匯率與房地產泡沫

把經濟放緩完全歸咎于政府是不對的。

有些人過分強調匯率問題。美國對中國貿易赤字的關鍵在于其長期性和結構性。當美國政府財政赤字達到現如今的規模時，我個人認為，美國再把經常賬戶赤字問題歸咎于中國毫無意義。

另一個孤立的問題是，我認為中國的匯率政策加大了通脹壓力帶來的風險，這可能已經體現在諸如房地產和股票的估值上。我能想像到它所產生的重大問題，例如，政策是否加大了房地產和股票價格的泡沫，或者爆發范圍更廣的通貨膨脹。因此，我認為中國讓人民幣升值是個不錯的選擇，但我不認為它會引起貿易赤字的巨大變化。

在北京遏制房地產價格泡沫的同時，歐洲國家也深陷主權債務問題當中，這直接削弱了信貸供應，導致支出被削減。有些證據也向我們表明，美國經濟復蘇正在遠去。隨著中國制造業產品出口市場的疲軟，我認為匯豐銀行的調研應該代表了基本面的真實疲軟。盡管我相信中國的信貸措施是一個促成因素，但我不認為是惟一的因素。

我還要指出，如果真像許多觀察家說的那樣——出現了房地產價格泡沫，不管政府怎么做，最終結果必將是負面的。經濟危機爆發的規模越大，危機維持的時間越長。從這個意義上說，把經濟放緩完全歸咎于政府是不對的。

如今，美元的總體趨勢是兌日元下跌，對大多數貨幣也是如此。我相信美聯儲的二次量化寬松政策是導致這一趨勢的重要因素之一。即使不考慮量化寬松政策，想想美國龐大的貿易赤字，美元的貶值也是一種必要的長期調整。不過，我不認為美聯儲的主要目的是讓美元貶值。如果其他國家也以貨幣擴張來應對，我認為這不會刺激到包括美聯儲在內的決策者。

阻止美元-人民幣匯率發生重大變化的做法不可持續，美國的量化寬松再一次加強了它的不可持續性。如果中國想維持匯率不變，那中國國內的通脹壓力將變得愈發嚴重并具有破壞性。美聯儲的舉動（二次量化寬松）為中國提供了一個重新評估其匯率政策強有力的理由。

The importance of the exchange rate has been overemphasized by some people.The key sources of the U.S. trade deficit with China areof a long-term， structural nature.Personally I do not feel it makes much sense for the U.S. to blame China for our current account deficit when our government budget deficit is as large as it is.

There is a separate question as to whether keeping the renminbi cheap is in China's own interests.I think the Chinese exchange rate policy raises a significant risk of pent-up inflation pressure， which may have been manifest up to this point in things like property and stock values.I could imagine this producing significant problems， for example， if the policy has helped fuel a bubble in real estate or stock prices that later collapses， or if inflation breaks out more broadly.So I feel it would be a good idea for China to allow more appreciation ofthe renminbi， but not because I think it will produce a huge change in the trade deficit.

Beijing’s efforts to curb the property price bubble came about the same time as sovereign debt concerns for several European countries， which impaired credit provision and reduced spending directly.We are also seeing evidence that the U.S. economic recovery is sputtering.With the weakening export market for China’s manufactured goods， I suspect that the HSBC survey could be indicating a true weakening of fundamentals.While I believe that the Chinese credit measures were a contributing factor， I would not regard them as the only factor.

I would also point out that， if it is true as many observers claim that there has been a property price bubble， there are eventually going to be negative ramifications of that， no matter what the government does.The size of the ultimate disruption gets bigger the longer it is put off.In that sense， it might also be a mistake to blame the slowdown entirely on the government’s credit measures.

Nowadays， the overall trend of the dollar is down against the yen， as it is down against most currencies. I believe that the anticipation of the recently announced second round of quantitative easing by the U.S.Federal Reserve has been one important factor in that trend. Even apart from quantitative easing， given the large U.S. trade deficit，depreciation of the dollar is a necessary long-run adjustment. However，I do not believe that the Fed's primary intention was to cause a dollar depreciation. If other countries respond with monetary expansions of their own， I do not think that would irritate policy makers within the U.S. Federal Reserve.

The idea of preventing big changes in the dollar-yuan exchange rate has never been sustainable， and quantitative easing makes it even lesssustainable. If China tries to maintain the exchange rate， the inflationary pressures within China will become more significant and damaging. The recent moves by the Federal Reserve provide a strong reason for China to re-evaluate its exchange rate policy.