”is a magma source rooted in the Earth’s mantle that is persistent for at least a few tens of million of years and intermittently produces volcanoes on the overlying earth’s crust as it drifts across the hot spot during continental drift.where magma overflowed,diffused and accumulated along an axis located in the Amerasian Basin in the Arctic Ocean 120 to 130 million years ago;it is a surface morphology with a single continuous geological characteristic formed through the volcanic mechanism by a hot spot on the oceanic crust.The U.S.has put forward evidence in the form of bathymetric,aeromagnetic,seismic and bedrock data to show that theα-Mendeleev Ridge is not connected to Russia’s mainland:aeromagnetic and bathymetric data show that the ridge goes across the Arctic Ocean,aeromagnetic features disappear at both ends of the continental margin without appearing on the adjacent continental shelf;the rocks found in the ridge are of an oceanic type rather than the more rapidly deposited,typically coarser-grained current-bedded deposits found on continental shelves.Furthermore,all types of bedrock originated from northwestern Canada and were distributed widely in the Amerasian Basin in the Arctic Ocean.Therefore,theα-Mendeleev Ridge is only a volcanic oceanic ridge by marine origin developed on the oceanic crust in the Amerasian Basin rather than part of the continental shelf of any country.This argument was fatal to Russia’s submission because the Guidelines point out that ridges formed by volcanic activity related to crustal movement at hot spot are likely to be oceanic ridges rather than a natural prolongation of the continental shelf.

Regarding the Lomonosov Ridge,the U.S.believes that it is a continental geological structure formed by seafloor spreading and separated from Scandinavia and Russia’s northwestern continental margin,and is an independent topographical feature in the deep part of the Arctic Ocean Basin rather than a product of volcanic activity.It is an oceanic ridge consisting of basalt,and therefore not part of the natural continental margin of Russia or any other countries. The U.S.has also provided a large amount of evidence of rock source found in theα-Mendeleev Ridge.But in recent years,the struggles among various domestic political forces in the U.S.as to whether to ratify the Convention or not,as well as how to maintain U.S.maritime rights and interests in the fu-ture,have not stopped.Currently,the attitude towards the nature of the Lomonosov Ridge by U.S.government-led academics has changed fundamentally, taking a trend arguing that the Lomonosov Ridge has a strong geological connection with the related land mass.This indicates that the U.S.might re-define its interests and strategies in the Arctic waters.

E.Other Issues

With the decline of the socialist bloc headed by the U.S.S.R.and the end of the Cold War,the U.S.has ushered in an era in which it absolutely dominates international affairs.Out of consideration of other interests,the U.S. has not ratified the Convention,thus leading to a serious weakness on its discourse power in the field of delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nm. However,the U.S.is unwilling to lose its interests to any other countries.Facing the first submission in the world,which was put forward by its old rival, the U.S.has launched a strong offensive indirectly with great efforts.In addition to challenging the nature of the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges directly(as aforementioned),the U.S.also referred to relevant provisions of the Guidelines for the purpose of curbing Russia as well as strengthening its own rights to speak to maintain its potential interests.The U.S.pointed out that the Rules of Procedure permit the Commission to consider comments on data contained in an executive summary from other countries as well as any disputes related to a submission.The U.S.put forward a series of objections to Russia’s submission,and the remaining questions were also quite weighty,having the potential to seriously impede any of Russia’s follow-up claims.

1.The Need to Provide Objective Data Sources to Determine the Location of 2500-m Isobath and the Foot of Continental Slope The U.S.’s note stated that there were two pieces of unclear information in Russia’s submission,namely 2500-m isobath and foot of continental slope, which cannot be ignored in any submission.Although the fixed points of 2500-m isobath are not required in an executive summary according to the Guidelines,①See CLCS/11,paragraph 9.1.4,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.the U.S.still worried that such confidential data as 2500-m isobath and foot of continental slope might be inconsistent with those in the topogra-phy database of the IBCAO,①See CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.and therefore it appealed to the Commission to make an objective evaluation on Russia’s fixed points.②The U.S.urged the Commission to make decision based on relevant scientific data,especially open and peer-reviewed scientific literature reports.It also strongly advocated reference to the International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean(IBCOA),because it is a cooperative result contributed by the International Arctic Science Committee(IASC),the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission(IOC),and the International Hydrographic Organization(IHO).If the data in Russia’s 2001 Submission as well as its possible resubmission were significantly different from the internationally recognized data provided by the International Oceanographic Commission(IOC),Russia must employ the internationally accepted data to eliminate this discrepancy.Since the outcome of deliberations on this issue has not been made public,it is unclear whether the 2500-m isobath and the foot of continental slope in Russia’s 2001 Submission could meet the requirements of the Commission’s Guidelines.

2.Absence of the Term“Submarine Ridges”in the Executive Summary of Russia’s 2001 Submission

The U.S.’s note also pointed out that due to the absence of the term“submarine ridges”for Russia to establish the outer limits of continental shelf in its submission,submarine ridges could not be applied for this purpose in Russia’s submission any longer.③See paragraph“SUBMARINE RIDGES”on page 3 of CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__ USAtext.pdf,1 May 2012.The U.S.’s note actually only involved part of the information in the executive summary disclosed upon Russia’s permission,while it is unclear whether submarine ridges were employed in the undisclosed portion and the main body of Russia’s submission.Though the Guidelines require that a description on specifics quoted from article 76 must be contained in a submission,both the Guidelines and the Rules of Procedure do not mention the consequences of an omission.Some scholars④For example,B.Spielman(Notes&Comments Editor of Emory International Law Review),An Evaluation of Russia’s Impending Claim for Continental Shelf Expansion:Why Rule 5 Will Shelve Russia’s Submission,Emory International Law Review,Vol.23, 2009,p.329.including those from the U.S.do not believe that Russia would be in a position to employ the provision(submarine ridges)if it were not employed in its first submission,but this argument is subject to challenge.Russia’s 2001 Submission was unlikely to vi-olate the requirements that the specifics cited from article 76 must be indicated.It indicated only that Russia was unwilling to make them publicly available due to uncertainty of scientific data,lest it incur more criticism.If the“submarine ridges”clause was truly not employed in Russia’s 2001 Submission,the effect should be limited within Russia’s 2001 Submission in which Russia could not claim the continental shelf beyond 200 nm based on submarine ridges,rather than its subsequent submission.

Judging from the charts permitted by Russia for the public,the provision of“submarine elevations”was the most likely to be employed,①M.Benitah,Russia’s Claim in the Arctic and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in UNCLOS, ASIL INSIGHTS,Vol.11,Issue 27,2007,or at http://www.asil.org/insights071108. cfm,1 May 2012.because Russia could claim continental shelf according to 2500-m isobath plus 100 nm free from the restriction set by the 350-nm limits,much in line with Russia’s charts.Although the terms“submarine elevations”and“natural components”are not defined in the Convention,if it deemed the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges as submarine elevations,Russia would provoke a serious condemnation from the world.That might be the true cause for Russia’s unwillingness to release the specifics it cited for public.Should the Commission recognize the Lomonosov Ridge as submarine elevations,it would exert considerable negative impact on future delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm,namely encouraging coastal States to follow Russia’s suit making farfetched submarine topographical structures into submarine elevations,thus undermining the consistency and authority of the Convention and the Guidelines. In addition,the U.S.also pointed out that the Commission has no competence to deal with baselines,regardless of whether or not they comply with international law.The challenge from the U.S.was the greatest,and the questions it posed were also the most difficult ones for Russia to handle.

Ⅴ.The Aftermath of Russia’s 2001 Submission

A.Russia

Russia did not give up its efforts in spite of its frustration on the 2001 Submission,considering the huge potential energy and military interests,its international position and influence in the future.Based on the recommendationsby the Commission on its submission in 2002,Russia has adjusted its direction to the two key issues of maritime delimitation disputes and scientific data.As to maritime delimitation disputes,the Barents Sea Treaty signed in 2010 with Norway cleared the barriers and paved a way for Russia to claim the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in this water successfully and creatively,while there were not many improvements in the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.The problem in the Bering Sea is not serious because the initiative is in the hands of Russia,and it might not be called a problem in some ways.However,the disputes with Japan in the southern Sea of Okhotsk will not be resolved easily for now,and might last for a long period of time.

In the realm of scientific data,most of Russia’s efforts in recent years have been focused on the requirements of the Guidelines,namely that it must find the continental margin based on prolongation by providing the turning point of continental slope,slope area,2500-M isobath and 1%sediment as well as at least five kinds of data such as single-beam echo,multi-beam echo,bathymetric side-scan sonar,coherent side-scan sonar and seismic reflection.Russia worked out the first topographic map of the Arctic seabed in the world in 2004,began a new round of large-scale Arctic expedition investigating the connection between theα-Mendeleev Ridge and the Siberian continental margin in terms of geology and tectonics in the summer of 2005,and presented its preliminary results to the 2005 AGU(American Geophysical Union)Fall Meeting.①V.D.Kaminsky,V.A.Poselov,V.Y Glebovsky,A.V.Zayonchek and V.V.Butsenko,Geophysical and Geological Study of the Transition Zone between the Mendeleev Rise and the Adjacent Siberian Shelf:Preliminary Results,2005,at http://www.agu.org/meetings/fm05,1 May 2012.Russia carried out the second round of large-scale Arctic expedition called“Arktika 2007”②In the expedition,A.Chilingarov,the renowned Arctic expert,former Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Duma,led his expedition team of 50 scientists and took deep-sea submersible MIR-1 and MIR-2 diving to the North Pole on the seafloor of the Arctic up to 4,261 m below the sea level.They had taken back land and ocean biological samples there by manipulating a deep-sea diving robot,and placed a 1-M high titanium Russian flag which could be preserved for about 100 years on the ocean floor.The move had caused an uproar in the international community.in August 2007 as part of its activities in the 2007-2008 IPY(International PolarYear)①International Polar Year(IPY)is planned and carried out jointly by scientists around the world,also known as the“Polar Olympic Games”for scientific expeditions.Only four Years have been organized since 1882 to date,namely 1882—1883,1932—1933,1957—1958 and 2007—2008.The 1957—1958 IPY directly contributed to the birth of the Antarctic Treaty.For historical reasons,China didn’t participate in the first three IPYs.As one of the sponsors for the 4thIPY,China’s government attached great importance to the activity by preparing an action plan,which reflected China’s increasing impact on polar expedition..

In addition,Russia has made a lot of effort in creating an international atmosphere following the Commission’s recommendations on its 2001 Submission in 2002.To cope with the Commission’s questions,Russia held a special international seminar at St.Petersburg in 2003 aiming to promote the implementation of article 76 as well as to discuss issues related to geosciences in the Arctic.In order to mitigate the increasingly tense situation in the Arctic and to open an international dialogue window,Russia held two high-level international forums themed“Arctic:territorial dialogue”in 2010 and 2011 successfully,intending to forge it into a permanent international forum.It is worth mentioning that Russia selected the birthplace of Lomonosov,②Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov(1711—1765),Russia’s encyclopedic scientists,linguists, philosophers and poets,also known as Peter the Great in Russia’s history of science,had founded Russia’s first chemical laboratory in 1748 and first university-University of Moscow in 1755.Arkhangelsk,as the site for the second forum.

In March of 2009,Russia introduced the Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and Beyond③Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and Beyond,at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html,1 May 2012.which clearly defines its interests in the Arctic.The exacting legal and scientific requirements have forced Russia to postpone its resubmission again and again.Based on the 2010 9000-km section survey in the Arctic and the latest data collected for the two ridges in 2011,Russia announced that its evidence for territorial sovereignty in the Arctic had been acquired,and its resubmission might be set in 2012.The move reflected Russia’s strong desire not to be a loser to Canada and Denmark with the same desire for the Arctic.

B.Norway

After a 40-year negotiation,the Treaty Between the Kingdom of Norwayand the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean①The Barents Sea Treaty was signed on September 15,2010 in Murmansk,and was ratified by Norway’s parliament and Russia’s Duma on February 8 and March 25,2011 respectively.At a ceremony on June 7,2011 in Oslo,Norway,Norwaw’s Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr St?re and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov exchanged the text of the treaty which came into effect on May 7,2011.For the English and Russian versions of the treaty,at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf and http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_russisk.pdf respectively,1 May 2012.(hereinafter“the Barents Sea Treaty”)was finally signed in 2010,marking the maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea concerning a disputed area of about 175,000 km2.A single delimitation line for both EEZ and continental shelf within 200 nm and for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm was established between Russia and Norway under the treaty(see Fig.5).Eight coordinates defining the delimitation line which divides the disputed area into two parts of roughly the same area are determined by article 1 of the treaty.The fact that the delimitation line has been adjusted by taking Russia’s long coastline into account reflects that non-legal factors can also be given weight in delimitation.②The two countries referred to the Black Sea Demarcation Case in 2009,which gave more consideration on the coastline of disputed area.See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.Ukraine),Judgment of 3 February 2009,paragraph 77～78,at http://www. icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf,1 May 2012.The Barents Sea Treaty has a unique feature in international law:a small portion in which Russia exercises its sovereign rights to the east of demarcation line is actually within Norway’s 200-nm limit and outside that of Russia.The case that the sovereign rights of one nation by origin can be moved into the jurisdiction of another country by surpassing international law reflects once again that international law is characteristically soft law resulting from the coordinated will of the international community.The Barents Sea Treaty has not only cleared the demarcation obstacles for the two countries,but also set a new model for the settlement of maritime disputes between countries around the world,especially for the disputes related to delimitation on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.

C.Japan

The dispute on territorial sovereignty over Four Islands,which is a direct impact of the delimitation between Russia and Japan in the southern Sea of Ok-hotsk,saw a turnaround again in 2004.Putin said that Russia intended to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan under the 1956 U.S.S.R.-Japan Joint Declaration,①See 1956 U.S.S.R.-Japan Joint Declaration,Wikipedia,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Japanese_Joint_Declaration_of_1956,1 May 2012.while Koizumi insisted upon the bottom line set by the 1993 Russo-Japanese Tokyo Declaration,②See Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations,at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n -america/us/q&a/declaration.html,1 May 2012.namely that Four Islands ought to be returned at the same time,thus losing the best opportunity for the settlement of disputes.Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro also put forward a bisector of the area of Four Islands as Russo-Japanese border in 2006,which was ignored by Russia.Instead,Russia passed a nine-year development plan called“Social-Economic Development of Kuril Islands in 2007—2015”costing 17.9 billion rs(ruble)in the same year.Unwilling to admit Russia’s victory,Japan adopted a bill of amendment called“Special Law to Promote Settlement of Problems Concerning the Northern Territories”in 2009,which,for the first time,expressly conferred the status of domestic law to Four Islands by stating that“Japan has sovereignty over Four Islands”,while its annual white paper entitled“The DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2010”also said that Takeshima and Four Islands are Japanese territory.Conflict between Russia and Japan around Four Islands have been escalating since Russia’s former President Dmitry Medvedev visited Kunashir on November 1,2010 as head of state for the first time.Medvedev’s visit highlighted Russia’s tough stance on the issue of Four Islands,not only strongly proclaiming to the international community that Four Islands are an important part of Russia,but also exerting heavy pressure on Japan in order to settle delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the southern Sea of Okhotsk.

D.Denmark

After Russia’s 2001 Submission,Denmark ratified the Convention on November 16,2004,while speeding up its basic work on the submission for the continental shelf.In order to survey seabed and reduce research costs,Denmark and Canada signed a memorandum of understanding to collect seabed data surrounding Ellesmere Island and Greenland jointly on June 27,2005.③T.L.McDorman,The Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm:Law and Politics in the Arctic O-cean,Journal of Transnational Law and Policy,Vol.18,2009,pp.155～193.Denmark’s special projects on the continental shelf include LORITA-1,LOMROG 2007,Spring 2009 and LOMROGⅡ2009.①Expeditions and fieldwork,at http://a76.dk/greenland_uk/north_uk/gr_n_expeditions_ uk/index.html,1 May 2012.Denmark’s Minister of Science and Technology,H.Sander,pointed out that the preliminary investigation had shown that the Lomonosov Ridge is a geological extension of the northern coast of Greenland.②M.Rajabov,Melting Ice and Heated Conflicts:A Multilateral Treaty as a Preferable Settlement for the Arctic Territorial Dispute,Southwestern Journal of International Law, Vol.15,2009,p.427.Beginning in 2010,Denmark’s experts have employed sonar,seismological instruments and global satellite system in their re-expedition to pinpoint the edge of continental shelf of Greenland and the seabed of the Arctic.In order to take precautions against potential military disputes concerning competition for the continental shelf of the Arctic,the Danish parliament passed the Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014 on June 24,2009,③See Danish Defence Agreement,at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Denmark2010-2014English.pdf,1 May 2012.intending to establish its military bases in Greenland for the purpose of strengthening its military force in the Arctic.In order to create an appropriate atmosphere for submission for the continental shelf in the Arctic,the Danish government released the Kingdom of Denmark-Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 on August 22,2011,claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf of the five regions around Faroe Islands and Greenland including the North Pole in totality.In addition,Denmark announced a new position of Arctic Ambassador responsible for coordinating and implementing Denmark’s unique strategy in the Arctic on January 17,2012.In accordance with the 10-year deadline,Denmark is expected to put forward its submission by the end of 2014.

E.Canada

In fact,Canada and Denmark had already begun mapping work under the ice of the Arctic before Russia high-profiledly announced its Arctic sovereignty by planting a flag during its expedition named“Arktika 2007”in April 2007. Since Canada’s Prime Minister S.Harper took office in 2006,his Arctic trip has become an annual tour declaring Canada’s sovereignty.Canada’s government stresses that Canada has sovereignty over the Arctic by making public its latest Arctic policy report-“Canada’s Northern Strategy:Our North,OurHeritage,Our Future”on May 27,2009,and its“Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy”on August 20,2010.In addition,Canada has paid special attention to cooperation with the U.S.on Arctic-related issues in spite of a dispute between the two countries over the ownership of seabed area in the Beaufort Sea.In order to prepare for their future submissions,they carried out three joint Arctic expeditions collecting scientific data of seabed,including the continental shelf of the Arctic,in 2008,2009 and 2010.Canada’s research pointed out that its claim over the eastern region in the Arctic is based on theα-Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges.In light of the 10-year deadline,Canada is expected to make its submission by the end of 2013,as it ratified the Convention on November 7,2003.

F.The U.S.

As the U.S.is the only country that has not ratified the Convention among nations within the Arctic Circle,①158 countries have ratified the Convention.There has been debate on why the U.S.has not ratified the Convention.Some hold the view it is because of the concern about infringing sovereignty,while others think that the U.S.would be asked to pay the fees of mining rights as well as bound to prejudiced jurisdiction on the high seas and weapons-related matters.it can only intervene indirectly in the delimitation contests on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.The U.S.is deeply aware that once it chooses to ratify the Convention to apply for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the future,it will experience at least as much difficulty as it has created for Russia.Therefore,the U.S.established a special working group for the continental shelf in 2003,and carried out three largescale mappings on its so-called“Arctic Ocean Territory”in 2003,2004 and 2007.The Center for Coastal Ocean Mapping(CCOM)and the Joint Hydrographic Center(JHC)in the University of New Hampshire have also drawn three-dimensional topographic maps of the relevant seabed in the Chukchi Sea. On one hand,the U.S.is actively preparing scientific data for what it will do after the Arctic dispute is peacefully settled at last and when it has to ratify the Convention for the limited interests of the Arctic.On the other hand,the U.S. would like to make a profit from other parties’conflict as it did during the World Wars rather than ratifying the Convention soon;that is,take opportunistic action when the other four Arctic countries lose patience and start to fight.In addition,always defying international law,the U.S.has already embarked on preparation in military tactics and domestic law:A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea-power was issued jointly by the U.S.Navy,Coast Guard,and Marine Corps in October 2007 in spite of its non-approval of the Convention;①See A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,at http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf,1 May 2012.former President Bush signed the presidential directives NSPD-66 and HSPD-25 which are the comprehensive exposition of U.S.Arctic policy on January 9, 2009;②See National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, at http://www.arctic.gov/news/2009%20Arctic%20Region%20Policy.pdf,1 May 2012.the Navy Arctic Roadmap formulating policies and strategies of the U. S.Navy for the Arctic region was approved in November 2009;③See U.S.Navy Arctic Roadmap,at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/ 2009/11/us-navy-arctic-roadmap-nov-2009.pdf,1 May 2012.military joint exercises code-named“Occam’s Razor”have been held almost every year since 1993.④Northern Edge,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Edge,1 May 2012.Military deterrence is another tool for the U.S.to deter other countries,including Russia,from claiming the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Arctic.

Ⅵ.The Prospect of Russia’s Future Submission

Due to the constraints from the UN and the Convention,coupled with its weakening influence on international affairs compared with the former U.S.S.R.,Russia cannot keep up with the former U.S.-led NATO which exceeds what is allowed by international law at will in international affairs.It can be speculated that Russia’s future submission will be less likely to break through the framework proposed by the Commission for all of its waters,and as a matter of fact,Russia has been working hard within this framework for nearly ten years.

A.Barents Sea

As mentioned earlier,the Russia-Norway Barents Sea Treaty in 2010 cleared the obstacles for Russia to claim the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Barents Sea,leaving only some minor and procedural matters(such as sub-mitting coordinates and charts,announcing boundaries,etc).Based on the current situation,it seems that Russia has no intention to announce its limits on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in this water separately.It will come up with the limits on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm of other regions as a whole in Russia’s future resubmission upon the consideration by the Commission.

B.Bering Sea

As previously discussed,the direct use of the 1990 Boundary determining the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Bering Sea in Russia’s 2001 Submission reflected that Russia has tended to accept the 1990 Boundary.However,Russia’s claim in the Bering Sea would still be a dispute in the meaning of paragraph 5 in Annex I to the Rules of Procedure as the 1990 Boundary is still a pending boundary with the U.S.In order not to leave room for the U.S.to raise objection on this pretext,Russia’s Duma should ratify the agreement at an appropriate time,which has also been desired by the U.S.as such,the initiative would be on Russia’s side.In this way,it would not be difficult for Russia to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in this water. But if Russia does not employ the 1990 Boundary in its future resubmission, another maritime boundary dispute with the U.S.would definitely arise in the sense of article 5 in Annex I to the Rules of Procedure because that move would demonstrate that Russia itself is unwilling to be bound legally to the 1990 Agreement.Such action would seriously prejudice consideration by the Commission on its revised submission as well as increase the difficulty for delimitation.It is estimated that Russia,facing a strong rival in the U.S.,will act cautiously rather than proceed to re-delimitation without careful consideration.

C.Sea of Okhotsk

The brief summary of recommendations by the Commission implicitly recognized that all the seabed under the Sea of Okhotsk is part of the legal continental shelf in that area.Furthermore,the dispute on Four Islands will not spread to the northern Sea of Okhotsk.Thus,there is no obstacle to Russia putting forward its submission there.The situation in the south is more difficult.The seesaw battle concerning the critical problem on Four Islands between Japan and Russia may lead to a protracted case of delimitation,thus af-fecting Russia’s delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in that area.However,from the current situation,Russia seems to have gradually lost patience with Japan on the protracted conflict,preferring to shelve disputes and preemptively exploit oil and gas resources in the Sea of Okhotsk by virtue of geographical advantages as well as to overawe Japan and to exploit opportunities to delimit.Japan is now in the dock concerning the dispute with Russia in the Sea of Okhotsk due to its geopolitical and military disadvantage coupled with its dispute on Diaoyu Islands with China as well as its less-than-optimistic outcomes on the delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Northwest Pacific.Therefore,it is possible for Russia to settle all of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Sea of Okhotsk subject to possible alterations.Of course,that depends on the contest behind the scenes between Russia and Japan.

D.Central Arctic Ocean

For Russia,the most difficult delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nm is in the Central Arctic Ocean.Firstly,it has to face three strong competitors including Denmark and Canada from the front as well as the U.S.laterally;secondly,collecting geo-scientific evidence calls for great effort;thirdly,in order to cope with the circle of science,international law and the Commission, a positive international atmosphere has to be created.It should be mentioned that Russia’s claim for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in this area would encounter the greatest difficulty,while the potential benefits are the most attractive.

Academics have put forward a variety of schemes for the Arctic such as the Medium-Line approach,the Sector Principle,the Antarctic Treaty①See Antarctic Treaty System,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctic_Treaty_System,1 May 2012.approach,the Svalbard Treaty②See Svalbard Treaty,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svalbard_Treaty,1 May 2012.approach,the military method as well as the Convention approach.Judging from the current situation,taking the Convention approach is the most likely option,while the possibility of relevant countries taking extreme approaches cannot be ruled out because they might prefer ignoring international law due to the temptation of huge profits.According to the provisions in the Convention,claiming for the continental shelf of the Arctic(only possible by Russia,Denmark and Canada)must pass the test of appurtenance at first.①See CLCS/11,paragraph.2.3,at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N99/171/08/IMG/N9917108.pdf?Open Element,1 May 2012.Russia,Denmark and Canada in recent years have been in full swing with Arctic expeditions collecting scientific data which will serve their following submissions possibly from 2012 to 2014.If the Commission only recognizes data from one country,the problem would be simple,with only such follow-up matters as procedure.If the data of two or three countries are recognized,a second problem,namely overlapping delimitation between the relevant countries,might follow.If the matter goes this way,the Commission would basically be free from the bondage.Then the countries concerned must negotiate to reach an agreement and submit their charts and coordinates to be deposited with the UN Secretary-General in order to be recognized by the international community for their limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nm.However, delimitation of the overlapping region is difficult and often protracted.

As no broad consensus within the geo-science circle has been reached on the tectonic history and the geological features of seabed in the Arctic Ocean, only a few scholars have put forward some points based on the expeditions to date.For instance,Australia’s P.Symonds described theα-Mendeleev Ridge as a micro-continent within the vicinity of a continent,its origin and separation from the main continent difficult to define;②P.A.Symonds,Ridge Issues,in P.J.Cook and C.M.Carleron,ed.,Continental Shelf Limits:The Scientific and Legal Interface,New York:Oxford University Press,2000,p. 290.A.Grantz from the U.S.pointed out that the origins of both theα-Mendeleev Ridge and Iceland-Faroe Ridges in the North Atlantic are similar,both formed by the separation between the shelf of deep oceanic crust and the surrounding mainland upon fracture;③A.Grantz,Treatment of Ridges and Borderlands Under Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:the Example of the Arctic Ocean,in M.H.Nordquist, J.N.Moore and T.H.Heidar,ed.,Legal and Scientific Aspects of Continental Shelf Limits,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2004,pp.206～207.Canada’s R.Mac Nab believed that in order to explain the potential form of fracture,one needs to better understand the form of fracture or the deep trench between the end of ridge and the continental margin.④R.Macnab,Submarine Elevations and Ridges:Wild Cards in the Poker Game of UNCLOS Article 76,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.39,2008,p.226.When it comes to the Commission to consider the submissions of the three countries,a conclusion could only be reached by a deep exchange with the geo-science circle,especiallyon whether the geological features of the Lomonosov andα-Mendeleev Ridges are consistent with the norm of“natural prolongation”from the land mass of coastal States.Should an understanding among the three countries be reached in advance,the possibility for the Commission to recognize their claims would be greatly increased.

Is it possible for Russia to employ the mandatory mechanism expressed by article 286①Article 286 of the Convention reads:“Subject to section 3,any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall,where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1,be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.”of the Convention to handle the potential delimitation dispute in the Arctic Ocean?The answer is no,because Russia declared upon its signature on the Convention explicitly that it would not be bound to a decision“related to the delimitation dispute of maritime boundaries by the mandatory procedures”.②Declarations and Statements,at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm#Russian%20Federation%2OUpon%20signature,1 May 2012.Russia is unable to take advantage of this mechanism until it withdraws its reservations.In addition,Russia could not agitate a forced delimitation since Canada,Norway and Denmark have refused to make use of an arbitration court to resolve the disputes on maritime delimitation even if Russia withdraws its reservations.Moreover,a forced delimitation is a passive way which would bring no greater benefits to Russia.

At the international political level,the Arctic Council③Arctic Council,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_Council,1 May 2012.established in 1996 and the Ilulissat Declaration④See The Ilulissat Declaration,at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_ Declaration.pdf,1 May 2012.by the five Arctic countries in 2008 both suggested to the international community that the Arctic belongs to the Arctic countries,while outsiders ought to have no finger in the pie.The Antarctic is relatively calm because of the existence of the Antarctic Treaty,a“hard nail”no one wants to touch.However,due to the absence of a similar Arctic Treaty and extreme reluctance on the part of Arctic countries to increase any further constraint to curb contention for the Arctic,the Convention can only suspend contention for the time being.With future submissions to be put forward by the three countries,the Convention would not be in a position to prevent relevant nations from contending for the Arctic.The above countries share the same strategy to contend for the Arctic,namely a parallel arrangement by legaland military means followed by military deterrence and exploiting the resources in advance in order to prevent other countries from becoming involved,provided that the legal resolution does not work,and then waiting for a chance to make the proper delimitation.

In addition,the U.S.played a decisive role in curbing Russia’s 2001 Submission especially for the central Arctic Ocean.The U.S.’s glacier study project continues for the purpose of preparing for future submission of its own and employing more effective ways to curb the claims of Russia(resubmission), Canada and Denmark upon their submissions concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Arctic.The U.S.will not sit by and watch the three countries carve up the Arctic pie.Therefore,Russia’s resubmission concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Arctic will surely be more difficult and present more variables than its 2001 Submission.

Ⅶ.The Implication of Russia’s Submission for China’s Future Submission

To sum up,Russia’s 2001 Submission failed mainly due to the following three reasons:firstly,Russia’s failure in settling the disputes with stakeholder countries before its submission led to a strong resistance which at least made the Commission unwilling to intervene,lest more international disputes be provoked;secondly,the geo-scientific data provided in its submission,with a wide gap from the requirements of the Guidance,failed to obtain the approval of the international community(especially the Commission);thirdly,its submission, as the first to the Commission,touched the polar regions(Central Arctic O-cean),thus incurring a strong resistance from the international community (mainly the U.S.),which is very sensitive to them.①D.A.Colson,The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf between Neighboring States,The American Society of International Law,Vol.97,2003,pp.91～107.Rather than sitting still on its frustration,Russia has made a great endeavor in adjusting its strategy and actively creating an international atmosphere for its next submissions.

China officially submitted its preliminary information about the outer limits on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the East China Sea on May 11, 2009.The next step is to make a formal submission for the East China Sea and South China Sea.China should take precautions to cope with the Commission, the States parties to the Convention,and its surrounding ocean neighbors from

all aspects.In order to solve the problems on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the East and South China seas successfully,it is imperative for China to mitigate,neutralize and resolve the disputes with its neighboring countries in the two waters.Practice has shown that dealing with all disputes from one approach tends to exact a greater cost.The settlement of disputes in the Barents Sea as well as those for Australia with neighboring countries in its submission has provided valuable legal precedent for China and other countries that are preparing to make a submission.In addition,the overall standardization of a submission containing detailed scientific data and being versed in international law are important pillars to support a submission.To maximize its oceanic rights and interests,China will have a long way to go for its delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 nm,which calls for more flexible measures to deal with the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.

On Russia’s Submission Concerning the Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM

PAN Jun*

Delimitation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm is of far-reaching strategic significance for coastal States on their politics,economy and military affairs,and factors significantly in the new order set by the UN Convention on Law of the Sea.Russia’s 2001 Submission,the first one of this kind considered by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,has acquainted Russia and other coastal States with the complexity and difficulty in their attempts to extend their continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the baseline of the territorial sea under international law.Frustrated,Russia has coordinated with its neighbors in a pragmatic manner and proactively created an international atmosphere,while carrying out further survey for geo-scientific data to prepare its resubmission carefully.The gains and losses of Russia’s submission have provided good lessons on scientific and legal practice for the coastal States,especially for China facing great difficulty in maritime delimitation.

Russia;CLCS;Continental shelf beyond 200 nm;Outer limits; Submission

*潘軍,加利福尼亞大學伯克利分校法學院2012/2013年度高級訪問學者,北京大學法學院2009/2010年度訪問學者,江蘇建筑學院副教授,主要從事國際法、海洋法研究。電子郵箱:pj670805@126.com。基金項目:本文系教育部2009年人文社會科學研究規劃基金項目《基于聯合國海洋法公約框架下中國未來海洋權益的外大陸架法律問題研究》(09YJA820068)資助的階段性成果,作者為該項目主持人。

①《公約》各海洋區域示意圖,下載于http://image.baidu.com/i?tn=baiduimage&ct= 201326592&lm=-1&cl=2&word=%B4%F3%C2%BD%BC%DC,2012年5月1日。

《公約》第76條第8款規定,從測算領海寬度的基線量起200海里以外大陸架界限的信息資料應由沿海國提交根據附件二在公平地區代表制基礎上設立的大陸架界限委員會。《公約》附件二第4條規定:“一個沿海國……應將這種界限的詳情連同支持這種界限的科學和技術資料,盡早提交委員會,而且無論如何應于本公約對該國生效后10年內提出?！?/p>

①圖中陰影區域顯示俄羅斯在巴倫支海和中北冰洋200海里以外大陸架的位置,紅色線為200海里界限,下載于http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_2.jpg,2012年5月1日。

①T.Henriksena and G.Ulfsteinb,Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic:The Barents Sea Treaty,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.42,2011,p.3.

①Sea of Okhotsk,at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/okh.html,1 May 2012.

①Bering Sea,at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/bseamap.html,1 May 2012.

①File:Arctic Ocean bathymetric features.png,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arctic_Ocean_bathymetric_features.png,1 May 2012.

*PAN Jun,senior visiting scholar at Law School of University of California,Berkeley during 2012/2013,visiting scholar at Law School of Peking University during 2009/2010,associate professor at Jiangsu Institute of Architectural Technology,is mainly engaged in the research on international law and the law of the sea.E-mail:pj670805@126.com.This article is one of phased results of a project titled“Legal Study on Outer Continental Shelf for China’s Future Maritime Rights and Interests under the Framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”(Grant No.09 YJA820068),funded by the Ministry of Education, PRC in 2009,and directed by the author.

②See Schematic of marine divisions set by the Convention,at http://image.baidu.com/i? tn=baiduimage&ct=201326592&lm=-1&cl=2&word=%B4%F3%C2%BD%BC% DC,1 May 2012.

①Kuen-chen Fu,Essays on International Law of the Sea,Xiamen:Xiamen University Press,2004,p.283.(in Chinese)

①The shaded area shows the position of Russia’s continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea,while the yellow line is the agreed demarcation line between the U.S.S.R.and the U.S.in 1990.See the map at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs _new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_3.jpg,1 May 2012①The shaded area shows the position of Russia’s continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,while the red line demarks its 200-nm limits.See the map at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_ LOS_2.jpg,1 May 2012.

①T.Henriksena and G.Ulfsteinb,Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic:The Barents Sea Treaty,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.42,2011,p.3.

①Sea of Okhotsk,at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/okh.html,1 May 2012.

①Bering Sea,at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/np/pages/seas/bseamap.html,1 May 2012.

①File:Arctic Ocean bathymetric features.png,at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arctic_Ocean_bathymetric_features.png,1 May 2012.